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## **Wars of the future in Russian – hybrid, sociological and psychological war in view of the Ukrainian conflict**

### **Introduction**

After the end of the Cold War we have been observing rapid changes in tactics and the way conflicts and wars are waged. Increasing mutual interaction and combining of regular and irregular wars techniques have become noticeable. Current military conflicts, both regional and that on wider scale, are characterized by complexity of application and practical use of all available means of fight. Already preliminary analyses indicate mutual dependencies between individual phases of the plan realization and political and military goals of the enemy set on a tactical, operational and strategic level. Although, the complexity mentioned, should be understood in much wider sense. It would be better to use the term *hybridization* of the new battlefield. Nevertheless, the phenomenon is nothing new as the way of waging wars and it does not only come down to carrying operations in a military sense, but also to other numerous actions of information, political and economic nature. This does also not include only security forces of the attacked country but most of all it affects wide sections of society, national, ethnic and religious groups. The diversity of elements being a part of destruction activities has become a very popular topic of political and journalistic conversations and has nowadays become defined as *hybrid activities* or *hybrid war*.<sup>1</sup>

There is no doubt that changes to international environment after the Cold War caused new challenges for the whole world when it comes to international security area in a very broad sense. There was no threat of a global conflict between the then two superpowers and blocks of states. The threat of nuclear destruction has also gone, which still, to a large extent, was present in security thinking in the early 1980s. New problems in the international security area have come to the fore.

Just after the communist bloc had collapsed it seemed that the main security threats in the coming years would be conflicts of ethnic, national and religious nature. Further crises turning into long-term wars in the former Soviet Union and Yugoslavia seemed to confirm that. „Thawing” of conflicts was also pointed out as they started to emerge because of geopolitical changes in different parts of the world. Some states happened to be in a new political reality faced also new problems (increasing contradictions) that they could not handle well. Previous system, which had concentrated around two superpowers maintaining the balance of forces, collapsed, and there was only one

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<sup>1</sup> A. Dębczak, C. Pawlak, J. Keplin, *Analityczny model oceny hybrydowości współczesnych konfliktów*, „Zeszyty Naukowe AON” 2015, No 2, p. 45.

player left, who, as it seemed, facing no dangerous adversary, would impose its own democratic system successfully. Nevertheless, the situation after the Cold War has very quickly verified the hopes: it turned out that both international organizations as well as the biggest superpower cannot deal with numerous and rapid changes. Conflicts and wars from the beginning of 1990s caused necessity of thinking reevaluation and the way security in a broader sense had been perceived up to that moment. The situation got even more complicated after globalization processes had started.<sup>2</sup> It appeared that doctrines, strategies and old cold-war armies were things of the past. The way the role of a state and armed forces in the new reality was perceived, changed.

In these circumstances new theoretical trends of a new world vision based primarily on a unipolar domination of the USA. They focused on maintaining, supervision and widening areas of democracy, free market and western way of life. The pattern of an American way of living<sup>3</sup> and, what comes next – also the way democracy was perceived, became a main determinant of the superpower politics in the end of the 20th century, and at the beginning of the next century. Successive administrations did not intend to change their politics nor the foreign policy which had been worked out after the Cold War ending. This politics was directed to enhance advantage gained after bipolar world had collapsed. This way it became unacceptable to let Russia rebuild its military and political position it had as the USSR, which could threaten the position of the USA. Normalization of internal situation after Yeltsin times and program of the first presidency of Putin raised concerns in the USA. Especially that the new Kremlin host specified his program very clearly: he acknowledged that burying the cold-war world and the USSR was the greatest catastrophe for Russians ever – to paraphrase it. American politicians, although looked at Putin's activities with fear, in reality did not believe that Russia could threaten the USA. Apart from that they started to be more and more preoccupied with growing terrorism phenomenon and fighting Islam. Also numerous dictators, particularly from Arab countries, started to pose a serious threat to American politics in the early 21st century, especially in view of the Al Qaeda offensive. Military operations by the USA to prevent global terror spreading, not only stopped the threat but, on the contrary, have speeded up consolidation of radical organizations and led to creation one terrorist centre. It occurred very soon that methods and ways of combating the new enemy through military and technology prevalence were not effective and completely useless.

In the described time there was a belief that military politics of the USA would still be defined through the lens of the Revolution in Military Affairs, RMA<sup>4</sup> which was

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<sup>2</sup> В.Н. Горбунов, С.А. Богданов, *О характере вооружённой борьбы в XXI веке*, „Военная мысль” 2009, No 3, pp. 2–3.

<sup>3</sup> M.A. Piotrowski, *Konflikt nigdy nie jest prosty: amerykańska teoria i doktryna wojen oraz przeciwników hybrydowych*, „Sprawy Międzynarodowe” 2015, No 2, p. 8.

<sup>4</sup> See: J. Blaker, *Understanding the RMA: A Guide to America's 21 Century Defense Military Affairs*, Washington 1997; E.C. Sloan, *The Revolution in Military Affairs: Implications for Canada and NATO*, Montreal 2002.

supposed to maintain technological, information and military prevalence. This idea, promoted from the late 1990s, referred to making use of new information technologies, leadership, intelligence<sup>5</sup>, munitions together with concepts of tactical operations, operational and strategic activities that make it possible to conduct immediate joint operations by all services, and ability to strike in each and every place of the battlefield any time of the day and night in any field and atmospheric conditions.<sup>6</sup>

If one conduct more complete and thorough examinations, it would turn out the RMA concept was not invented by Americans. Its roots should be looked for in the USSR between the 1970s and 1980s. Among some Soviet commanders and military theoreticians there was a very interesting and innovative of the time concept of military-technical revolution, worked out and the then Chief of the General Staff of the Soviet Union Armed Forces, marshal Nikolai Ogarkov claimed that effectiveness of conducting hostilities in the future would be determined by high-tech and non-nuclear technologies.<sup>7</sup>

Russian Chief of General Staff ideas had not influenced the then Russian warfare theory. Despite huge leap forward in civilization and scientific and technical progress fuelling creation of new weapon systems in the 20th century, military theoreticians were not able to establish the nature of future wars. Russian warfare theory and practice stopped on the previous generation wars as evidenced in Russian Warfare Doctrine of 1999.<sup>8</sup>

Due to an advanced technological development, technological and information revolution, it was a new technical and scientific base created to set new trends for the future wars and highly advanced technologies and information systems were to be its foundations. An extremely important role played: microelectronics, optoelectronics, sensor technology, new production technologies and technologies of high-grade materials application.<sup>9</sup> Through these achievements there were created new advanced weapon and equipment systems which shall be capable of changing completely the nature of the fight and the war as such.<sup>10</sup> But apart from the modern technologies, as it was to appear soon, also primitive models of struggle combining modern technologies with old weapon systems can be a killer app.

Whereas, totally different was the process of studying conflicts and war in the West. Reality and challenges enforced changes application in new tactics and doctrine of waging war in a new changed political and military environment. Some military professionals claimed that both RMA and other techniques of fighting in view of new challenges and treats do not meet the expectations and new solutions should be found.

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<sup>5</sup> M. Lekowski, *Współczesna rewolucja w dziedzinie wojskowości. Analiza wybranych aspektów i cech charakterystycznych*, „Bezpieczeństwo Narodowe” 2011, No 19, p. 267.

<sup>6</sup> R.O. Hundley, *Past revolutions, future transformations. What can the history of revolution in military affairs tell us about transforming the US military?*, Washington 2009, pp. 9–10.

<sup>7</sup> M. Wickers, R. Martinage, *The revolution in War*, Washington 2004, pp. 8–9.

<sup>8</sup> И. Капитанец, *Битва за мировой океан*, Москва 2002, pp. 50–51.

<sup>9</sup> В.Н. Горбунов, С.А. Богданов, *О характере вооружённой борьбы...*, p. 5.

<sup>10</sup> И. Капитанец, *Битва за...*, pp. 50–51.

It was also agreed that political and military situation would generate new conflicts and could not be solved by the then methods and forms of combat action. Beliefs that diplomacy during crisis situations, were criticized. It was thought that peaceful conflict solving can be effective only in some strictly defined situations. Nevertheless, all previous events lead to a conclusion that the basic reason for future conflicts will be collapse of state structures, growing frustration and lack of prospects not only for a single country, but also for the whole regions as well as for the US domination. These beliefs seemed to be confirmed by conflicts in Afghanistan and Iraq, where American administration involvement was particularly strong.

What used to seem simple and resulted from a vast political, economy and military prevalence of the USA, occurred to be more complicated than politicians, planners, military men and intelligence experts thought. The USA was involved in a long-term conflict which seems to have no end. No changes in tactics and military philosophy in new weapon systems application have brought expected results, particularly to gain such prevalence which would allow turning the tide in favor of Americans.

In the light of experience in the late 20th, early 21st centuries there has been created a theory of asymmetric threats and wars, and the so called complex wars and 4 generation wars (4GW). To describe the last type shortly it should be pointed out that it refers to such actions that lead to weakening of the adversary by methods totally different to those applied by the opponent party.<sup>11</sup> Therefore, in strategic and operational spheres we will come across such phenomena as losing a state monopoly of waging wars, return to the world of cultures and states of war, domestic division of society (ethnic, religious, according to groups of interest), looking for the main goal of psychological strike (will of fight, public opinion) and disproportion between investments and results. In tactics area, it will result in moving strength from the adversary's line to his home front and using the adversary's potential against him.<sup>12</sup>

Professor Jacek Reginia-Zacharski stresses that in wars of that kind the role of a non-state factor grows having significant resources and using wars to make more money at the same time. Moreover, in such kind of wars terrorist organizations, organized crime groups and transnational corporations<sup>13</sup> take part. So in a way, 4GW war can be defined as a hybrid war, if you take under consideration the assumptions of the theory. The world has changed so much that it made main international actors change their way of waging wars. One is for sure, strategies, tactics, combat actions with mass army's presence, known from the more or less distant past, are the past at the moment. It seems that new concepts and ways of waging wars seeking are justified by the growing discrepancies between RMA ideas and security policy practice in many countries, including foremost the USA. It had to lead in the end to a criticism

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<sup>11</sup> H. Królikowski, *Siły operacji specjalnych (Wojska Specjalne) w konfliktach hybrydowych*, „Bezpieczeństwo. Teoria i Praktyka” 2016, No 3, p. 24.

<sup>12</sup> Ibidem.

<sup>13</sup> See: J. Reginia-Zacharski, *Wojna w świecie współczesnym. Uczestnicy, cele, modele, teorie*, Łódź 2014, pp. 294–304.

of the security paradigm which was based on an elementary significance of using technologies in defense systems of individual countries and models of carrying modern combat actions. Basic charge being raised for a few years is that it is impossible to find such solution which would shift the deadlock on the current art of war. Deadlock, which is the effect of growing complexity of current (and most probably future) wars and conflicts and methods of their waging and resolving. It should be noticed that this deadlock current war actors face is the basic feature of the 21st century wars, in which no technological prevalence, nor psychological, nor command and organizational prevalence is (and most probably will be) decisive in gaining an ultimate success.<sup>14</sup> It is not known, though, whether in few months' time or even years, there would be a necessity to base military potential on mass armies and whether manuals of huge operations with the use of groups of arms and fronts get back into favor. It should not be forgotten, therefore, that apart from irregular wars, guerilla wars, non-linear wars, complex wars and special operations practice there are still classical views on organization and the way wars should be waged.

### **Hybridity of current conflicts and wars in view of Russian and Western military thoughts**

The concept of hybrid wars is nothing new in the history of wars and military thought and nowadays it should be understood in a much wider sense not only as the way of waging wars.<sup>15</sup> It seems to be another America-centric depiction of current wars and an attempt to resolve „the American power dilemma” and to get the answer to a question why the USA were not able to use its position of a worldwide hegemony and resolve the confrontation with much weaker opponents in American favor.<sup>16</sup> The American helplessness is a result of numerous complex phenomena happening in the current security area. *Imperial hubris* and *hegemonic presumption* are only some of the reasons of the American failure over the last twenty years. Moreover, there is

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<sup>14</sup> A. Gruszczak, *Hybrydowość współczesnych wojen – analiza krytyczna*, in: *Asymetria i hybrydowość – stare armie wobec nowych konfliktów*, W. Sokała, B. Zapala (ed.), Warszawa 2011, p. 9.

<sup>15</sup> Numerous proposals of doctrine regarding the formation of hybridity theory in current wars seem to be another stage of seeking universal method of effective warfare on each and every level of army and institutions of military security in a broader sense. Western theoreticians, checking different variants of the struggle for Western (American) model of democracy do not take under consideration many vital practical and military factors. As if they forgot about such things like very fast changes in the battlefield, necessity of improvisation, leaving command initiative (especially on a tactical level) or regarded them as unnecessary. Creating strict doctrinal norms seems to be quite an interesting measure but it is risky as well, especially that in a couple of months somebody figures out or propose another “hybrid”. Combining different forms of fighting since the dawn the dawn of time has been a practiced way of waging wars. Politicians and military professionals, especially the second ones, have been delighted many times by a new concept of winning a war, being under pressure to finish a long-lasting conflict. Nevertheless, mostly the result came not because of new fighting techniques application but in skilful combination of numerous elements, both military and non-military.

<sup>16</sup> N. Freier, *The defense identity crisis: It's a hybrid world*, „Parameters” 2009, No 3, p. 82.

a lack of one strategy and effective tactical techniques to achieve success. This is why there are so many concepts and war theories, which, instead of solving doubts, in fact create even bigger chaos, both in scientific as well as in practical sense. Undoubtedly, looking for a universal model of new forms of military actions in an environment, where there is no state-like opponent, made it necessary to find an effective antidote to helplessness of the biggest and the one superpower. Despite numerous studies and continuous search, unfortunately there has no solution been found, which would give military success and guarantee that the war ends. On the contrary, present wars or future conflicts will be long-term processes and technological, economic or military prevalence will not guarantee aims achievement of goals or that strategic or political interests<sup>17</sup> will be achieved.

Etymology of the hybridity term leads to Latin *hybrida* which means something of mixed origin or composition, the offspring produced by breeding plants or animals of different varieties, species, or races.<sup>18</sup> *Hybridity* can also be defined as

(...) quality resulting from the crossing or mixing features, elements of different, quite often structurally different and genetically distant, opposing subjects, organisms or states. So, hybridity means consolidation of opposing features into one separate being, while maintaining specific features of the species which decide about primacy of this new hybrid organism, as regards - for example - disease resistance, strength, or better adaptation abilities.<sup>19</sup>

Hybrid war term has been introduced into science by Frank G. Hoffman<sup>20</sup>, a retired marine's lieutenant colonel. He claimed that this phenomenon is (...) „*a physical and psychological, kinetic and non-kinetic convergence of (...) militants and civilians (...) armed forces and societies, states and non-state actors as well as of their combat action*”.<sup>21</sup> Nevertheless, hybrid wars term was used in scientific discussions in the 1990s *inter alia* thanks to Thomas R. Mockaitis<sup>22</sup>, historian of the DePaul

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<sup>17</sup> A. Gruszcak, *Hybrydowość współczesnych wojen...*, p. 10.

<sup>18</sup> *Słownik wyrazów obcych PWN*, J. Tokarski (ed.), Warszawa 1980, p. 290.

<sup>19</sup> A. Gruszcak, *Hybrydowość współczesnych wojen...*, p. 11.

<sup>20</sup> Hybrid activities and hybrid war are the terms used also in 2002 in the work of major William J. Nemeth *Future war and Chechnya. A case for hybrid warfare*. However, they were limited to the assessment of the Chechen society and some forms of operations carried out by Chechen rebels. This is a reason why it is difficult to acknowledge that vocabulary apparatus proposed by Nemeth gives a full complexity of hybridity phenomenon as a new form of military struggle, because it does not take account of the whole complexity of this phenomenon and is rather a clumsy attempt to analyze Chechen versus Russian conflict. Nevertheless, as very valuable should be acknowledged the assessment of possibilities of Russian army of that time and completely useless in new battlefield realities of that time. See: Ł. Skoneczny, *Wojna hybrydowa – wyzwanie przyszłości? Wybrane zagadnienia*, „Przegląd Bezpieczeństwa Wewnętrznego” 2016, No 14, p. 40, special edition.

<sup>21</sup> F.G. Hoffman, *Hybrid Warfare and Challenges*, „Joint Force Quarterly” 2009, No 52, p. 34.

<sup>22</sup> Mockaitis also stressed a hybrid nature of British expedition forces, which were supported by a diplomatic component and political actions. See T.R. Mockaitis, *British Counterinsurgency in*

University of Chicago and the American Strategic Studies Institute. This American historian, during his research into colonial wars by the UK, noticed that apart from classic conventional fighting there were anti-partisan, terrorist actions with the use of combined forms of combat operations carried out at that time as well.<sup>23</sup>

In 1998 the term came up in some works on the history of Marine Corps. Commander Robert Walker described units of the Corps as hybrid<sup>24</sup> and operations carried out by them as hybrid actions. Also some other Western experts tried to formulate a new research paradigm towards changes in current military conflicts. Colonel Daniel T. Lasica, for example, considered „hybridity” as a combination of strategy and tactics, combining different forms of military activities.<sup>25</sup> Colonel John J. McCuen proposed to assume that hybrid war is nothing more than a connection between components of a symmetric and asymmetric war.<sup>26</sup> The proposed hybrid war term brings it to armed struggle within the ongoing conflict or the proxy war, i.e. formula of different ways of armed struggle depending on the place and adversaries.

It is worth noting that in literature of the subject in Russia the term hybrid war had not been used or at least very rarely until 2014. It showed up only in the context of deliberations on American and their allies’ military forces acting in Afghanistan and Iraq to give a picture of a new form of war waged by the West there. It is only the Ukrainian conflict that made this American version of hybrid war popular, which stayed in journalism as well as in political (scientific) discussions in Russian for good. It is something obvious, Russians willingly adapted notions and terms inseparable from new types of war, including hybridity of conflicts. It does not mean, however, that Russian theoreticians do not think of their own relevant vocabulary to describe hybridity of wars. As an example three definitions by Russian experts describing hybrid wars can be given. First, by C.F. Vikulov and J.J. Khrustal’jov, says that hybrid wars are complex and methodical impact of not only military (but also of political, economic, social) nature in international relations.<sup>27</sup> Another definition, close to that

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*the Post Imperial Era*, London 1995, pp. 16–17, 30 and 38.

<sup>23</sup> M.A. Piotrowski, *Konflikt nigdy nie jest prosty...*, p. 10.

<sup>24</sup> See: R.G. Walker, *Spec Fi: The United States Marine Corps and Special Operations*, Monterey 1998; M.A. Piotrowski, *Konflikt nigdy nie jest prosty...*, p. 11.

<sup>25</sup> M. Wojnowski, *Mit „wojny hybrydowej”*. *Konflikt na terenie państwa ukraińskiego w świetle rosyjskiej myśli wojskowej XIX–XXI wieku*, „Przegląd Bezpieczeństwa Wewnętrznego” 2016, No 14, p. 9, special edition.

<sup>26</sup> According to the American theoretician, military decision-makers and experts faced the necessity to solve quite a big problem, how to carry out effectively military operations in new conditions, having as an adversary something that is not a state entity but different kinds of military (or paramilitary) organizations. So, how to win a war, if classical forms of fighting fail? Next problem in his considerations was to find such model of conduct, which would enable to keep order (stabilize situation) on territories under control of intervention power (as a basis for considerations conflicts in Vietnam, Somalia and Liban were taken). See: J.J. McCuen, *Hybrid Wars*, „Military Review” 2008, Vol. 2, pp. 107–108.

<sup>27</sup> In their opinion hybrid war is: „(...) комплексное применение различных методов (не только военного, но и экономического, социального, политического характера) воздействия

of Hoffman's, is presented by a well known political scientist, A.A. Bartosz. He gives the definition of a hybrid war as multiple actions of different kind carried out by an aggressor through irregular and conventional (classical) forms whilst being supported by a non-military component. Third definition is presented by Vladimir N. Akulinin and Natalia S. Epifanova, who, regarding political and military context, claim that hybrid war is a different military tactics, political actions and subversion actions as far as social and economic spheres are concerned on the territory of a potential adversary.<sup>28</sup>

Classical definition of hybrid warfare seems to be still imperfect though, narrowing significance of the described phenomenon. It seems also quite often misinterpreted. Firstly, it regards mainly to activities carried out by organized military forces. Secondly, hybridity phenomenon defined nowadays is characterized by multiplatform activities and non-state actors taking part. One more element indicated by experts is the lack of declaration of war or introducing other states of emergency or a martial law. So, taking under consideration a broad spectrum, nature and scale of activities that follow the hybrid war and the fact that, usually, it is limited on purpose and kept under the level of regular war, instead of hybrid war there should rather be used terms like hybrid activities or operations of a hybrid nature.

Unfortunately, since 2014 on, i.e. since the conflict in Ukraine has started, hybrid war term has been abused because of its strong influence on public opinion, both domestically and internationally. Another abuse is creation of numerous references to the conflict in Ukraine, characterized as hybrid war, which is carried out by Russia against an independent and sovereign country. One basic question should, therefore, be asked here, whether the Ukrainian conflict is a classical example of hybrid war, like many Western theoreticians wish (journalists, politicians), or this hybridity phenomenon of military actions there is a new form of modern wars and was put into practice by Russian commanders and military decision-makers within the frames of politics to restore Russia's power position and making changes in the global balance of power? Many other questions can be asked to verify Western thesis that Russia had been preparing for the aggression for a long time, and the so called Gerasimov doctrine is one of the major pieces of evidence supporting it.

At present, Russia shall be assigned a particular role in creating and carrying out the new forms of activities, as hybrid wars. Many experts are obsessed with convincing the public that Russia, in particular its political and military decision-makers, had been preparing plans and strategies for many years to start hybrid activities. Such thesis seems false, though. To analyze thoroughly this problem, it should be assumed that

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на противника в рамках межгосударственного противоборства (...)". See: С.Ф. Викулов, Е.Ю. Хрусталёв, *Методологические основы и специфика военно-экономического анализа*, „Экономический анализ: теория и практика” 2014, No 7, pp. 5–6.

<sup>28</sup> Гибридная война – это широкий диапазон действий, осуществляемых противником с использованием военных и иррегулярных формирований, с одновременным привлечением гражданских компонентов, В.Н. Акулинин, Н.С. Епифанова, *Концепция гибридной войны в практике межгосударственного противостояния*, „Национальные интересы: приоритеты и безопасность” 2015, No 36, p. 54.

each country (superpower or small or average), usually tends to create and introduce many normative acts, in which the strategic priorities in military and security areas are set up. These are doctrines, strategies, concepts of national security or military security. Generally, these are documents which are a basis of the state security system of the country. It is assumed that they have to be consistent not only with foreign policy (of security) but also and foremost with operational planning, training and armed forces development. That is why nobody should be surprised that Russia tends to modify and enhance its legal acts regarding national security in broader sense and its reason of state. Analyzing Russia's politics, one should take into consideration their professional attitude towards the topic of national security of the modern Russian country.

### **Russian theory of new wars. Gerasimov's concept**

Several dozen of months back media were flooded by a wave of information indicating that Russians had been preparing the aggression on Ukraine for a very long time back (at least since 2008). Such news was adopted without a word of critics and stayed in media discussions for good, and, what is even worse, in scientific discussions as well. No one is arguing now that Russia for the last few years by changing its war doctrine and national security strategy clearly has shown that it does not intend to wait for further developments and do nothing. No one can also undermine the fact that political leaders of the Russian state have relatively clear policy, which aim is to change unipolar world and to get Russia back for a superpower position. It is worth remembering that in spite of numerous repeated trials Russia failed to get rid of fixed standards and beliefs coming back to the WWII that „human and equipment mass” would be able to counter effectively technological development. And patterns, which had been shaping it, for decades were recognized as indisputable canon. And it seemed that such idea was confirmed by the events of crushing the small Georgia. The assessment of the Georgia conflict done by the Russian General Staff showed that Russian army is not only unable to lead military operations in the long run but also it will not be able to fight effectively with a relatively strong adversary. Its training doctrine appeared to be out-of-date, moreover, Russian armed forces were not equipped with modern command and communication systems, combat equipment was archaic, and man power advantage and combat techniques advantage were only an illusion. Based on such assessment it has become necessary to implement system and modernization changes. Experiences from the war with Georgia, numerous corruption scandals and stagnation in armed forces reforms from the beginning of the 21st century made Putin realize that the necessity of changes both in doctrine and in organizational area regarding military security of the country in a broader sense, must become a priority of the state's political leadership. Apart from reforms of the armed forces a new training doctrine adjusted to an up-to-date battlefield has become a must. Based on security policy priorities and basic aims Russia dedicated itself in its foreign policy, some works were started on Russian vision for future wars and ways of conducting military activities in modern environment.

Nevertheless, it should be stated that concept of a new generation war was a topic discussed long back before the war in Georgia. At this moment, W. Kapitaniec views should be reminded which were published in *Битва за мировой океан* issued in 2002. He claimed that in spite of the huge leap forward in civilization and scientific-technological progress stimulating creation of new weapon systems in the 20th century, Russian art of war theoreticians were unable to establish the nature of future conflicts.<sup>29</sup> This is a reason why, in the beginning of the 21st century, there is a concept of the sixth-generation wars, in which precision-guided weapon and defense weapon play crucial role, not like in the past – mass land army. According to his assessments, whole aggressor's potential of a strike force shall be made to disrupt economy facilities by strong air strikes and mass precision-guided strikes from different positions, taking into account operations within global and regional information fight.<sup>30</sup> Furthermore, Kapitaniec claimed that new wars (6GW) would not be conducted on land, at sea or in the air only, but most of all in outer space. They would also not be of a chronic character<sup>31</sup>, with the use of mass troops and equipment. The whole process of armed struggle will be compact, quick and it will take the form of mass strikes of precision-guided weapon on economic and military facilities of the potential adversary<sup>32</sup> with widespread use of radio electronic weapon (WRE). He noticed also that in this kind of fighting there may be a risk of the conflict transformation into a nuclear war.<sup>33</sup>

However, the most interesting views of Kapitaniec refer to activities within information war since he claimed that with the growing saturation of the current battlefield with means of radio electronic struggle, there is an urgent need to take relevant remedial actions in order to paralyze adversary's electromagnetic emission means. The term WRE operations in a new war mean a complex of undertakings and activities to paralyze an aggressor by radio electronic means and protection of one's own troops and weapon systems from radio electronic impact of the potential adversary. The most likely components of such operations would be fire annihilation of the adversary's WRE systems and systems of every electromagnetic radiation, paralysis of the whole system of radio electronic means, protection of one's own sources of electromagnetic radiation, radio electronic cover against precision-guided

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<sup>29</sup> И. Капитанец, *Битва за...*, pp. 50–51.

<sup>30</sup> *Ibidem*, pp. 51–52.

<sup>31</sup> Russian theoretician, using the term chronic, made reference to experiences from the Great War time, when after a short phase of a maneuver warfare mass armies came to devastating positional activities.

<sup>32</sup> A living force of an adversary may not be a target of strikes. Instead, economic facilities and state administration facilities on the whole of its territory will be attacked. No strategic reserves will be attacked formed on the basis of ground troops, because in new generation wars they are not going to pose a threat for a country that is the attacker, who wages a war using precision-guided weapon. This way, there is no need to occupy the territory of an adversary that is derived of economy, political system of which will the most probably collapse. These views clearly show that their author has based most of all on analysis of two conflicts, i.e. the second war in Persian Gulf and the so called NATO–Yugoslavia.

<sup>33</sup> И. Капитанец, *Битва за...*, pp. 53–54.

strikes. Activities carried out within WRA operation, together with fire and maneuvers, will be conducted simultaneously during strike operation in the air, in outer space, at sea and strategic operation to repel aggression. Information activities, on the other hand, were to be an active part of the striking component of the precision-guided means of destruction. Information resource of the countries was to be one of the most important elements of strategic striking forces systems and strategic defense forces of the country. It is going to embrace all areas of struggle (space, cyberspace, air, land, sea) and is going to concentrate on securing nets, telecommunication systems, radio navigational systems, power system, systems of command, transportation, finance, etc.

Also space recognition means will be added to information struggle measures and will become the main sources of information, both at planning stage, as well as at organizational stage, and conducting combat actions. There is going to be carried out a constant (uninterrupted) and to a large extent communication, radar, infrared, radiation, chemical, photographic and TV recognition from the space, which is to deliver information in real time.

Information counteracting<sup>34</sup> will be gained by the rule in information space and permanent information protection of strike and defense systems.<sup>35</sup>

The main goal of information struggle, according to Kapitaniec, will be keeping necessary level of information security and decreasing such level of the adversary. The goal may be reached through the implementation of many interrelated tasks, from which the most important are: disrupting information resource and information field of the opponent and securing once own resource and fields.

Information countering, therefore, will be realized in the following directions and field of struggle:

- with command systems on different levels,
- fighting between strike and defense systems,
- creating information system in the whole outer space,
- Information securing/protection for its own offensive and defense systems.<sup>36</sup>

Military and political goals in the sixth-generation war<sup>37</sup> will be possible to

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<sup>34</sup> Information counteracting in wars of future should be understood as a new strategic form of warfare, in which special forms and methods influencing the opponent's information environment will be used and securing their own space in order to achieve strategic goals of the war.

<sup>35</sup> И. Капитанец, *Битва за...*, p. 69.

<sup>36</sup> Ibidem.

<sup>37</sup> The sixth generation war refers to the classification given primarily by Russian military theoreticians. They assume a division into 2 basic war categories: pre-nuclear era and nuclear one. There are four generations included in the first period of time (white weapon – war on a tactical scale; powder – war on a operational and tactical scale; rifled weapon – wars on operational and strategic scale; semi-automatic weapon, mass armies – wars on a strategic scale). The second period of time embraces two generations of weapon, i.e. nuclear weapon (threat to the world) – the Cold War time and non-contact war – operations in three basic dimentions: on land, in the air and space, development of precision-guided weapon. Its goal was to destroy basic functions of a state and economy as well as command systems and the most important military facilities. И.В. Бочарников, С.В. Лемешев,

achieve only by application on a large scale a precise offensive weapon, recognition and information systems and WRE. Therefore, it is necessary to integrate those components into one common weapons system combining information area in the outer space, in the air, at sea, on land and in cyberspace, which could change the nature of the future warfare.

Presented above views by Kapitaniec indicate that long before changes which brought armed forces reform in the Russian Federation, among Russian experts there had been noticed the necessity of changes in regard to transformation in the area of the future military conflict. Growing importance of information struggle deserves particular attention. After analysis of the mentioned Gerasimov's doctrine, it should be stated that much of Kapitaniec ideas have been adapted for the current theory of Russian military thought, especially, when it comes to forms and ways of conducting military actions during conflicts and wars in the beginning of the 21st century. Undoubtedly, some aspects of that vision have been also used during development and implementation of a new training doctrine in armed forces of the Russian Federation.

I. Kapitaniec was not the only Russian expert who had undertaken much earlier an analysis of changing war and military conflict realities and presentation of Russian point of view on this subject. Similar views presented also the late general major Vladimir Sliptchenko. He also believed that future wars would be based on a non-contact fighting with the use of precision-guided weapon (systems).<sup>38</sup> Different views on the future military conflicts presented another Russian military professional, general Makhmut Gareev, who – based on experiences for the war in Georgia in August 2008 – believed that only a mass attack of conventional forces, possibly with a support of modern measures, would characterize future battles.<sup>39</sup>

After general Gerasimov's speech about his views on theory of future wars at the scientific conference in January 25, 2013 in the Military Sciences Academy in Moscow, large number of Russian scientists started to present many theories regarding different forms of waging wars in the future. The most interesting are those of J.J. Gorbachev concerning wars in cyberspace. In the article published in 2013 *Кибервойна уже идет*<sup>40</sup> he stated that we had been dealing with wars in the net for a long time because of computer technology developments. Moreover, computerization of weapon systems, communication and command and other fields of life would have a major impact on the way future wars would be waged. Gorbachev notes that every way of fighting could not be undertaken without operations in the net.<sup>41</sup>

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Г.В. Люткене, *Современные концепции войн и практика военного строительства*, Москва 2013, р. 62; H. Sołkiewicz, *Wojna przyszłości – wojną niekontaktową (wg aktualnych poglądów rosyjskich)*, „Zeszyty Naukowe Akademii Marynarki Wojennej” 2009, No 1, pp. 72–73; В.И. Слипченко, *Войны нового поколения: дистанционные бесконтактные*, Москва 2004, pp. 44–58.

<sup>38</sup> И.В. Бочарников, С.В. Лемешев, Г.В. Люткене, *Современные концепции войн...*, pp. 61–62.

<sup>39</sup> М.А. Гареев, *Проблемы стратегического сдерживания в современных условиях*, „Военная мысль” 2009, No 4, pp. 3–6.

<sup>40</sup> See: Ю.Е. Горбачев, *Кибервойна уже идет*, „Независимое военное обозрение” 2013, No 13.

<sup>41</sup> С.Г. Чекинов, С.А. Богданов, *О характере и содержании войны нового поколения*,

Furthermore, he points out that gaining dominance in a future war will depend on its gaining in the net. In his views he was supported by Dmitry Rogozin, who said that (...) *without robotics, effective reconnaissance (intelligence), weapon systems, command and communication automation, there is no way now or in the future to conduct armed struggle.*<sup>42</sup>

Another idea, although controversial one, is the so called *консциентальных войн*, i.e. social wars or ones impacting on subconscious by W. Potehin and J. Gromyko. According to those two Russian scientists, it is a combination of undertakings which include the following elements of war: psychological (in terms of forms), civilization (essence), and information (the use of means and tools).<sup>43</sup> The basic goal of such war is to incapacitate the elites and whole nations by using different techniques of psychological and information influence so that they surrender. Russian scientists claim that current Russia has been a subject to such mechanisms for a dozen years which are typical for such kind of actions.<sup>44</sup>

In the context of such considerations by Russian scientists and experts gen. Valeriy Gerasimov public announcement together with his article from the beginning of 2013 means, at the same time, an outline and systematization of views of Russian political and military decision makers, both on changes going on in international relationships and on future conflicts and wars. It was undoubtedly a presentation of Russian perspective and, in a way, political and doctrine assumptions, including foreign policy directions as well as using military and non-military potential of the Russian Federation.

V. Gerasimov thinks that, after the so called colorful revolutions, the world has changed so dramatically that the line between war and stable peace had been blurred.<sup>45</sup> Also the basic war paradigm involving defeating armed forces and the will of the adversary, taking over his territory, forcing him to take the conditions of peace, must give way to new solutions, at least as tools, methods and ways of getting the goal are concerned.<sup>46</sup> So, wars of the future will not certainly be waged with the use of military potential, but also with other tools and ways leading to a destruction of the potential adversary. Methods of conventional conduct have not been abandoned, nevertheless, they must be supported by operations of intelligence, political, psychological, economic, information, humanitarian and social nature, which are led together with the use of „protesting potential”.<sup>47</sup> Particular place in these activities should have all

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„Военная мысль” 2013, No 10, p. 14.

<sup>42</sup> Д.О. Рогозин, *Перейти от заклинаний и воззваний к практической деятельности*, „Военно-промышленный курьер” 2013, No 14.

<sup>43</sup> И.В. Бочарников, С.В. Лемешев, Г.В. Люткене, *Современные концепции войн...*, pp. 64–65.

<sup>44</sup> *Ibidem*, pp. 65–67.

<sup>45</sup> В. Герасимов, *Ценность науки в предвидении*, „Военно-промышленный курьер” 2013, No 8, p. 2.

<sup>46</sup> M. Wojnowski, *Koncepcja „wojny nowej generacji” w ujęciu strategów Sztabu Generalnego Sił Zbrojnych Federacji Rosyjskiej*, „Przegląd Bezpieczeństwa Wewnętrznego” 2015, No 13, p. 14.

<sup>47</sup> Gerasimov stressed that in Wars of future there is further automation of a battlefield, that is

kinds of special forces operations, and intelligence and counterintelligence services operations. On each stage of waging war, actions by specialized groups and sub-units of special forces are to play the most important role. Special forces and intelligence take an active part in non-military undertakings as far as information and psychological war is concerned. Basically, the future war will consist of three or four stages. First stage shall consist in intelligence preparation, recognition, infiltration, and active psychological and information activities (disinformation, subversion, sabotage, terrorism, infiltration, anarchizing the area of potential aggression); second – active and permanent internal destabilization and isolation of the target internationally; third – military action with the use of special forces, mercenary units, paramilitary and rebels to invade a part of the aggression target territory (activities without declaring war); fourth – operations with the use of all kinds of troops to destroy military and economic potential of the attacked country using precision-guided strikes systems as well as methods and forms of actions typical for a psychological and information war.<sup>48</sup>

V. Gerasimov stressed a particular role of asymmetric and irregular actions on each and every stage of the conflict. Apart from partisan activities, sabotage or similar to terrorist activities he added also, for example, use of the so called protests potential, i.e. domestic opposition forces, national a religious minorities in the particular country.<sup>49</sup> Using those forces against the potential adversary will allow destabilizing the target of aggression, weakening of his potential, not only military but also political and economic. To realize that, according to Gerasimov, tools from the psychological and information war should be used. Such solutions are not, that should be stressed, anything new in Russian war tactics. Irregular activities or subversive acts, sabotage and terrorist have been practiced for over 70 years of the Soviet Union. Disinformation, inspiration, manipulating societies (active measures)<sup>50</sup>, subversion, acts of terror (assassination), irregular activities (the so called active intelligence) have entered the arsenal used by Russians for good not only against political opponents, but also against neighbor countries and all those who were classified as hostile.<sup>51</sup> Of particular concern should be the fact that exceptionally great emphasis was placed on information war tools on each step of future wars. According to Gerasimov, information struggle in broad sense is a separate kind of confrontation done by information, technical and psychological

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why he considered necessary to carry out studies on possible application of artificial intelligence in lighting systems. See: *The Value of Science Is in the Foresight New Challenges Demand Rethinking the Forms and Methods of Carrying out Combat Operations General of the Army Valery Gerasimov, Chief of the General Staff of the Russian Federation Armed Forces*, „Military Review” 2016, January–February, p. 26.

<sup>48</sup> В. Герасимов, *Ценность науки...*, p. 3.

<sup>49</sup> M. Wojnowski, *Koncepcja „wojny nowej generacji”...*, p. 15.

<sup>50</sup> See: J. Darczewska, P. Żochowski, *Środki aktywne. Rosyjski towar eksportowy*, Warszawa 2017.

<sup>51</sup> M. Snegovaya, *Putin's information warfare in Ukraine. Soviet origins of Russia's Hybrid Warfare*, Washington 2015, pp. 11–12; M. Galeotti, *Hybrid War or Gibridnaya Voina? Getting Russia's non-linear military challenge right*, without the place of edition 2016, pp. 44–47.

measures practically in all spheres of the state's activity (political, economic, diplomatic, humanitarian, military) as well as during a war.<sup>52</sup>

Concept of a new generation war has become also a subject of considerations by two prominent military experts, colonel Sergey Tchekinov and general lieutenant retired Sergey Bogdanov. They both managed to assess tendencies which are to dominate in armed struggle in the 21st century. According to those two experts in current century there has been a significant growth in the importance of weapons designed on the basis of artificial intelligence, nanotechnology and robotic complexes of weapon of prospective generation.<sup>53</sup> It is particularly a geophysical weapon (which enables to influence lithosphere, atmosphere, ionosphere, influence climate changes and volcanoes eruptions, earthquakes initiation and other weather rapid changes<sup>54</sup>), as well as laser weapon, plasma and psychotropic weapon.

Furthermore, according to Russian experts, revolution in technology caused a significantly growing role of measures and forces acting in the air and space area (what I. Kapitaniec had predicted) and information significance at all military struggle stages. The time taken to prepare operations or conduct combat action fell significantly. It was possible thanks to modern command systems that allow insight into a sphere of activities of an individual soldier on the battlefield.

S. Tchekinov and S. Bogdanov presented in October 2013 extended and original concept of a new generation war taking into account Gerasimov's theses. The proposed model was based on the eight consecutive stages.

1. Asymmetric activities.
2. Political leadership disinformation and general command disinformation by the so called active influence with the use of combined – overt and covert – special operations via media in a very broad sense, as well as via specialized entities, including special services.
3. Political and military systems disintegration (by intimidating, deceiving and corrupting political and military elites).
4. Using tools of information and psychological war on operational and strategic scale together with subversive and sabotage influence (terrorist).
5. Establishment of a no-fly zone over territory of the attacked country, roadblocks, bridges blockages, nodes blockages simultaneously with the use of mercenaries organizations and social regime and political system opponents of the country being an aggression target.
6. Conventional combat activities preceded by special forces operations and radio electronic (WRE), psychological and intelligence influence.
7. Intensification of military activities with support of information war tools.

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<sup>52</sup> В. Герасимов, *Ценность науки...*, p. 2–3; М. Snegovaya, *Putin's information warfare in Ukraine...*, pp. 15–17; P. Eronen, *Russian Hybrid Warfare: How to Confront a New Challenge to the West*, Washington 2016, p. 7.

<sup>53</sup> М. Wojnowski, *Mit „wojny hybrydowej”...*, p. 16.

<sup>54</sup> Ibidem.

8. Taking control over sensitive facilities and points of opposition. Elimination of the opponent troops, seizure, cleaning and maintenance of the area taken (final operations of land forces and airborne).<sup>55</sup>

As we can see, both proposals by Gerasimov and Tchekinov and Bogdanov, complement each other and are a systematized Russian view on a future battlefield at the same time, both tactically and strategically. What is important here, it is an attempt to respond to Western proposals, especially of American theorists. While trying to analyze in details theoretical bases of definition by Hoffman and Gerasimov's concept as well as of S. Tchekinov and S. Bogdanov, one could acknowledge that substantial differences do not come from different views on the way military activities should be conducted, but they come from the authors' mentality and the way they perceive reality, which is closely linked to history and culture of nations they represent.

### **Hybrid war and Ukrainian conflict**

Undoubtedly, the Ukrainian conflict has got many characteristics in line with classical definition of the described phenomenon. Whether this convergence should decide if we are to call the war in Ukraine, nowadays or in the future, a classical example of hybrid war and identify Russia as the country which had used its elements for the first time in practice? Even if we agree with the opinion that Russia's involvement in the conflict took a form of hybrid actions, doubts, however, about the nature of the conflict will stay. It is indisputable that Russia has taken Crimea and has used in the course of its actions new forms and ways of operations typical for hybrid conflicts. Also its involvement in the rebellion in the eastern provinces of Ukraine is unquestionable. Nevertheless, many aspects of terminology by Hoffman do not coincide with events in the course of the Ukrainian conflict. So, further definitions of those events seem to be a pure simplification and are more like an element of information war waged both by Russians as well as the West and Ukraine itself. Therefore, it should be stressed that Ukrainian conflict should be defined rather as a civil war or a rebellious war, in which new, combined forms and ways of military actions were used, both conventional (although without direct presence of entities of the international law) and other non-military methods. Especially the term *c i v i l w a r* is justified in its classical meaning because it is a political and ethnic conflict conducted by armed struggle within one country. At the same time, outer player (subject) does not affect the relevance of the term usage to the description of events connected to Ukrainian conflict. In the past there were at least few examples of civil wars with even bunch of outer players and the course of events was characterized by some basic for hybrid wars features. A very good example can be the Spanish Civil War 1936–1939. In this case one may speak about a classic example of armed clashes between two political options using different forms of combat actions and different methods, including

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<sup>55</sup> С.Г. Чекинов, С.А. Богданов, *О характере и содержании войны...*, pp. 16–23.

non-military ones, in their fight. Apart from classical operations there were elements of guerilla war, irregular activities (subversion, sabotage), psychological and information war. Both sides were supported by outer actors which had also been carrying out not only armed struggle but also psychological and information struggle although range and intensity of it were limited by technological capabilities. So, it is possible in theory to find a lot of similarities between Ukrainian and Spanish conflicts:

- war in Ukraine and in Spain served as testing grounds for both Russia and the West,
- in the two conflicts there are paramilitary troops, irregular troops and volunteers, including outer actors,
- the parties to the conflict are waging fierce war for hearts and minds and at the same time they influence intensively the general public,
- in case of both wars there were both conventional and irregular (guerilla) operations carried out.

It is worth noting that the nature of conflict sides is a differentiation element as far as the two wars are concerned. In Spain we are dealing with political adversaries, there is no interference of a neighboring country and the reason of the war is, first of all, ideological conflict and to some extent religious and social conflict. While in Ukraine, there was a political conflict in the first phase with a significant interference of the neighboring country which changed in a due course (or rather developed) into an ethnic conflict of a rebellion nature (form of rebellion war typical for civil wars). Certainly, there are also numerous differences of historical nature. That is the reason, what should be stressed, the Spanish civil war example is in this case only a hypothesis indicating some similarities as far as civil war phenomenon is concerned.

Coming back to consideration of hybridity of Ukrainian conflict, there should undoubtedly be noticed that it is an example of new forms of combined activities typical for new wars of the 21st century. This Ukrainian example clearly proves that application of different forms of military and non-military (hybrid) impact in scope of conducted operations proved to be very effective only because the target of aggression was weak<sup>56</sup>, with no solid democratic institutions and, what is more important, torn apart by domestic conflicts, which had deepened in the course of its short history. A major issue for the conflict development was a lack of a state-building experience and patterns that could support political elites in the course of a system transformation. From its very beginning, Ukrainian state by building its statehood, had been taking eastern patterns.

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<sup>56</sup> Krzysztof Wąsowski claims (after: Military Balance 2015) that during Russia's operations in Ukraine there were 3 characteristics of a hybrid war occurred. These were: conventional activities, psychological and information activities, special forces operations as well as influencing cyberspace and political and economic spheres. At the same time he distinguished as many as nine groups (attributes) typical for hybrid methods. These were: asymmetric nature, ambiguity and war via intermediaries (irregular character). Such division, although interesting and definitely authorian is a mixture of different forms and methods of military and non-military action, Rather freely assigned. It also causes chaos in terms of vocabulary and problems. See: K. Wąsowski, *Istota i uniwersalność rosyjskiego modelu wojny hybrydowej wykorzystanego na Ukrainie*, „Sprawy Międzynarodowe” 2015, No 2, pp. 45–47.

That is the reason why it appeared to be only a matter of time that the internal conflict would occur, which almost led to a disintegration of the country.

Undoubtedly, Russia had been very well prepared for the events of 2014. It used weaknesses of its neighbor. Earlier on, it had very well recognized the political scene and even had stimulated some events. Acting on the basis of already checked patterns it took over the control over Crimea territory in a bloodless way. It was a practical implementation of some elements of the Gerasimov's doctrine. According to unconfirmed information, both before annexation of Crimea and during the Crimea operation, most of the territory of Ukraine had been covered by radio electronic shielding and got under organized cyber strike<sup>57</sup>, which enabled, to a large extent, the management of governmental administration and of military and internal security sector on the peninsula. Furthermore, there had been tactical recognition done before and all levels of state management from the central level to the local one<sup>58</sup> had been worked out by intelligence. Russian-speaking population unwillingness to Ukrainian authorities was perfectly used and opposition forces were logistically prepared. It all happened under the watchful eye of the governmental administration and security forces of Ukraine.<sup>59</sup> However, it should not be a surprise for the majority of analysts who had been observing the situation in the country and changes in the defense system of the Russian Federation very carefully. Rapidly escalating internal chaos in Ukraine, numerous unresolved social problems, common corruption, unemployment, constant conflicts with Russia and lack of any perspectives to improve citizens' life together with laxity of oligarchs to ruin the country, like Cossack warlords prowling in the former borderland of the Second Republic of Poland, had been sui generis trademark of Ukraine from its very beginning.<sup>60</sup>

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<sup>57</sup> According to some Western experts Russia was to use operations in cyberspace during the political dispute in 2007 with Estonia for the first time with regard to liquidation of Soviet occupation symbols in public space as well as during the war with Georgia in 2008. It was pointed out, though, that hacking activities against Estonia were not coordinated and most probably were not supervised by Russian special services, so – if experts can be believed – the initiative came from the grassroots from Russian patriots (hackers). Totally different was supposed to be the situation of attacks on Georgia's informative systems before the country was attacked. It is not only that part of the nets used by governmental institutions that was blocked but also some data on possible preparations of military forces to an offensive against Georgia were installed. Behind that, according to Pasi Eronen inter alia, were Russian hackers and members of nationalist youth groups. Such scenario reminds modus operandi characteristic to active operations inspired by Soviet (Russian) special forces. See. *Georgia on Their Minds*, „The Wall Street Journal” 2009, October 1, [http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB1000142405274870447150457444658\\_2129281924](http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB1000142405274870447150457444658_2129281924) [access: 12 I 2018]; A. Hagen, *The Russo-Georgian War 2008*, in: *A Fierce Domain: Conflict in Cyberspace, 1986 to 2012*, by J. Healey, K. Grindal, Arlington 2013, p. 196–200; P. Eronen, *Russian Hybrid Warfare...*, p. 8.

<sup>58</sup> Mark Galeotti assessed that in the eastern Ukraine FSB had perfectly penetrated Ukrainian security apparatus and at the same time it had been taking activities stimulating to a desertion, monitoring planning and activities by Kiev. See: M. Snegovaya, *Putin's information warfare in Ukraine...*, p. 12.

<sup>59</sup> This way, as Polish and Western experts claim, definition basis for hybrid war was fulfilled with regard to Ukrainian conflict.

<sup>60</sup> In terms of GDP, Ukraine was and still is one of the poorest European countries. According to the IMF data from 2013, GDP per capita in Ukraine was 3900 USD. For comparison: in Estonia –

Furthermore, police forces, special services and army suffered from underinvestment and there was no way to counteract the adversary. On the one hand administrative apparatus had been corrupted by oligarchs and, on the other hand, it had been infiltrated by Russian special services.<sup>61</sup> Not to simply pay lip-service, words of general lieutenant A. Skipalsky, founder of the Ukrainian military counterintelligence and former deputy chief of the SBU should be cited. He said: *In the days of Janukovich almost all heads of Ukrainian military forces and Spetsnaz used to belong to the Russian Association of Airborne landing Soldiers led by one of deputies of the Defense Minister of the Russian Federation. Most of them have hold their high positions until now.*<sup>62</sup>

And this is the following assessment of the SBU by gen. Skipalsky: *We have a structure born with qualities of being unprofessional and corrupt, saturated with anti-Ukrainian, pro-Russian, thieving and immoral elements (...). Former KGB officers who had stayed to work in our country, did not counteract but favored anti-Ukrainian sentiments in the course of Russian special services activities.*<sup>63</sup>

It should be noted that while Skipalsky was assessing the condition of Ukrainian special services, in reality he was assessing condition of the whole country. What can you say about the country whose head of special services deserts and takes refuge at the hostile neighbor. It was A.G. Yakimenko, a graduate of Yuriy Gagarin Air Force Academy, until 1998 officer of Russian Army. Until the time of Maidan, he had been at the head of the most powerful and influential special service of Ukraine and had knowledge about the whole security system in Ukraine. How it happened then that political decision-makers had put him in charge of such a sensitive institution a Russian guy? Partial response can be found in Yakimenko's internet entry: *after graduating from the academy I understood that my skills are of no use to anybody. So, I quit. And those jerks noticed it and recalled me again. So I'm still acting.*<sup>64</sup>

„The jerks” had accepted a former Russian officer to serve in the SBU Regional Department in Donetsk, then appointed him the Chief of SBU in Sevastopol and then sent this exquisite expert back to Donbas for the post of the Chief of the SBU Regional Department in Donbas. On January 9, 2013 Yakimenko became the SBU Chief and this position gave him the right to be a member of the National Security and Defense

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18 000 USD, in Russia – 15 000 USD, in Poland – 13 000 USD, in Belarus – 7400 USD. In 2016 GDP in Ukraine was 2185 USD per capita and GDB in Belarus was almost 5 000 USD per capita. In the same year Russian GDP was assessed to be ca. 8700 USD and Polish GDP more than 12 300 USD. Making Ukraine with its chernozemes, natural resources, rivers and seas two times poorer than barren Belarus is a unique result, which had not been achieved so far by any king, hetman or any secretary general.

<sup>61</sup> In 2010, after Yanukovych took the power in Ukraine, the Chief of the SBU became Valeriy Khoroshkovsky, who was stressing many times in press interviews, that what stood behind a good cooperation with the FSB was a common chekist past. It resulted in signing in 2010 an agreement on cooperation with FSB and breaking contacts with the CIA at the same time, and easing any operations against Russian special services in Ukraine.

<sup>62</sup> М. Солонин, *Проект «Новороссия» – итоги*, „Военно-промышленный курьер” 2014, No 38, p. 11.

<sup>63</sup> Ibidem.

<sup>64</sup> Ibidem.

Council. This way he got the access to all intelligence and military secrets of Ukraine. On February 24, 2014, after the overthrow of Yanukovich, he fled to Russia where he has been hiding up to now.<sup>65</sup> Any comments are unnecessary here.

It is not only special services that were a problem in Ukraine. Ukrainian army was not in a better shape. Military forces stance in the country during the conflict is best reflected in one of the Chinese philosophers thoughts: *the army of morons under the lion's command matters more than the army of lions under the moron's command*. At first, it should be underlined that military forces of Ukraine had been penetrated by the Russian intelligence as much as other elements of law enforcement structures of the Ukrainian country. One should agree with a conclusion by Andrzej Wilk, an excellent expert on eastern Europe political and military issues that it was a quarter of a century for Ukraine to build efficient military forces from the very beginning. Conflict in Donbas and seizure of Crimea revealed, however, that the country did not have sufficient military potential in the spring of 2014 to prevent annexation of the peninsula and rebellion in the eastern provinces of the country.<sup>66</sup> Informal ties and connections between Ukrainian and Russian army personnel had never been broken, which caused, in consequence, that Ukrainian personnel switched sides after Crimea annexation. Changes observed by Ukrainian soldiers in the military forces of their eastern neighbor, especially as far as economic aspect was concerned, were also crucial. The Ukrainian army, as from 2010, found itself in permanent collapse. Corruption, underfunding (budget of 1%<sup>67</sup>), abandonment of integration into NATO, were those indicators that made the process even deeper. Reforms, which had been initiated back in the 1990s, were limited because of lack of money. Also personnel decisions did not make restructurization processes easier. A. Gricenko, former Chairman of the Supreme Committee of the Council of Ukraine on National Security and Defense, gave the picture of the Ukrainian military forces from 2011: *at present Ukrainian military forces do not have even one battalion with combat capacity, no one squadron in shape to fight, there are twenty two thousands of vacant posts in the army at the moment with no candidates for them. There is a lack of lower-level and mid-level officers in the army. Commanding officers are paid slightly less than cashiers at cashiers' desks in supermarkets*.<sup>68</sup> However, there was plenty of generals – 450, including 14 army generals<sup>69</sup> (the highest rank in the Ukrainian army). The quality of management and command personnel did not meet requirements of the 21st century as well. There are two examples that give

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<sup>65</sup> Ibidem.

<sup>66</sup> A. Wilk, *Najlepsza armia, jaką miała Ukraina. Zmiany w Siłach Zbrojnych Ukrainy po agresji rosyjskiej*, Warszawa 2017, p. 8.

<sup>67</sup> Still in 2006 the budget was about 1,36–1,74% of the GDP, to gain 0,79% three years later and ca. 1% in the next few years – with progressing degradation of equipment and decreasing number of recruits and after the professional army was established – with practically no interest from Ukrainian nationals in entering the service in the army. See: D. Sanders, 'The War We Want. The War That We Get': *Ukraine's Military Reform and the Conflict in the East*, „Journal of Slavic Military Studies” 2017, Vol. 30, No 1, pp. 33–34.

<sup>68</sup> М. Солонин, *Проект «Новороссия»...*, p. 11.

<sup>69</sup> Ibidem.

a good picture of the situation: first – designation of a businessman Pavel Lebedev as the Minister of Defense and second – giving admiral Denis Berezhovskiy command over Ukrainian Navy who, just after his appointment, went over to the Russian side.<sup>70</sup> Anyway, he was not the only soldier who abandoned service in the Ukrainian military forces towards military forces of the Russian Federation.

So, how was it possible that this internally broken, infiltrated and full of domestic conflicts Ukraine could resist a mighty neighbor? The answer seems to be simple: the country could not be able to do that. What is more, practically no other country, maybe with the exception of the USA, could manage to deal with aggression based on hybrid tools and methods on a strategic scale. It is possible that some part of countries of the so called old democracies circle would eventually fend off the possible attack, but its results would be very hard to assess. However, the case of Ukraine shows that weak democratic institutions together with a lack of state-building experiences are basic factors contributing to the state disintegration. This is the reason why there should not any special plan (strategy) be found with regard to Moscow activities toward Ukrainian state. One should also agree (at least partially) with some assessments of Russian politicians and experts, who claimed that, both in Crimea and in the eastern regions of Ukraine, Russia has not used any new forms and methods of combat, nor tactic solutions defined by the West as hybrid war. This is also the opinion of the Head of the Center for Strategy and Technology Assessment in Moscow, Ruslan Puhov.<sup>71</sup> His assessments are only partially true. Russians, indeed, did not use any new methods of combat which can be described as destabilizing or disintegrating the country. They just used experiences from the past, both from the history of their own military forces and special services, as well as from the experiences of the West (particularly the USA). In this way they worked out their own model of fighting in a globalization era.

To summarize, it has to be concluded that Puhov's ideas and assessments fit into a new Russian doctrine of future wars. At the same time we should also agree with the opinion of a Russian scientist, who had assessed Ukrainian military troops correctly by saying that Russians did not have to lead more or less advanced information operations because of low grade computerization of the Ukrainian army and archaic equipment it had, especially its units based on Crimea. However, other assessments and analyses by Puhov should undoubtedly be regarded as deliberate disinformation of social public, fitting perfectly into a Russian model of information fight.

By analyzing the Ukrainian conflict, one more – interesting as it seems – aspect should be pointed out. While assessing the course of events, starting from the protests in Maidan, via Crimea annexation, to struggles in eastern provinces of Ukraine, one may have the distinct impression that our eastern neighbor has become a one huge training ground used by current actors of international relations as area for testing new military doctrines (tactics and strategy of fighting on current battlefield), techniques,

<sup>70</sup> A. Wilk, *Najlepsza armia, jaką miała Ukraina...*, p. 10.

<sup>71</sup> Р. Пухов, *Миф о «гибридной войне». Никаких принципиально новых действий наша армия в Крыму и на Украине не вела*, „Независимое военное обозрение” 2015, No 19, p. 1.

equipment (gear and weapon systems) and diplomatic plays. Both Russians and the West (and obviously Ukraine) carry out massive and universal information and psychological war, test new weapon systems, systems of command and support, new training doctrine and future wars concept (in this area Russians are the leaders). Damage, destabilization of Ukraine and its disorganization do not mean anything for Russia and countries of the so called old democracies. Only one accounts: checking whether Russia can be finally eliminated from the global market and make it to submit to a general worldwide trend and post Cold-War order. No one from among political leaders does not probably realize what the reality after the Ukrainian crisis will look like and to what extent experiences gained during the war in Ukraine in military and political spheres will be used. Undoubtedly, apart from damage and human and material losses Ukrainian state lost most in mental and state-building spheres, which anyway, has its reference to non-military hybrid activities. Despite the change of those in power and, as it seems, the opening for the West, internal situation in Ukraine is still very complicated. It is still a corrupt country, ruled *de facto* by *familijas*, building up its credibility among its citizens and military potential very slowly. In spite of the fact that intensity of fighting has dropped visibly it does not mean that the process of dealing with the crisis and conflict gives hope for the peaceful war ending. Quite opposite, it seems that sides of the conflict are at the serious impasse and hybrid war has turned into a trench warfare.

## **Recommendations**

It should be clear that the West in broader sense has entered probably the most stormy era of an aggressive confrontation to overthrow fundamental basis of democratic models and institutions. Asymmetric and hybrid warfare makes it possible that even less mighty players are able to carry out many effective strikes despite of a lack of enough military potential, and, in some favorable circumstances, to take initiative both on tactical as well as on strategic level. It should be remembered that it is a state that will be even more threatening adversary, by using developed hybrid techniques and tools because it has a worked out doctrine of action and measures, and it is determined to gain political aims by using them especially against potentially weaker opponent.

Undoubtedly, it is the USA, the European Union and NATO that have such proper measures at their disposal to prevent Russia from leading hybrid operations, but it would be a waste if each and every Russia's move was counteracted. It is Russia strategy to inspire actions by the West and to force presence in expensive operations. Instead of that the West should clearly identify the most important strategic and economic infrastructure and take effective steps to eliminate and weaken Russian possibilities of waging hybrid wars. In view of this there should be intelligence activities on a broad scale carried out, including those which allow to permanently eliminate Kremlin's abilities and limit its possibilities of information and psychological actions. By using

asymmetric and hybrid tools the potential and influences from the Gerasimov's doctrine should be effectively limited. Moreover, the following should be done:

- building (creating) national and international coordination centers against hybrid war,
- doing scientific research into structures and procedures able to oppose hybrid and asymmetric threats on each level and to use them,
- studies on Russian strategic investments area, recognizing them and diminishing their influences,
- introducing new strict procedures and legal solutions regarding cyber security and security of information in a broad sense,
- leading diversified and effective propaganda campaign with regard to social opinion of the West and Russia,
- developing defensive capabilities and alliances in frame of economic war,
- developing abilities and anti-corruption tools.

### **Abstract**

After the collapse of the Cold War we have been observing sudden changes in tactics and ways the wars and conflicts are waged. Increasing mutual penetration and combining of regular and irregular war techniques has been noticeable. Current military conflicts, both regional and with broader range, are characterized by complexity of all possible warfare means and their practical usage. This diversity of elements included in destructive actions has become extremely popular subject of political and media discussions and has currently been defined as hybrid activities or hybrid war.

It has to be clear that the West in broader sense has entered the most stormy era of the aggressive confrontation to overthrow fundamental basis of democratic models and institutions. Asymmetric and hybrid warfare makes it possible that even less mighty players are able to carry out many effective strikes despite of a lack of enough military potential, and in some favorable circumstances to take initiative both on tactical as well as on strategic level.

**Keywords:** hybrid wars, future wars, war in Ukraine, Gerasimov's concept, military conflict, asymmetric war, rebellious wars, sixth generation wars (6G wars), irregular war.