Contracts and Automation: Exploring the Normativity of Automation in the Context of U.S. Contract Law and E.U. Consumer Protection Directives

• Authors: Barnhizer Daniel
• Languages of publication: EN

Abstracts

EN

Given a choice between two systems of contract rules, a court or legislature may have a normative obligation to adopt the rule that is more susceptible to coding and automation. This paper explores the ramifications of that normative proposition through the lens of multiple contract doctrines that traditionally involve “messy” judgments or multiple interacting judgments regarding which human beings are – arguably – capable of making finely nuanced analyses. Using the common law doctrine of unconscionability and Polish Civil Code Article 385 on unfair terms in consumer contracts, this paper explores the differences between contract rules that require human analysis versus those that can be applied with strong reliability by automated processes. Finally, the paper analyzes some of the potential pitfalls of this normative proposition in light of technological, economic, and moral/ethical concerns.

FR

En donnant le choix entre deux systèmes de règles contractuelles, un tribunal ou une législature peut avoir l'obligation normative d'adopter une règle qui est plus susceptible de codification et d’automatisation. Cet article analyse les conséquences de cette proposition normative à travers des différentes doctrines contractuelles qui impliquent traditionnellement des jugements “désordonnés” ou des jugements multiples dépendant de la profondeur de l’analyse. En faisant la référence à la doctrine de “common law” de l’inconscience et à l’article 385 de Code Civil polonais concernant les clauses contractuelles abusives dans les contrats conclus avec les consommateurs, cet article explore les différences entre les règles contractuelles qui exigent une analyse humaine et celles qui peuvent être appliquées avec une grande fiabilité par des processus automatisés. Enfin, le document analyse certaines difficultés potentiels de cette proposition normative à la lumière des préoccupations technologiques, économiques et morales / éthiques.

Keywords

EN

contract automation; unconscionability; consumer protection; dispute resolution

• Publisher: Uniwersytet Warszawski. Wydział Nauk Ekonomicznych
• Journal: Yearbook of Antitrust and Regulatory Studies
• Year: 2016
• Volume: 9(14)
• Pages: 15-42

Dates

published

2016-12-31

printed

2016-12-31

Contributors

author

Barnhizer Daniel

• Professor of Law, Michigan State University College of Law, Bradford Stone Faculty Scholar

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Identifiers

ISSN

1689-9024

DOI

10.7172/1689-9024.YARS.2016.9.14.1