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Journal
2007 | 12 | 1-24
Article title

A justification for Popper’s non-justificationism

Authors
Content
Title variants
Languages of publication
EN
Abstracts
EN
Using the somewhat simple thesis that we can learn from our mistakes despite our fallibility as a basis, Karl Popper developed a non-justificationist epistemology in which knowledge grows through criticizing rather than justifying our theories. However, there is much controversy among philosophers over the validity and feasibility of his non-justificationism. In this paper, I first consider the problem of the bounds of reason which, arising from justificationism, disputes Popper’s non-justificationist epistemology. Then, after examining in turn three views of rationality that are intended to solve this problem, viz. comprehensive rationalism, critical rationalism, and comprehensively critical rationalism, I argue that Popper’s non-justificationism is justified on the ground that it can solve the problem in the form of comprehensively critical rationalism. Finally, I argue that the implementation of such a non-justificationist theory means exposing to criticism various philosophical presuppositions that work against criticism.
Keywords
Journal
Year
Issue
12
Pages
1-24
Physical description
Contributors
author
  • The University of Hong Kong
References
Document Type
Publication order reference
Identifiers
YADDA identifier
bwmeta1.element.desklight-77621ed2-93a6-41c4-82c2-8f617a804920
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