Prawda, Sąd, Powiedzenie. Kazimierza Twardowskiego postulat jasności i precyzji wypowiedzi w kontekście odpowiedzialności za przekazywanie informacji

• Authors: Dominik Traczykowski

Title variants

Truth, judgement, dictum. Kazimierz Twardowski’s demand for clarity and precision of statement in the context of responsibility for transmission of information

Abstracts

In this article I would like to reconstruct Kazimierz Twardowski’s views concerning the clarity and precision of statements. On many occasions the founder of the philosophical Lvov- Warsaw School was writing about an unclear, everyday language which, in his opinion, was the main cause of the relativism of truth. In order to solve the problem he recommended to distinguish judgements from statements, and to use clear and precise language which contains sharp definitions. The reconstruction of Twardowski’s views will be supplemented by the context of ethical responsibility for transmission of information, which, in my opinion, is just as important as our willingness to be precise. Taking as example the professional language of teachers’ and doctors’, I am trying to show how two statements, having the same precision, may differ in ethical context.

Keywords

PL

Kazimierz Twardowski, odpowiedzialność, słowo, prawda

• Publisher: Uniwersytet Mikołaja Kopernika w Toruniu. Wydawnictwo UMK
• Journal: Acta Universitatis Nicolai Copernici. Pedagogika
• Year: 2015
• Volume: 31
• Pages: 99-112

Contributors

author

Dominik Traczykowski

• Uniwersytet Kazimierza Wielkiego w Bydgoszczy

Identifiers

DOI

DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.12775/AUNC_PED.2015.006