Scientific Realism and the Future Development of Science

• Authors: Park Seungbae
• Languages of publication: PL EN

Abstracts

EN

Nickles raises many original objections against scientific realism. One of them holds that scientific realism originates from the end of history illusion. I reply that this objection is self-defeating and commits the genetic fallacy. Another objection is that it is unknowable whether our descendants will regard our current mature theories as true or false. I reply that this objection entails skepticism about induction, leading to skepticism about the world, which is inconsistent with the appeal to the end of history illusion. Finally, I argue that we have an inductive rationale for thinking that will lead our descendants to regard our current mature theories as true.

Keywords

EN

end of history illusion; mature theories; pessimistic induction; scientific realism

• Publisher: Instytut Filozofii - Uniwersytet Jagielloński
• Journal: Diametros
• Year: 2019
• Volume: 16
• Issue: 60
• Pages: 61-71

Dates

published

2019-06

Contributors

author

Park Seungbae

• Ulsan National Institute of Science and Technology in the Republic of Korea

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Identifiers

DOI

10.33392/diam.1119

ISSN

ISSN 1733-5566