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2009 | 74 | 2 | 45-61

Article title

Starania Polski o przyjęcie planu Rapackiego w Szwecji, Danii i Norwegii w latach 1957–1960

Title variants

EN
Poland’s attempts to have Rapacki’s plan accepted in Sweden, Denmark and Norway in the years 1957–1960

Languages of publication

PL

Abstracts

EN
In the autumn of 1957 at the 12th Session of the General Assembly of the United Nations the Polish Foreign Secretary Adam Rapacki presented the proposal of creating the zone free from nuclear weapons in Poland and both German states. The proposal met with great interest also in Scandinavian countries, which on the one hand supported the initiatives of the Nordic integration. On the other hand, they were not unanimous as far as their common stand in the international relations was concerned. Denmark and Norway belonged to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, while Sweden continued the policy of neutrality and no alliances. The reactions to the proposal of the Polish minister were cautious. Despite the fact that the USA did not comment the Polish minister’s address, the Polish party expressed their satisfaction as the most important aim had been achieved – the discussion was induced in favourable time, confirming the willingness to continue the policy of détente. In the same way the plan was supported by other countries of the Eastern Bloc – the German Democratic Republic and Czechoslovakia. In such an ambience the first reactions of the Scandinavian countries were expected. In Sweden the problem of disarmament was vividly discussed, which reflected a visible and strong trend in the public life there. Actions promoting peace initiatives were organized. The pacifist movement was becoming more and more popular. On account of those facts, Poland hoped Sweden to accept Rapacki’s proposal. According to the Polish ambassador, Prime Minister Tage Erlander was to consider the plan interesting and logical. Nonetheless, the Swedish government failed to take a stand on the issue. Neither politicians nor the press paid much attention to Rapacki’s address, waiting for the official stand of the government. According to Swedish politicians, Rapacki’s plan was interesting but its future depended on superpowers. Sweden advocated the initiative to discuss the proposal on the international level and declared to take part in it. In Denmark the reaction to Adam Rapacki’s proposal met with various opinions. From some point in time Social Democrats manifested a very positive viewpoint concerning the creation of the nuclear-free zone which would include Poland, Czechoslovakia, Germany, Denmark and Norway. Nevertheless, with time it became obvious that the concept of involving Denmark had little chance to succeed as it would complicate relations with the allies. It was widely thought that the initiative had been inspired by the Soviet Union. Undoubtedly, the stand of the Danish government depended on the opinions of the superpowers. Prime Minister H. C. Hansen emphasized many times that meetings at the highest level would be necessary, but the initiative was constructive and worth talking about. The Prime Minister was cautious and did not attach much significance to the plans. The visit of the Danish Foreign Secretary J. O. Krag in Poland in September 1959 did not change the stand Denmark had on the issue. He was the first minister from the countries belonging to the NATO to visit Poland officially. The meeting was a further step to strengthen the Polish-Danish cooperation in many fields, but it did not bring any solutions for Rapacki’s proposal. Neither did the return visit paid by the minister A. Rapacki in Denmark on 7–10 June 1960. Norway accepted the words of the minister Rapacki with attention. The cautious stand of the Norwegian government and doubts concerning the Polish origin of the proposal were connected with bad Norwegian-Soviet relations at that time, which were caused by incidents on the border and the Soviet criticism of the Norwegian involvement in equipping the army with short-range missiles. The Polish proposal was important as it constituted a starting point in the discussion about the condition of the international security. However, according to Norwegian politicians it was too general. It was stated that in the current shape the plan could not be accepted, but it could be a basis for further talks. Rapacki’s visits in Oslo in 1958 and the minister H. Lange’s visits in Poland in 1959 concerned mainly economic issues and the cooperation in the field of culture. They did not change the Norwegian government’s stand on the issue. Exacerbating the international situation, the Berlin and Cuban crises led to resigning from the plan of Adam Rapacki despite its other versions presented later by Poland. The Scandinavian Social-Democratic parties were interested in the plan, particularly in its initial stage, despite the fact that it did not concern directly any of the Scandinavian countries. The positive attitude of politicians and the press came from the rising interest of the Scandinavian societies in the problem of reducing nuclear armament. However, the final decision was influenced by the superpowers with which the Nordic countries were connected through belonging to the NATO (Denmark, Norway) or through continuing the policy of neutrality (Sweden). Polish politicians had to realize that the reaction to Rapacki’s proposal would be dependent on many factors and no Scandinavian country would lead to the conflict of interests, which would arise due to the explicit support given to the plan. Carrying out the plan would have strengthened the position of the Soviet Union in the Baltic area. Polish attempts to have the plan accepted brought only partial results. One of them was a more and more positive image of Poland in Oslo, Kopenhagen and Stockholm, and, indirectly, a closer cooperation mainly in the economic field.

Keywords

Year

Volume

74

Issue

2

Pages

45-61

Physical description

Contributors

  • Wydział Historyczny, Uniwersytet Gdański

References

Document Type

Publication order reference

Identifiers

YADDA identifier

bwmeta1.element.desklight-8423bdb2-eecb-47b2-a918-969f84be98ac
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