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TAIWAN: THE HOTSPOT IN THE WESTERN PACIFIC

TAIWAN: PUNKT ZAPALNY NA ZACHODNIM PACYFIKU

Streszczenie: Artykuł dotyczy wciąż nie- rozwiązanej kwestii problematycznego statusu Tajwanu, a w szczególności jego wpływu na bezpieczeństwo w Cieśninie Tajwańskiej co wiąże się z trójstronnymi relacjami pomiędzy Tajwanem, Chinami i Stanami Zjednoczonymi. Omówiono historię prawnego statusu Tajwanu z punktu widzenia „dylematu dwóch Chin”. W dalszej części autor koncentruje się na zainteresowaniu Tajpej, Pekinu i Waszyngtonu Cieśniną Tajwańską, ich interpretacji „polityki jednych Chin” i ich podejściu do kwestii tajwańskiej. Celem tej analizy jest określenie ryzyka konfrontacji w Cieśninie Tajwańskiej.

Słowa kluczowe: Status Tajwanu, polityka jednych Chin, dylemat dwóch Chin, dwuznaczność USA

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Abstract: The article deals with the unresolved question of Taiwan’s problematic status and focuses in particular on its impact on the security in the Taiwan Strait which is related to the character of the triangular relations between Taiwan, the People’s Republic of China and the United States. At first, the article provides an overview of the historical development of Taiwan’s legal status issued from „two Chinas dilemma”. Afterwards, it concentrates on the particular interests of Taipei, Beijing and Washington in the Taiwan Strait, their interpretation of „one China policy” and their approach towards the Taiwan issue. The objective of the analyses is to determine the risk of confrontation in the Taiwan Strait according to different intentions and policies implemented by each of the concerned parties.

Key words: Taiwan’s status, one China policy, cross-strait relations, two Chinas dilemma, American ambiguity

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INTRODUCTION

The Taiwan Strait is considered to be one of the potential conflict zones in the Western Pacific. The disputed status of Taiwan is the source of tensions and suspicion between Beijing and Taipei, however, the situation in the Taiwan Strait is perplexed by the engagement of the third party, the United States of America. Taiwan's status became a sensitive issue in the triangular relations between the People's Republic of China, the Republic of China and the United States. The parties implement different policies towards Taiwan issue in compliance with their own particular interests. The article is based on the hypothesis that the inconsistency in their ambitions provokes instability and magnifies the risk of escalation of tensions into the open conflict. The aim of this article is to provide an overview of different approaches of Taipei, Beijing and Washington towards the Taiwan issue and consequently to assess the impact of these policies on the security in the Taiwan Strait and especially on the risk of confrontation.

TWO CHINAS DILEMMA

The contemporary disputed status of Taiwan is the result of „two Chinas dilemma“ which dates back to the 20th century.

The first one, the Republic of China (ROC), was founded in 1912 by Sun Yat-sen, however, Taiwan was not a part of it at that time. It had been under the direct administration of Japan since 1895 as a result of Chinese defeat in Sino-Japanese war. In 1945 Japan had to renounce on Taiwan as a condition of surrender in the Second World War and thus, China assumed jurisdiction over Taiwan after fifty years of Japanese administration and the relations between the mainland and the island became the internal issue of the ROC. [Chiang, 2004]

The „two Chinas dilemma“ originated from the civil war between the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) headed by Mao Zedong and Chiang Kai-shek's Kuomintang, the governing party of the ROC. The war resulted in the declaration of the People's Republic of China (PRC) in 1949, while the defeated Chiang Kai-shek was forced to flee to Taiwan. The government of the ROC continued to execute its functions from Taipei, which became the oper-

ational base of the Kuomintang. Chiang Kai-shek's aim was to regain control over the overall Chinese territory, while the strategic goal of the CCP was to maintain territorial integrity of the PRC, including Taiwan.

The cross-strait relations entered a new uncertain phase where they did not correspond to neither international relations nor domestic affairs. [Hsieh, 2009] Two governments emerged in China, one in Beijing, another in Taipei, not recognizing each other and both claiming sovereignty over the whole Chinese territory. The PRC perceived itself as the only successor of the ROC which, according to Beijing, ceased to exist after the defeat in the civil war and it considered the government in Taipei to be illegitimate. However, most of the states continued to recognize the ROC, one of the UN founders, for at least three more decades due to the circumstances of the Cold War and the attempt to contain communism.

Nevertheless, in 1970s' the partnership with Beijing became strategically important to rebalance the power of the USSR. The US-affiliated states decided to reevaluate their attitude towards the PRC and in 1971 the UN General Assembly passed the resolution recognizing the PRC as the sole legitimate representative of China. The PRC obtained the seat at the Security Council at the expense of the ROC which was expelled from most of the UN-affiliated agencies. [Carpenter, 2003] Consequently, most of the states suspended official diplomatic relations with the ROC and instead, they recognized the PRC.

Since the PRC admission to the UN, it has been recognized by 171 states while Taiwan preserved its official diplomatic relations with only 23 governments. Hence the Chinese territory has been divided de facto between two republics, both of them claiming shared sovereignty of overall territory, but neither of them executing jurisdiction over the other. [Hsieh, 2009] The core stone of the cross-strait relations is the „one-China principle“ stating that there is only one China and Taiwan is a part of it. Although Beijing, Taipei and Washington have acknowledged the principle, they differ in its interpretation.

THE POLICY OF TAIPEI: ONE CHINA OR INDEPENDENCE?

Taipei's „one China policy“ is based on the belief that although there is only one China, but its legitimate government is located in Taipei. This policy was employed by Chiang Kai-shek who adhered to the vision of regaining control over mainland. The government argued that the ROC had never ceased to exist and it had all signs of statehood including territory, permanent population and effective government capable to enter into international relations, even though its diplomatic activities were limited because of Beijing's pressure. [Hsieh, 2009] Though, after Chiang Kai-shek's death in 1975, the enforcement of the „one China principle“ and the struggle for the recognition of the ROC has been strongly related to progressive liberalization and democratization of the political scene.

The political transformation on Taiwan accelerated in the 1990s' after Lee Teng-hui, the Kuomintang's candidate, was elected the first president with Taiwanese origin. Lee tried to strengthen Taiwanese identity and reform domestic policy in order to establish solid democracy [Just, 2014] which reinforced Beijing's anxiety and Washington's sympathy. He did not adhere to the traditional „one China policy“, and instead, he promoted the vision of two separate states across the Taiwan Strait. He considered the cross-strait relations as a „special state-to-state relations“ and refused the model proposed by the PRC according to which Taiwan would have been politically reunified with the mainland as an entity subordinate to Beijing and deprived of ability to perform on the international scene. [Tucker, 2005]

Lee wanted to improve Taiwan's international position and thus he travelled abroad in order to establish international relations and gain more support for independent Taiwan. The journey to the US in 1995 raised the ire in Beijing which blamed Lee from promoting separatism and demonizing China in his public speeches. [Carpenter, 2005] The PRC's reaction did not get along without military exercise and missile tests near Taiwan. The US responded to Beijing's military provocations by deployment of two aircraft carriers in the strait in order to prevent the outbreak of open violence. The situation resulted into a crisis exasperated by the fact that Chinese and American military forces faced each other.

The crisis of 1995 demonstrated the instability in the Taiwan Strait and the risk of conflict. However, both parties wanted to avoid armed confrontation, therefore, they acknowledged the necessity to improve bilateral communication by the means of specialized agencies established on the both sides of the strait. Negotiations took place between the Association for relations across the Taiwan Strait located in Taipei and the Strait exchange foundation with the seat in Hong Kong. [Hsieh, 2009] These non-governmental negotiations were to avoid false impression of the mutual recognition between Taipei and Beijing.

However, tensions have remained and further culminated after the first political alteration on the Taiwanese political scene in 2000 when Chen Shui-bian from the opposition Democratic Progressive Party [DPP] was elected president. Since then the democratization and the party affiliation of Taiwan's president have determined the nature of the cross-strait relations and the security environment in the Taiwan Strait. Chen refused the „one China principle“ and argued that the island of Taiwan has been independent since 1949 and any attempt to change its status must be approved by referendum. [Saunders, 2005]

Chen's election caused anxiety in Beijing and Washington where he was perceived as an undesirable candidate due to his separatist rhetoric. His policy was based on three controversial principles. First of all, Chen emphasized the necessity to lead a dialogue with Beijing at the basis of equality which, however, would raise Taiwan to the position of a sovereign state. The second principle was based on the peaceful settlement of dispute pursuant to the non-intervention in the internal affairs of a state, which again demonstrates Chen's belief that there are two independent states on the banks of Taiwan Strait and their relationship is subject to international law. Finally, he argues that unification is only one of the options and not a predetermined destiny. [Carpenter, 2005]

In spite of occasional moderate gestures in order to calm tensions and surrender to the US pressure, Chen repeatedly provoked Beijing by promotion of Taiwan's independence and the principle of „one country on each side of strait“. He adopted cultural reforms emphasizing the difference between the Taiwanese and Chinese identity. The reinforced Taiwanese identi-

ty became a pillar of his argument that sovereign Taiwan existed without need to expressly declare its independence. [Saunders, 2005] Moreover, in order to further disavow from the mainland of China, he preferred the designation „Taiwan“ instead of the „ROC“ which he wanted to codify in the new constitution. Beijing perceived Chen’s constitutional attempts as dangerous steps towards de jure independence.

Chen tried to settle the cross-strait dispute in the regional security context and warned East Asian states against the Chinese strengthening military potential. He wanted to convince them that China represents threat not only for Taiwan but also for the regional stability. On the other hand, Beijing stated that Taiwanese separatism was a security threat to the region. During Chen’s presidency, the security environment in the Taiwan Strait faced increased mistrust and unpredictability. Moreover, Beijing suspended negotiations with Taipei until it would acknowledge the „one China principle“. [Chai, 2002] However, it did not happen during Chen’s mandate.

The presidential elections in 2008 and the victory of the Kuomintang’s candidate, Ma Ying-jeou¹, brought a new hope for brighter future in the cross-strait relations. Ma disapproved Chen’s separatist policy and resumed the dialogue with Beijing after a decade of suspension. The renewed cross-strait communication had a positive impact on the reduction of tensions in the strait. His policy is based on the support of status quo and refusal of reunification, independence and use of force. He denies the interstate character of the cross-strait relations and agrees that both banks of Taiwan Strait are part of one China according to the model of „one country, two areas“². Both, the mainland and the island, do not recognize themselves as independent entities, however, they do not reject their governing authorities.

The aim of Ma’s administration is to strengthen security and prosperity in the Taiwan Strait. He seeks to normalize cross-strait relations, to reinforce

¹ President Ma was reelected in 2012 and he will be in office until 2016.

² „One country, two areas“ formula was suggested in 1990s’ pursuant to the theory of divided state and it is based on the distinction between state’s sovereignty and jurisdiction. According to the model, the ROC is comprised of two distinct areas: the free area corresponds to the island of Taiwan and it is directly governed by Taipei, while the rest of the Chinese territory is exempt from the ROC’s jurisdiction despite the claim that both areas underlie Taiwan’s sovereignty. [Hsieh, 2009]

transparency and bring to an end the rivalry with Beijing regarding diplomatic recognition. His diplomacy enables both sides to cooperate with states that maintain diplomatic relations with „the other China“ across the strait. [Kan, Morisson, 2014] He succeeded to improve the position of the island on the international scene in 2009 when Taiwan was granted the status of observer at the World Health Assembly under the name of Chinese Taipei, and thus, participated on the activities of the UN for the first time since its exclusion. [Brezáni, 2009] Taiwan’s current intention is to become an important autonomous actor in the international politics with the ability to influence the regional stability, security and development.

THE POLICY OF BEIJING AND THE RISK OF WAR

The national prestige of the PRC and its regime’s legitimacy are conditioned by its capability to secure sovereignty and territorial integrity. Beijing considers Taiwan as the undeniable part of the PRC’s territory which was at first occupied by imperial Japan and after the civil war by the defeated nationalist party Kuomintang. According to Beijing, the division of China was artificial and in conflict with the national Chinese interest. Since 1970s’, Deng Xiaoping has promoted reunification on the basis of the model „one China, two systems“. [Carpenter, 2005] According to his proposition, Taiwan would benefit certain degree of autonomy and a number of privileges regarding domestic affairs. However, Taiwan did not respond to the proposal as it was refusing the idea of reunification.

Beijing’s policy towards Taiwan has been shaped in the context of China’s peaceful rise, therefore, Beijing emphasized the necessity of peaceful reunification. However, it does not exclude the use force in order to prevent the secession of the island if the other means failed. The government declared that China should never renounce on the military means in order to intimidate Taiwanese separatists from declaring independence. [Kan, 2013]

In 2000 the CCP defined the main principles of its policy towards Taiwan. First of all, the government highlighted the importance of cross-strait dialogue and permitted certain liberalization of „one China, two system“ formula in favour of more international engagement of Taiwan in economic, cultural and social sphere. [Kan, 2013] Beijing also appealed to other states to

withdraw from any actions that would magnify tensions and prevent reunification. This statement was addressed especially to the US and its continuous sales of sophisticated arms to Taipei which Beijing considers until present to be a direct threat to peace and stability in the region of the Western Pacific.

During the following decade, Beijing stiffened up its policy towards Taipei in reaction to Chen's provocative and hostile rhetoric. In the White paper on Taiwan issue the PRC government stated that it would be willing to resort to force in case of any act leading to the formal independence of Taiwan, in case of foreign invasion aimed to support Taiwan's independence or if Taipei repeatedly postponed negotiations regarding reunification. [The one-China principle..., 2000]

Moreover, in 2005 the Chinese government decided to adopt the Anti-secession law which enabled to condemn Taiwan's separatist endeavours as illegal. According to this law, Beijing will never allow Taiwan to separate from China under any name and by any means and it was determined to proceed to reunification even by military means in order to protect Chinese sovereignty and integrity. [Anti-secession law, 2005] Beijing stated, that if Chen led Taiwan towards independence, the PRC would lead the People's liberation army (PLA) towards Taiwan. Taiwan was worried that these steps were to provide legal base for Beijing's unilateral military intervention on the island.

Since the accession of Ma Ying-jeou to power, the cross-strait tensions have decreased, even though, the risk of confrontation have remained. Beijing has progressively resigned to the policy of armed liberation of Taiwan promoted during Chen's mandate and it has inclined again towards peaceful reunification. The Chinese president Hu Jintao wanted to establish cross-strait relations based on the mutual trust, shared interests and economic benefits, while force remained an acceptable alternative in case that the „one China principle“ was threatened. The contemporary president of the PRC, Xi Jinping, implemented similar rhetoric and insists on the efficiency of the cross-strait dialogue.

In 2013, the tensions between the PRC and Taiwan reached their historical minimum. However, Beijing continues to remind Taipei that the aim of Chinese military reforms and modernization of the PLA is to protect vital

national interests, including territorial integrity. For purpose of deterrence, the PRC have deployed over one thousand ballistic missiles along the coast-line aiming at Taiwan, it repeatedly carries out military exercises of air, naval and land invasion and strengthens its defensive as well as offensive capabilities. [Kan, Morisson, 2014]

The PRC wants to make the threat credible in order to deter Taiwan and the US from the violation of status quo. Beijing recognizes the risk of the US engagement in the potential conflict due to American support of Taiwan. At the same time, the Chinese government is aware of the technological weakness of the PLA which would probably surrender to the American modern army in the conventional war. [Tucker, 2005] Even though the PRC disposes of sufficient means to attack Taiwan and lead a rapid and intense war by a combination of missile, air and naval operations, yet, its success would depend in a large scale on the reaction of the US and its allies.

Beijing wants to avoid military confrontation at least until the moment, when the balance of power in the strait would be in favour of the PRC. Meanwhile, it prepares for asymmetric war, in which a weaker state could defeat a stronger rival by the means of correct strategy. For this purpose, the Chinese military strategy includes the strategy of „assassin mace“ and „fait accompli“. The strategy of „assassin mace“ is based on the belief that the unexpected assault upon the stronger enemy will reduce its advantage as well as eliminate casualties. It is accompanied by „fait accompli“ stating that the rapid and devastating attack against Taiwan would enable PLA to seize the island before the US could react. [Carpenter, 2005] Afterwards, the US would have to decide whether to undertake a counter-attack in order to return the island to the Taiwanese government or accept the conquest by the communist China. However, there is risk that in case that the strategy of limited war failed, it would have disastrous consequences for all involved parties.

The PRC's determination to protect integrity even by force results from its assumption that the US will not fight for Taiwan because it is engaged in other parts of the world. At the same time, Chinese modernization is aimed to increase the costs of the war to such a level, that the US will not be willing to risk its own vital interest for the sake of Taiwan. However, the war would

be expensive for both, the US and China, due to economic interdependence between the American and Chinese economies. If China invaded Taiwan, it would risk US sanctions and the loss of American market and important economic partner. Thus, it would jeopardize Chinese economic development which is a pre-requisite for military modernization. [Carpenter, 2005] Another possibility of how the PRC could enforce its political ambitions over Taiwan is the blockade and restriction of its economic activities. Although these acts are considered to be in violation with the international law, from Beijing's perspective it would be the matter of internal affairs of China. [Tucker, 2005]

Beijing is aware of the risk of its coercive policy and of the potential invasion on Taiwan as it would probably not get along without the US reaction either through direct military involvement or through economic and diplomatic sanctions. Despite the risk, the PRC is determined to prevent the loss of Taiwan which could be a dangerous precedence for other separatist movements within China. Beijing is ready to accept de facto independence of Taiwan under the condition it would not seek de jure recognition. [Chai, 2002] The bilateral relations between the PRC and Taiwan represent important opportunities for both sides of the strait, especially in the economic field, however, it can thrive only if Beijing and Taipei avoid provocations and mistrust.

THE US ENGAGEMENT IN THE TAIWAN STRAIT

Taiwan has been ranked among American strategic interests during the Cold War due to its geostrategic importance in terms of containment of communism. Since democratization took place on the island, the US has been carefully monitoring the status quo in the Taiwan Strait in order to safeguard Taiwanese democracy and protect American interests in the Western Pacific.

The US policy towards Taiwan issue is characterized by strategic ambiguity, as it tries to neutralize the Taiwan Strait and enjoy benefits from relations with both, the PRC and Taiwan, without irritating the other side. This ambivalent approach is based on five key documents adopted since 1970: three

communiqués, Taiwan relations act (TRA) and Six Reagan's assurances to Taipei.

Shanghai communiqué was signed in 1972 by Nixon and Mao Zedong in the context of normalization of Sino-American relations. Mao insisted that Taiwan was exclusively the matter of Chinese internal policy and Nixon acknowledged in the communiqué the recognition of „one China principle“. Moreover, both parties confirmed their shared interest in the peaceful resolution of the dispute and the US agreed to withdraw the American army from the island and the navy from the waters of Taiwan ¹. [Shanghai communiqué, 1972]

The Sino-American normalization was achieved in 1978 in the Joint communiqué on the establishment of diplomatic relations when the US recognized the PRC and ended the official diplomatic relations with the ROC. Despite the end of de jure recognition of the ROC, the US has maintained unofficial cultural and commercial relations with Taipei and confirmed its interest to back Taiwan in the TRA adopted in 1979. According to this act, the US is committed to maintain in the Western Pacific sufficient forces to be able to face coercion, assure security, defend social and economic system of Taiwan and protect the Taiwanese people. The US agreed to provide Taiwan defence technology and arms in order to reinforce capacity of the island to defend itself against potential communist attack. The TRA also stipulates that any attempt to define the future of Taiwan by other than peaceful means, would be perceived as a threat to peace and security in the Western Pacific, and thus, it would be a subject of major American concern. In such a case, the US president and Congress would decide on appropriate response. [Taiwan Relations Act, 1979]. However, the TRA does not oblige the US to intervene by military means in case of crisis.

Beijing was outraged by the Act and continuous military support of the island, which they considered to be in violation with the previous two Sino-

¹ American armed forces were deployed on the island for the purpose of protection pursuant to the Mutual Defence Treaty which was signed between Washington and Taipei in 1954. Both parties committed themselves to the mutual assistance in order to maintain sufficient capacities to prevent communist attack from the mainland. [Carpenter, 2005]

American communiqués. In order to calm down Chinese outrage, Reagan signed the third communiqué in 1982 and declared that it is not in the US interests to disrupt Chinese sovereignty and territorial integrity, neither to interfere in its internal affairs and promised not to improve quality or increase quantity of arms sales to Taiwan. [Carpenter, 2005]

At the same time, in compliance with the strategic ambiguity, Reagan adopted „Six assurances“ to guarantee Taipei continual American support. He assured Taipei that in spite of Beijing’s insistence, Washington would not settle the deadline of arms sales, it would not discuss the issue of sales with the PRC, neither would it play the role of mediator between Beijing and Taipei. Washington also assured Taipei not to force the government to negotiations with Beijing, neither to revise the TRA, nor to change its attitude regarding Taiwan’s sovereignty. [Kan, 2013]

Since 1980s’ American approach towards Taiwan has been shaped in connection to Taiwanese democratization and political liberalization which became the instrument of Taipei’s lobbying for the US support. The lobbying brought results in 1992 when the president George H. W. Bush agreed with quantitatively and qualitatively unprecedented sale of arms and later George W. Bush proceeded to the sale of offensive technology. Consequently, Beijing accused the US of the violation of the third communiqué.

The terrorist attacks of 2001 and provocative presidency of Chen contributed to the change of orientation of the US policy. In order to gain support of the PRC in the issues of international security, Washington altered the approach towards Taiwan. Bush strictly refused the independence of the island as well as any unilateral actions from the part of either Taiwan or PRC which could threaten the status quo in the strait. [Chiang, 2004] The relations between Washington and Taipei remained tense until the presidential elections in Taiwan in 2008 when the return of the Kuomintang released tensions in the triangular relations.

The following Obama administration declared the Western Pacific as strategic for maintenance of international security. Washington wants to improve the position of Taiwan on the international scene and to reinforce Taipei’s capability to contribute to preservation of the international security. [Kan, Morisson, 2014] Obama seeks to intensify the relations with the PRC,

but in such a way that it would not threaten establishment of the flourishing and sustainable unofficial relations with Taiwan.

American policy towards Taiwan faces several ambiguities and contradictions. The US acknowledges that there is only one China and its legitimate government is in Beijing, but it refuses Chinese territorial claims over Taiwan and warns Beijing against the use of force in the strait. Even though the US does not recognize Taiwan de jure as a sovereign state, it recognized its existence de facto through unofficial relations and protection against Chinese aggression. At the same time, however, the US government tries to repress separatist ambitions of Taiwan, in order not to endanger the developing Sino-American relations.

The ambivalent policy serves Washington to assure the PRC that it disagrees with unilateral declaration of independent Taiwan and at the same time to assure Taiwan that the US wants to support its defence capabilities and improve its international position. However, the US does not provide any concrete information on what exactly it would do in case of crisis, under what circumstances they would intervene in the conflict or by what means. The policy of ambiguity serves as a deterrent based on the assumption that the PRC would avoid aggressive actions against Taiwan because it would not be sure, how Washington would react. At the same time, the US believes that Taiwan would give up provocations, because of the uncertain American military support. [Tucker, 2005] The US have become a strategic lever in the Taiwan Strait and it believes that before making a military decision, both parties would at first evaluate possibility of American reaction. Washington assumes that even though, the potential disturber of status quo cannot be sure of American involvement in the conflict, he will not be willing to undergo such a risk.

However, this policy may lead to miscalculation with fatal consequences as it has been proved in the crisis in 1995 when the parties occurred at the brinkmanship. Hypothetically, Taiwan could rely on American support in such a measure, that it would reinforce its separatist agenda based on the assumption that the US would intervene in case of Chinese armed reaction. On the other hand, Beijing could assume that the US would not intervene because of the acknowledgement of the „one China principle“ and because

of the fact, that protection of Taiwan is not within American vital interests. [Carpenter, 2005] Therefore, the policy which is meant to function as a deterrent may in fact lead to escalation of tensions.

Instead of proposing a concrete solution to the Taiwan issue, the US emphasizes the process of peaceful dialogue between Beijing and Taipei, which should get along without American intervention, use of violence and attempts to unilaterally change the status quo. [Kan, 2013]

CONCLUSION

To conclude, Taiwan's disputed status has resulted in tense triangular relations between Taipei, Beijing and Washington. The instability in the Taiwan Strait is magnified by risky political ambitions of involved parties, such as de jure independence of Taiwan or violent reunification of the island with the mainland as well as by the American ambivalent policy. Despite different ambitions of parties, they share a common interest of the peaceful resolution of the issue based on dialogue and mutual consensus. However, in order to eliminate the risk of armed confrontation and proceed to peaceful settlement of the dispute, the involved parties will have to resign on ambitious political goals and provocative actions. The prerequisite of stability is the implementation of more transparent policies in order to avoid disastrous outcomes of miscalculation and misinterpretation of national intentions. It is in the best interest of all concerned parties, that the situation was resolved in a peaceful way reinforcing the triangular cooperation which could ultimately reduce the risk of confrontation.

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