Causation and Intensionality in Aristotelian Logic

• Authors: Srećko Kovač
• Languages of publication: EN

Abstracts

EN

We want to show that Aristotle’s general conception of syllogism includes as its essential part the logical concept of necessity, which can be understood in a causal way. This logical conception of causality is more general then the conception of the causality in the Aristotelian theory of proof (“demonstrative syllogism”), which contains the causal account of knowledge and science outside formal logic. Aristotle’s syllogistic is described in a purely intensional way, without recourse to a set-theoretical formal semantics. It is shown that the conclusion of a syllogism is justified by the accumulation of logical causes applied during the reasoning process. It is also indicated that logical principles as well as the logical concept of causality have a fundamental ontological role in Aristotle’s “first philosophy”.

Keywords

EN

Aristotle; syllogism; proof; necessity; cause; intension

PL

Arystoteles; syllogizm; dowód; konieczność; przyczyna; intensja

• Publisher: Uniwersytet Kardynała Stefana Wyszyńskiego w Warszawie
• Journal: Studia Philosophiae Christianae
• Year: 2013
• Volume: 49
• Issue: 2
• Pages: 117-136

Contributors

author

Srećko Kovač

• University of Zagreb, Institute of Philosophy, Croatia