PL EN


2012 | 2(20) | 83-99
Article title

Instytucje i środowisko

Authors
Content
Title variants
EN
Institutions and the Environment
Languages of publication
PL
Abstracts
PL
W swoim artykule Elinor Ostrom przedstawia krytyczną analizę wyników wielu badań empirycznych, współczesnej teorii gier i własnych eksperymentów z dziedziny projektowania instytucji w odniesieniu do nadmiernej eksploatacji zasobów wspólnych. Autorka wskazuje na fakt, iż mając możliwość porozumiewania się, eksperymentowania i modyfikacji reguł instytucjonalnych, ludzie wypracowują różnorodne − niekoniecznie rynkowe − rozwiązania prowadzące do zrównoważonego zarządzania dobrami wspólnymi, do których rzekomo ma zastosowanie pojęcie "tragedii wspólnego pastwiska".
EN
In her article, Elinor Ostrom offers a critical account of a number of empirical studies, game-theoretic analyses and her own experiments in institutional design as applicable to the issue of overexploitation of common-pool resources. She argues that, given people's ability to communicate, experiment and modify institutional rules, they can develop various − not necessarily market-based − solutions with a view to achieving sustainable management of such resources to which the concept of the tragedy of the commons supposedly applies.
Contributors
author
  • Indiana University, Arizona State University
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Document Type
Publication order reference
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YADDA identifier
bwmeta1.element.desklight-9d80424a-138e-42d3-ad84-171f444677f4
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