A meta-logic of inference rules: Syntax

• Authors: Citkin Alex
• Languages of publication: EN

Abstracts

EN

This work was intended to be an attempt to introduce the meta-language for working with multiple-conclusion inference rules that admit asserted propositions along with the rejected propositions. The presence of rejected propositions, and especially the presence of the rule of reverse substitution, requires certain change the definition of structurality.

Keywords

EN

propositional logic; multiple-conclusion rule; rejected proposition; Ł-system; admissible rule; deductive system

• Publisher: Uniwersytet Mikołaja Kopernika (Nicolaus Copernicus University in Toruń)
• Journal: Logic and Logical Philosophy
• Year: 2015
• Volume: 24
• Issue: 3
• Pages: 313–337

Dates

published

2015-09-01

online

2015-03-09

Contributors

author

Citkin Alex

• Metropolitan Telecommunications, New York, 30 Upper Warren Way Warren, NJ 07059, USA

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Identifiers

DOI

10.12775/LLP.2015.007