PL EN


2016 | Tom: 6 | Numer: 1 | 223-237
Article title

Odpowiedź Lowe’a na argument Ramseya przeciwko rozróżnieniu uniwersalia–indywidua

Authors
Content
Title variants
EN
The answer of Lowe to Ramsey’s argument against the distinction universal vs. indivi- dual
Languages of publication
PL
Abstracts
EN
At the beginning of this article Ramsey’s argumentation against universal‐particular distinction is presented. It is based on the assumption that this division requires another one: namely, subject‐predicate distinction. This argumentation was a starting point for Lowe, who does not respect the aforementioned assumption. In his theory, there are not two but four categories, namely: substantial universals, non‐substantial universals, substantial particulars, and non‐substantial particulars. Two of these categories are categories of universals; the other two are categories of particulars. Lowe tries to de ne categories in an ontological way, that is, with essential use of ontological notions. These notions are rigid and non‐rigid existential de‐ pendence, which are themselves de ned in terms of necessity and existence. The contribution of this paper is an analysis of Lowe’s solution. In the rst place, it is con onted with Ramsey remarks. Then other objections are considered. Some of them do not respect the very idea of autonomous ‘ontological way’ in philosophy. Others concern Lowe’s particular version of it. Possible answers to all of these objections are presented, such that Lowe’s theory is defended. However, there is no ultimate conclusion here. In the author’s opinion autonomy and the value of ontology cannot be shown om a purely external position. We should rst assume that this discipline does make sense and then explore its virtues by using its notions.
Year
Volume
Issue
Pages
223-237
Physical description
Dates
published
2016
Contributors
author
  • Uniwersytet Jagielloński w Krakowie
References
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Document Type
Publication order reference
Identifiers
YADDA identifier
bwmeta1.element.desklight-76080403-5e8f-486b-8228-537ffa6ced66
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