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2009 | 19 | 2 | 51-74

Article title

Large population evolutionary games played within a life history framework


Selected contents from this journal

Title variants

Wieloosobowe gry ewolucyjne typu „cyklu życiowego”

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In many evolutionary games, such as parental care games, the length of time spent playing a realisation of the game is dependent on the strategy of an individual. Also, the payoff of a deserting male cannot be defined in isolation from the strategies used in the population as a whole. Such games should be defined as games against the field (large population games) rather than two-player games. Several examples are presented to illustrate the theory of such games against the field.
W dziedzinie gier ewolucyjnych zwykle zakłada się, że każda jednostka gra wiele razy w dany rodzaj gry dwuosobowej, z tym że za każdym razem jej przeciwnik zmienia się. W przypadku gier ewolucyjnych, takich jak „wojna na wyczerpanie” czy „opieka rodzicielska”, czas wykorzystany na realizację gry zależy od strategii wybranej przez jednostkę. W takich przypadkach należy brać pod uwagę nie tylko średnią wypłatę z każdej realizacji gry, ale też średni czas potrzebny na jej realizację. W tej sytuacji model standardowej gry dwuosobowej powinien być zastąpiony grą wieloosobową. Dodatkowo, w grach typu „opieka rodzicielska” wypłata samca, który nie opiekuje się swoimi dziećmi, zależy od możliwości uzyskania dodatkowych partnerek, co z kolei zależy od strategii używanych w całej populacji. W pracy rozważono kilka przykładów gier wieloosobowych, które są wygenerowane przez grę dwuosobową.








Physical description


  • Department of Mathematics and Statistics, University of Limerick, Limerick, Ireland


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Publication order reference


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