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Journal
2011 | 28 | 1-7
Article title

What does Kripke mean by "a priori?"

Authors
Content
Title variants
Languages of publication
EN
Abstracts
EN
This paper argues that Kripke's claim that there are contingent a priori truths would be vitiated by a seemingly unorthodox understanding of the term "a priori".
Keywords
Journal
Year
Issue
28
Pages
1-7
Physical description
Contributors
  • University of Puerto Rico, Río Piedras
References
  • Ayer [1946] – A.J. Ayer, Language, Truth, and Logic, Dover, New York 1946.
  • Devitt [2005] – M. Devitt, There is no a priori, [in:] Contemporary Debates in Epistemology, E. Sosa and M. Steup (eds.), Blackwell, Cambridge, MA 2005: 105-115.
  • Hale [1987] – B. Hale, Abstract Objects, Blackwell, Oxford 1987.
  • Hughes [2004] – C. Hughes, Kripke, Oxford University Press, Oxford 2004.
  • Kant [1781/2003] – I. Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, trans. by N. Kemp Smith, Palgrave Macmillan, Houndsmills 1781/2003.
  • Kripke [1980] – S. Kripke, Naming and Necessity, Blackwell, Oxford 1980.
  • Salmon [1988] – N. Salmon, How to measure the standard metre, “Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society” (88) 1988: 193-217.
  • Wittgenstein [1953] – L. Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, Blackwell, Oxford 1953.
Document Type
Publication order reference
Identifiers
YADDA identifier
bwmeta1.element.desklight-790c6b98-6be1-4494-af54-05a028893307
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