PL EN


2015 | 1 | 264-273
Article title

Human Rights and the Debate on Legal Positivism

Title variants
Languages of publication
EN
Abstracts
EN
This paper presents human rights in connection with the dispute between legal posi-tivism and legal non-positivism. The importance of this topic can be evaluated by the debate that took place between Hart and Dworkin. Indeed, much of Dworkin’s work can be considered a reaction to Hart’s positivism. The presented study argues for the defense of the thesis that in order to understand such a debate it is important to take a position between moral noncognitivism and moral cognitivism. The hypothesis is that legal positivism does depend on the non plausibility of strong moral cognitivism. There-fore, only based on strong moral cognitivism would it be consistent to sustain the typi-cal non-positivistic thesis of the necessary connection between law and morality. Human rights are in the center of this debate because they constitute the core of the current morality, especially the most important core of justice.
Contributors
  • Lawschool at Universidade Federal de Santa Catarina
References
Document Type
Publication order reference
Identifiers
YADDA identifier
bwmeta1.element.desklight-862796d4-cdf9-4ef2-9684-246a7e3e22b4
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