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2016 | 25 | 3 Mereology and Beyond (II) | 245-258
Article title

Mereology and truth-making

Authors
Title variants
Languages of publication
EN
Abstracts
EN
Many mereological propositions are true contingently, so we are entitled to ask why they are true. One frequently given type of answer to such questions evokes truth-makers, that is, entities in virtue of whose existence the propositions in question are true. However, even without endorsing the extreme view that all contingent propositions have truth-makers, it turns out to be puzzlingly hard to provide intuitively convincing candidate truth-makers for even a core class of basic mereological propositions. Part of the problem is that the relation of part to whole is ontologically intimate in a way reminiscent of identity. Such intimacy bespeaks a formal or internal relation, which typically requires no truth-makers beyond its terms. But truth-makers are held to necessitate their truths, so whence the contingency when A is part of B but need not be, or B need not have A as part? This paper addresses and attempts to disentangle the conundrum.
Year
Volume
25
Pages
245-258
Physical description
Dates
online
2015-10-29
Contributors
author
References
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  • Mulligan, K., P.M. Simons, and B. Smith, “Truth-Makers”, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 44 (1984): 287–322. DOI: 10.2307/2107686
  • Simons, P.M., Parts, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1987. DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199241460.001.0001
  • Simons, P.M., “How the world can make propositions true: A celebration of logical atomism”, pages 113–135 in M. Omyła (ed.), Skłonność metafizyczna: Bogusławowi Wolniewiczowi w darze, Warsaw, Uniwersytet Warszawski, 1997.
  • Simons, P.M., “How to exist at a time when you have no temporal parts”, The Monist, 83 (2000): 419–436. DOI: 10.5840/monist200083321
  • Simons, P.M., “Why the negations of false atomic sentences are true”, in T. de Mey andM. Keinänen (eds.), Essays on Armstrong. Acta Philosophica Fennica, 84 (2008): 15–36.
Document Type
Publication order reference
Identifiers
YADDA identifier
bwmeta1.element.desklight-a3a2b46f-c74a-4b20-a1ce-83642405e8fd
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