Racjonalność, konflikty i teoria gier w życiu i pracy Roberta J. Aumanna (Nagroda Imienia Nobla w Dziedzinie Ekonomii, 2005)

• Authors: Ostasiewicz Katarzyna

Title variants

EN

Rationality, conflicts and game theory in the life and career of Robert J. Aumann (Nobel Prize in Economic Sciences, 2005)

• Languages of publication: PL EN

Abstracts

EN

Robert J. Aumann received the Nobel Prize in Economic Sciences in 2005 for his work on conflict and cooperation through game-theory analysis. The best known of his achievements is the concept of correlated equilibrium. He is also famous, not only among scientists, for his attempts to apply mathematical results to real political conflicts. The paper presents the sketch of main ideas of Aumann’s, including common knowledge and rationality, theorem considering Nash equilibria in iterated games, correlated equilibrium and theorem related to “agreeing to disagree”. There is also mentioned a very interesting problem of “how the Talmud divides an estate among creditors”, solved by Aumann. Moreover, the personal profile of Aumann is presented, as a man and as a political figure.

Keywords

EN

Robert J. Aumann; correlated equilibrium; repeated games; Folk Theorem

• Publisher: Uniwersytet Ekonomiczny we Wrocławiu. Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Ekonomicznego we Wrocławiu
• Journal: Śląski Przegląd Statystyczny
• Year: 2014
• Issue: 12(18)
• Pages: 285-312

Contributors

author

Ostasiewicz Katarzyna

References

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