On the core of a cost allocation problem under asymmetric information

• Authors: Yusuke KAMISHIRO
• Languages of publication: EN

Abstracts

EN

We study a cost allocation problem under asymmetric information, and show that the ex ante incentive compatible core is non-empty. We also obtain a non-emptiness result for the incentive compatible coarse core, which is one concept of an interim core.

Keywords

EN

cost allocation; asymmetric information; core; incentive compatibility

• Publisher: Politechnika Wrocławska. Oficyna Wydawnicza Politechniki Wrocławskiej
• Journal: Operations Research and Decisions
• Year: 2015
• Volume: 25
• Issue: 1
• Pages: 17-32

Contributors

author

Yusuke KAMISHIRO

• College of Economics, Kanto Gakuin University, 1-50-1 Mutsuura-Higashi, Kanazawa-ku, Yokohama, Kanagawa, 236-8501, Japan

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Identifiers

DOI

10.5277/ord150102