Two Criticisms against Mathematical Realism

• Authors: Park Seungbae
• Languages of publication: PL

Abstracts

EN

Mathematical realism asserts that mathematical objects exist in the abstract world, and that a mathematical sentence is true or false, depending on whether the abstract world is as the mathematical sentence says it is. I raise two objections against mathematical realism. First, the abstract world is queer in that it allows for contradictory states of affairs. Second, mathematical realism does not have a theoretical resource to explain why a sentence about a tricle is true or false. A tricle is an object that changes its shape from a triangle to a circle, and then back to a triangle with every second.

Keywords

EN

Abstract World; Concrete World; Mathematical Realism; Mathematical Object; Tricle

• Publisher: Instytut Filozofii - Uniwersytet Jagielloński
• Journal: Diametros
• Year: 2017
• Issue: 52
• Pages: 96-106

Dates

published

2017-06

Contributors

author

Park Seungbae

• Ulsan National Institute of Science and Technology

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Identifiers

DOI

10.13153/diam.52.2017.1061