Sądowa kontrola konstytucyjności ustaw zmieniających konstytucję w Indiach

• Authors: Szwed Marcin

Title variants

EN

Judicial review of constitutionality of constitutional amendments in India

• Languages of publication: PL

Abstracts

EN

The article presents evolution of the case law of the Supreme Court of India on the judicial review of the constitutionality of constitutional amendments, its evaluation in the legal doctrine and perception outside India. Although the Constitution of India does not contain any limitations as to the substance of constitutional amendments, during the political crisis in the period of Indira Gandhi’s rule, the Supreme Court has developed an effective system of judicial review of constitutional amendments. It is based on the assumption that the competence of the Parliament to enact amendments to the Constitution is not unlimited, because the parliament cannot destroy the same act from which it derives its authority. It must therefore respect certain fundamental principles which form the so-called “basic structure of the Constitution”. Applying this doctrine, the Supreme Court overturned a number of amendments, including those violating principle of judicial independence. The evaluation of the Supreme Court’s case law is divergent: according to some legal scholars it helped to save Indian democracy, while according to others it is full of loopholes and gives unlimited power to the judges. Despite this, it has had a substantial impact on the jurisprudence of courts in other countries in the region or even in other parts of the World.

Keywords

EN

India; constitutional amendments; judicial review

• Publisher: Kancelaria Sejmu / Chancellery of the Sejm
• Journal: Przegląd Sejmowy
• Year: 2016
• Issue: 3(134)
• Pages: 63-78

Contributors

author

Szwed Marcin

• Mgr, Uniwersytet Warszawski, Wydział Prawa i Administracji