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2015 | 24 | 3 | 377–399
Article title

Dynamic Epistemic Logic and Logical Omniscience

Title variants
Languages of publication
EN
Abstracts
EN
Epistemic logics based on the possible worlds semantics suffer from the problem of logical omniscience, whereby agents are described as knowing all logical consequences of what they know, including all tautologies. This problem is doubly challenging: on the one hand, agents should be treated as logically non-omniscient, and on the other hand, as moderately logically competent. Many responses to logical omniscience fail to meet this double challenge because the concepts of knowledge and reasoning are not properly separated. In this paper, I present a dynamic logic of knowledge that models an agent’s epistemic state as it evolves over the course of reasoning. I show that the logic does not sacrifice logical competence on the altar of logical non-omniscience.
Year
Volume
24
Issue
3
Pages
377–399
Physical description
Dates
published
2015-09-01
online
2015-08-18
Contributors
  • University of Aarhus, Jens Chr. Skous Vej 7, DK-8000, Denmark
References
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Document Type
Publication order reference
Identifiers
YADDA identifier
bwmeta1.element.desklight-7995a803-a5a7-4b9b-b2ed-77bea8c5da71
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