Grounding and Logical Basing Permissions

• Authors: Tajer Diego
• Languages of publication: EN

Abstracts

EN

The relation between logic and rationality has recently re-emerged as an important topic of discussion. Following the ideas of Broome [1999] and MacFarlane [2004], the debate focused on providing rational requirements, which work as bridges between logic and epistemic norms. However, as Broome [2014] and Way [2011] observed, the usual requirements cannot capture some important aspects of rationality, such as how one can rationally believe something on the basis of believing something else. Broome [2014] proposed a few additional principles (“basing permissions”) for this purpose. In this paper I develop a more systematic family of basing permissions using the recent notion of grounding (Fine [2012], Correia [2014]). In particular, I claim that if Γ (logically) grounds A, and you believe Γ, then rationality permits you to believe A on the basis of believing Γ.

Keywords

EN

logic and rationality; basing permissions; rational requirements; bridge principles; grounding

• Publisher: Instytut Filozofii - Uniwersytet Jagielloński
• Journal: Diametros
• Year: 2016
• Issue: 50
• Pages: 81-96

Dates

published

2016-12

Contributors

author

Tajer Diego

• CONICET, University of Buenos Aires

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Identifiers

DOI

10.13153/diam.50.2016.979