R&D tax allowance and voluntary information disclosures

• Authors: Białek-Jaworska Anna , Budlewska Renata , Hałatek Eliza

Title variants

PL

Ulga podatkowa na działalność badawczo-rozwojową a dobrowolne ujawnianie informacji

• Languages of publication: EN

Abstracts

EN

Purpose: This paper examines whether the R&D tax allowance in force in Poland since 2016 has increased the voluntary disclosure of information on innovation, R&D, and strategic plans in the management commentary of companies listed on the Warsaw Stock Exchange (WSE). Methodology/approach: First, the Tobit model was used to examine the determinants of recognising development works in a sample of 29,288 observations from 3,406 firms. Second, it uses logit and generalised least squares (GLS) methods to analyse 556 management commentaries from 97 public companies that benefited from the R&D tax allowance between 2016 and 2021. Findings: We show that tax relief increases the probability of recognising development work and disclosing information about patents to signal innovativeness and engagement in R&D. Indebted companies disclose more R&D information and strategic plans. IFRS and advanced management increase disclosures, as opposed to tax planning that uses tax havens or that is supported by more advisors. Companies audited by the Big 4 provide fewer details on R&D outcomes and strategic plans. Research limitations/implications: Extending the sample requires collecting disclosure data based on the wording in management commentaries using text-mining tools. Originality/value: The paper contributes to the literature by identifying that R&D tax allowance influences voluntary R&D information disclosure in management commentaries, especially by smaller companies in debt with larger intangible assets.

PL

Cel: Celem artykułu jest zbadanie, czy wprowadzona w Polsce ulga podatkowa na B+R w 2016 roku zwiększyła dobrowolne ujawnianie informacji na temat innowacji, działalności B+R i planów strategicznych w sprawozdaniach z działalności spółek notowanych na Giełdzie Papierów Wartościowych w Warszawie (GPW). Metodyka/podejście badawcze: Po pierwsze, zbadano za pomocą modelu tobitowego na próbie 29 288 obserwacji 3406 firm determinanty rozpoznania prac rozwojowych w bilansie. Po drugie, wykorzystano logit i uogólnioną metodę najmniejszych kwadratów (GLS) do zbadania 556 sprawozdań z działalności 97 spółek publicznych, korzystających z ulgi na B+R w latach 2016–2021. Wyniki: Wykazano, że ulga zwiększa prawdopodobieństwo rozpoznania prac rozwojowych i ujawnienia informacji o patentach, aby zasygnalizować innowacyjność i zaangażowanie w B+R. Zadłużeni ujawniają więcej informacji o B+R oraz planach strategicznych. MSSF i zaawansowane zarządzanie zwiększają ujawniania, w przeciwieństwie do planowania podatkowego z wykorzystaniem rajów podatkowych lub wspieranych przez więcej doradców. Badani przez wielką czwórkę ujawniają mniej szczegółów o wynikach prac B+R i planach strategicznych. Ograniczenia/implikacje badawcze: Rozszerzenie próby wymaga zebrania danych dotyczących ujawnień opartych na sformułowaniach w komentarzach zarządu przy użyciu narzędzi do eksploracji tekstu. Oryginalność/wartość: Artykuł wnosi wkład do literatury poprzez zidentyfikowanie, że ulga na B+R wpływa na dobrowolne ujawnianie informacji o B+R w sprawozdaniach z działalności, zwłaszcza przez mniejsze firmy zadłużone, posiadające większe wartości niematerialne.

Keywords

EN

R&D; disclosure; innovation; tax allowance; patent applications

PL

B+R; ujawnianie informacji; innowacje; ulga podatkowa; wnioski patentowe

• Publisher: Stowarzyszenie Księgowych w Polsce (SKwP), Zarząd Główny, Rada Naukowa
• Journal: Zeszyty Teoretyczne Rachunkowości
• Year: 2024
• Issue: 48(2)
• Pages: 9-36

Contributors

author

Białek-Jaworska Anna

• University of Warsaw, Faculty of Economic Sciences, Innovation and Development Department

author

Budlewska Renata

• University of Warsaw, Faculty of Economic Sciences, Ministry of Finance

author

Hałatek Eliza

• University of Warsaw, Faculty of Economic Sciences, Innovation and Development Department

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