Full-text resources of CEJSH and other databases are now available in the new Library of Science.
Visit https://bibliotekanauki.pl

PL EN


2014 | 2(9) | 108-124

Article title

Obiektywność w prawie – podejście instytucjonalne jako alternatywa dla dominujących stanowisk teoretycznych

Authors

Content

Title variants

EN
Objectivity in law – the institutional approach as an alternative to the dominant theories

Languages of publication

PL

Abstracts

PL
The aim of the paper is to establish a theoretical elaboration of objectivity in law which would conform exiting linguistic practices in the legal field. It starts from a brief characterization of legal practice in this respect which allows for an exposure of semantic complexity of the term ‘objectivity’ in law. The term is said to take two basic meanings: objectivity as a fact and objectivity as a moral ideal. On this ground requirements towards a reliable theory of legal objectivity are defined: such a theory should not only make o room for both distinct meanings of legal objectivity, but also should consider their mutual relations. These requirements stemming from existing linguistic practice serve as criteria for examination of up to date theoretical concepts of objectivity. The paper discusses realistic, conventionalist, and idealistic theories of objectivity in law subsequently and exposes shortcomings of each of these. Eventually, key assumptions of an institutional theory of objectivity are presented which is claimed to offer a plausible understanding of objectivity in law in both its factual and ideal aspects.
EN
The aim of the paper is to establish a theoretical elaboration of objectivity in law which would conform exiting linguistic practices in the legal field. It starts from a brief characterization of legal practice in this respect which allows for an exposure of semantic complexity of the term ‘objectivity’ in law. The term is said to take two basic meanings: objectivity as a fact and objectivity as a moral ideal. On this ground requirements towards a reliable theory of legal objectivity are defined: such a theory should not only make o room for both distinct meanings of legal objectivity, but also should consider their mutual relations. These requirements stemming from existing linguistic practice serve as criteria for examination of up to date theoretical concepts of objectivity. The paper discusses realistic, conventionalist, and idealistic theories of objectivity in law subsequently and exposes shortcomings of each of these. Eventually, key assumptions of an institutional theory of objectivity are presented which is claimed to offer a plausible understanding of objectivity in law in both its factual and ideal aspects.

Year

Volume

Pages

108-124

Physical description

Dates

published
2014-06-01

Contributors

References

Notes

PL

Document Type

Publication order reference

Identifiers

YADDA identifier

bwmeta1.element.desklight-912375d3-4f1c-4c3e-bfbb-6cc00ed5d652
JavaScript is turned off in your web browser. Turn it on to take full advantage of this site, then refresh the page.