2013 | 132 | 148-159
Article title

Wspomaganie kooperacji z wykorzystaniem teorii gier i analizy wielokryterialnej

Title variants
Cooperation Support Based on Game Theory and Multicriterial Analysis
Languages of publication
In the paper an idea of cooperation supporting method based on game theory and multicriterial analysis. Because of taking into consideration a cooperation game with empty core an idea of supporting is based on Bondareva's and Shapley's conditions for non-emptyness of the core. There is defined a minimal value which should be added to payoff of great coalition. The minimal value should be profitable. Also an idea of multicriterial support for establish winnings for the players in cooperative game is presented. The problem is considered in case when ad hoc arrangement is irrational in meaning that the allocation of winnings is outside the core of the game. The proposal is based on concept of goal programming and reference point method. The proposed ideas are shown on example of cooperation problem of the three autonomous departments in enterprise.
Physical description
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