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Journal
2020 | 17 | 66 | 6
Article title

Is Epistemic Safety Threatened by Frankfurt Cases? A Reply to Kelp

Authors
Content
Title variants
Languages of publication
EN
Abstracts
EN
I intend to argue that the counterexamples inspired by the Frankfurt-type cases against the necessity of an epistemic safety condition for knowledge are not plausible. The epistemic safety condition for knowledge is a modal condition recently supported by Sosa (2007) and Pritchard (2015), among others, and can be formulated as follows: (SC) If S knows that p on basis B, then S’s true belief that p could not have easily been false on basis B. I will try to argue that the safety condition, expressed in (SC), is still necessary for knowledge and that, therefore, epistemic safety is not threatened by Frankfurt-type cases. In particular, I want to show that Kelp’s counterexamples are ineffective against (SC).
Journal
Year
Volume
17
Issue
66
Pages
6
Physical description
Dates
published
2020-04
Contributors
  • Centro de Filosofia da Universidade de Lisboa
References
  • Comesaña J. (2013), “Safety and Epistemic Frankfurt Cases,” [in:] Virtuous Thoughts: The Philosophy of Ernest Sosa, J. Turri (ed.), Springer, Dordrecht: 165–178.
  • Engel M. (1992), “Is Epistemic Luck Compatible with Knowledge?,” Southern Journal of Philosophy 30 (2): 59–75.
  • Frankfurt H. (1969), “Alternate Possibilities and Moral Responsibility,” Journal of Philosophy 66 (23): 829–839.
  • Goldman A. (1976), “Discrimination and Perceptual Knowledge,” Journal of Philosophy 73 (20): 771–791.
  • Goldman A. (1979), “What Is Justified Belief?,” [in:] Justification and Knowledge, G.S. Pappas (ed.), D. Reidel Publishing Company, Dordrecht: 1–23.
  • Kelp C. (2009), “Knowledge and Safety,” Journal of Philosophical Research 34: 21–31.
  • Kelp C. (2016), “Epistemic Frankfurt Cases Revisited,” American Philosophical Quarterly, 53 (1): 27–37.
  • Kelp C. (2019), Good Thinking: A Knowledge First Virtue Epistemology, Routledge, New York.
  • Neta R., Rohrbaugh G. (2004), “Luminosity and the Safety of Knowledge,” Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 85 (4): 396–406.
  • Pritchard D. (2005), Epistemic Luck, Oxford University Press, Oxford.
  • Pritchard D. (2015), “Anti-Luck Epistemology and the Gettier Problem,” Philosophical Studies 172 (1): 93–111.
  • Pritchard D. (2016), “Epistemic Risk,” Journal of Philosophy 113 (11): 550–571.
  • Sosa E. (2007), A Virtue Epistemology: Apt Belief and Reflective Knowledge, Volume I, Oxford University Press, Oxford.
Document Type
Publication order reference
Identifiers
ISSN
1733-5566
YADDA identifier
bwmeta1.element.desklight-77e20a92-f897-4e15-a169-fb8f86b3d2ff
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