PL EN


2013 | 2 | 31-54
Article title

Poznawalność bytu. Parmenides i św. Tomasz z Akwinu

Content
Title variants
EN
Cognoscibility of Being. Case of Parmenides and St. Thomas Aquinas
Languages of publication
PL
Abstracts
EN
According to Parmenides, the only acceptable way of philosophy as true cognition is research of being. The philosophical tradition had taken this track. St. Thomas Aquinas had very little information about Parmenidean ontology, but shared his focus on being as the object of knowledge. However, they had a different understanding of being. Philosopher of Elea claimed that everything is one monistic being. Therefore, every act of cognition has the same object – being. There is only being. Non-being is nothing. It doesn’t exist, so it isn’t cognizable. Moreover, the knowledge of being and being itself are the same. As a consequence, Parmenides described entity in identification to the mind and recognized the essence of being as truth. Therefore, his ontology is called “a veridical conception of being”. According to Aquinas, being is pluralistic. There are many types of entities, minds and truths. The core of every being is act of existence. The truth is property of singular beings or judgements. Thomas metaphysics is existential. The truth, that is here identified with adequation of thing and intellect, and cognoscibility of beings, is interpreted as the consequence of existence. Being, truth and cognoscibility are different things. In comparison with Parmenides, Thomas seems to be more faithful to the “way of being”. He characterizes being as existing and avoids a specific paradox that is inability to define the truth in a classical way, assuming her identity with the entity.
Year
Volume
2
Pages
31-54
Physical description
Contributors
References
Document Type
Publication order reference
Identifiers
ISSN
2300-1976
YADDA identifier
bwmeta1.element.desklight-91434b7e-a2ab-43cb-a29a-64d867358060
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