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2019 | 26/3 | 51-61

Article title

Wspólna struktura ludzkich dociekań w pragmatyce komunikacji prawniczej


Title variants

The common structure of human inquiry in the pragmatics of legal communication

Languages of publication



A lawyer who wants to go beyond matrix thinking must develop some mental and practical agility. Understanding and applying John Dewey's experimental logic allows this agility to be achieved. His concept of experimental logic assumes that creativity and subjectivity are the foundation of the functioning of a complex system of legal institutions. Dewey introduces the concept of a common structure or pattern of human inquiry, which remains largely the same regardless of the issue to which it is applied. The pragmatic pattern of legal reasoning is therefore based on a more general pattern of human reasoning. The purpose of the article is to discuss this concept and to present its assumptions in relation to legal reasoning and legal communication.





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  • University of Warsaw


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