Plantinga’s Haecceitism and Simple Quantified Modal Logic

• Authors: Pavone Luigi
• Languages of publication: EN

Abstracts

In a series of papers Alvin Plantinga argued for a serious actualist modal semantics based on the notions of possible world, understood as maximal possible state of affairs, and of individual essence (haecceity). Plantinga’s actualism is known as haecceitism. In spite of the fact that haecceitism has been thought by Plantinga to require a Kripke-style semantics, the aim of this paper is to show that it is compatible with constant domains semantics and the simplest quantified modal logic. I will argue that not only does this approach have all the advantages of a greater simplicity in combining quantification and modalities, but also it better conforms to the actualist program.

Keywords

EN

haecceitism; Kripke models; simplest quantified modal logic

• Publisher: Uniwersytet Mikołaja Kopernika (Nicolaus Copernicus University in Toruń)
• Journal: Logic and Logical Philosophy
• Year: 2018
• Volume: 27
• Issue: 2
• Pages: 151-160

Dates

published

2018-06-15

Contributors

author

Pavone Luigi

• Department of Humanities University of Palermo 90128 Palermo, Italy

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