2014 | 198 cz 1 | 200-210
Article title

Zakres i metody konkurencji podatkowej między władzami lokalnymi

Title variants
The Scope and Methods of Local Finance Competition
Languages of publication
The subject of paper is to identify factors determining the propensity of local authorities to tax competition. The essence of tax competition is to gain the source of tax revenues. Hence, it is very convenient to make assumption that the prime factor intensifying tax competition should be fiscal deficit. The need to finance local budget expenditures amplifying the propensity to look for additional sources of taxation. Nevertheless it is possible the propensity in question is the consequence of so-called economic deficit. Economic deficit is the difference between per capita expenditures attributed to specified local society and per capita expenditures in reference local society. It is pointed that the number of inhabitants correlates positively with the degree of tax competition intensification. Theoretical investigation allows to suggest two models of tax competition. The distinction between them depends on the relation between the area of local tax impact and the area under administrative power. The model of intensive tax competition is executed when these areas cover each other. The model of extensive tax competition is realized when the impact area includes the administration one. The paper stresses on taking into consideration the problems of the efficiency of tax competition. In suggested context, the crucial problem is the permanence of the source of tax revenues. Especially, the lasting source of taxation induces the growth of efficiency. In particulars, the permanence of tax revenues depends on the existence the barriers of tax jurisdiction leaving.
Physical description
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Document Type
Publication order reference
YADDA identifier
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