“Free riding” as a consequence of an agent’s adjustments to the publicly observed social involvement in the creation of the public good: the results of experimental research

• Authors: Jakubowski Rafał M. , Kuśmierczyk Paweł
• Languages of publication: EN

Abstracts

EN

The paper describes the results of the experiments concerning sequential choices of economic agents, contributing to the creation of the public good. As based on the collected data, a model which explains the agents’ decisions as a function of publicly revealed average social contribution was constructed. Previous experiments and practice have shown that the average contribution of agents falls in the subsequent periods, which is typically explained as a consequence of rising agents’ frustration, resulting from the observation of the non-cooperative behaviour of other community members. The results described in this paper demonstrate that this is only partially true, as the increasing individual willingness to a free-ride is also observed in the situation when participants are misinformed about the growing level of the average social contribution. The paper concludes that an increasing tendency to free-ride is motivated by adjustments to average social contribution, as well as by the individual urge to maximize the short-term payoff.

Keywords

EN

public goods, experiments; free-riding; sequential adjustments

• Publisher: Wyższa Szkoła Bankowa we Wrocławiu
• Journal: Central and Eastern European Journal of Management and Economics (CEEJME)
• Year: 2014
• Volume: 2
• Issue: 1
• Pages: 55-64

Dates

online

2014-03-01

Contributors

author

Jakubowski Rafał M.

• Wrocław School of Banking

author

Kuśmierczyk Paweł

• Wrocław School of Banking

References

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• Jakubowski, R.M.; Kuśmierczyk, P. (2007). Creation of Public Goods and the Problem of “Free Riding”. In: Polszakiewicz, B.; Boehlke, J. (eds.). Ownership and Control in Theory and Practice part 1: 163-184. Toruń: Publishing House of Nicolaus Copernicus University.
• Jakubowski, R.M.; Kuśmierczyk, P. (2008a). Whispering to Lecturers’ Ears, About the Role of Experiments in Contemporary Economics. Research Papers of Wrocław University of Economics 1193: 121-136.
• Jakubowski, R.M.; Kuśmierczyk, P. (2008b). Public Goods and the Problem of “Free Riding” – Experimental Research of the Problem. In: Polszakiewicz, B.; Boehlke, J. (eds.). Economics and Law Vol. 4 called Ownership and Control in Theory and Practice: 101-116. Toruń: Publishing House of Nicolaus Copernicus University.
• Jakubowski, R.M.; Kuśmierczyk, P. (2010). Tendency to „Free Ride” as a Function of Expectations and Adjustments of Economic Agents- Experimental Research. Scientific Papers of the Wrocław School of Banking 18: 177-192.
• Kagel, J.H.; Roth A.E. (ed.) (1995). The Handbook of Experimental Economics. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
• Krawczyk, M. (2012). Experimental Economics. Warsaw: Wolters Kluwer.

Identifiers

ISSN

2353 - 9119