Design of Regulatory Contracts – Example of the Urban Transport Industry

• Authors: Piechucka Joanna
• Languages of publication: EN

Abstracts

EN

The present article discusses economic issues related to the design of optimal regulatory contracts on the example of the urban public transport industry. It highlights the importance of the design of efficient regulatory contracts in the context of changes facing the urban transportation industry in the European Union. Furthermore, it provides an overview of the main issues put forward in economic literature related to the design of regulatory contracts. It discusses several problems relevant in this context such as informational asymmetries, transaction costs, and regulatory capture. It also comments on a selection of views presented in economic literature dealing with these issues. Finally, the article presents the regulatory framework, contractual practices and characteristics of the French urban public transport industry. France is well known for its long standing tradition of contracting between the State and the private sector in transportation. The analysis of the French example may help to prove useful insights in this regard.

FR

Cet article s’intéresse à la question de la conception de contrats réglementaires optimaux d’un point de vue économique dans le cadre du transport public urbain. Il met en évidence le fait qu’il est important de concevoir des contrats réglementaires efficaces dans le contexte des changements qui ont lieu actuellement dans le secteur du transport urbain dans l'Union Européenne. En outre, l’article fourni un aperçu des principales questions mises en avant dans la littérature économique liée à la conception des contrats réglementaires. Il discute des problèmes qui peuvent survenir dans ce contexte, telles que les asymétries d'information, les coûts de transaction, et la capture réglementaire. Il présente et critique également des arguments avancés dans la littérature économique qui traite ces questions. Enfin, l'article présente le cadre réglementaire, les pratiques contractuelles et les caractéristiques de l'industrie du transport public urbain en France. La France est bien connue pour sa tradition de relations contractuelles entre l'Etat et le secteur privé dans le secteur du transport. L'exemple du transport public urbain en France peut fournir des renseignements utiles à cet égard.

Keywords

EN

contracts; informational asymmetries; regulatory capture; transaction costs; urban public transport

• Publisher: Uniwersytet Warszawski. Wydział Nauk Ekonomicznych
• Journal: Yearbook of Antitrust and Regulatory Studies
• Year: 2016
• Volume: 9(13)
• Pages: 121-140

Dates

published

2016-06-30

printed

2016-06-30

Contributors

author

Piechucka Joanna

• PhD candidate, Paris School of Economics - Université Paris 1 Panthéon Sorbonne, Economist, Microeconomix, tel. [phone]

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Identifiers

ISSN

1689-9024

DOI

10.7172/1689-9024.YARS.2016.9.13.6