PL EN


Journal
2014 | 22 | 4(88) | 71-90
Article title

Teza Lowe'a w świetle semantyki Lowe'a

Title variants
EN
Lowe’s Thesis in Light of Lowe’s Semantics
Languages of publication
PL
Abstracts
EN
Lowe’s thesis (essential for his argument against identity theory) is the claim that if not all neurons had behaved the way they actually did, the arm would have risen anyway. Lowe’s argument for the thesis depends on a controversial delimitation of the class of the closest possible worlds (on Lewis’ semantics). I show how one could use Lowe’s semantics in the evaluation of Lowe’s thesis. I demonstrate that a weaker version of the principle of the simplification of disjunctive antecedents holds on this semantics. One can use the principle to argue for or against Lowe’s thesis. On Lowe’s semantics, the debate between defenders and opponents of Lowe’s thesis in fact mimics the standstill concerning the question which possible worlds are the closest to the actual world on Lewis’ semantics. However, Lowe’s semantics offers a way out of the impasse. I argue that the opponents of Lowe’s thesis are ultimately at an advantage.
Journal
Year
Volume
22
Issue
Pages
71-90
Physical description
Contributors
  • Zakład Epistemologii, Instytut Filozofii, Uniwersytet Warszawski, ul. Krakowskie Przedmieście 3, 00-927 Warszawa
References
  • Jackson F. (1977), A Causal Theory of Counterfactuals, „Australasian Journal of Philosophy” 55(1), 3-21.
  • Lewis D. (1973), Counterfactuals, Cambridge (MA): Harvard University Press.
  • Lewis D. (1986), Counterfactual Dependence and Time’s Arrow [w:] Philosophical Papers, t. 2, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 32-66.
  • Lowe E. (1983), A Simplification of the Logic of Conditionals, „Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic” 24(3), 357-366.
  • Lowe E. (1995), The Truth about Counterfactuals, „The Philosophical Quarterly” 45(178), 41-59.
  • Lowe E. (2006), Non-Cartesian Substance Dualism and the Problem of Mental Causation, „Erkenntnis” 65, 5-23.
  • Lowe E. (2008), Personal Agency. The Metaphysics of Mind and Action, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
  • Paprzycka K. (2013a), Jak obalić Lowe’a obalenie teorii identyczności jednostkowej, czyli co by się stało, gdyby nie wszystkie neurony zachowały się tak, jak się zachowały, „Przegląd Filozoficzny — Nowa Seria” 22(2) [86], 471-491.
  • Paprzycka K. (2013b), O argumentacji Lowe’a na rzecz koncepcji przyczynowości intencjonalnej i fizycznej, „Filozofia Nauki” 21(1) [81], 91-112.
  • Tichý P. (1976), A Counterexample to the Stalnaker-Lewis Analysis of Counterfactuals, „Philosophical Studies” 29(4), 271-273.
Document Type
Publication order reference
Identifiers
YADDA identifier
bwmeta1.element.desklight-8e795a56-ed5c-4a44-bfe2-753918562b79
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