2013 | 4 (25) | 13-23
Article title

Relacje między ekonomią a psychologią

Title variants
Relations between economics and psychology
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Economics as a science on economic activity has built an assumption about the nature of economizing man over many decades. Homo oeconomicus model is not “the only right”. It has been a subject to modifications extending between the two approaches of research: psychologism and anti-psychologism. In the last few decades, psychology has expanded its scope of research on economic behavior. The aim of this study is to validate by methods of incomplete induction, if the assumption of rationality of economizing man corresponds to the real states of the human mind and cognitive capabilities. On the basis of these studies the economic psychology and behavioral economics emerged. Researchers in these areas oppose inductive method to hypothetico-deductive research program of mainstream economics on the basis of observations of irrational behavior of economizing man. The purpose of this article is, first, an overview of trends: the psychological and antipsychological in the theoretical development of the economics and, secondly, to show the weaknesses and threats of psychologism in economics and economic psychology. The paper discusses the psychological associations of Adam Smith and John Stuart Mill, who shaped the standard of classical economics. Then it discusses the shift towards logical empiricism and rationality postulate of Karl Popper. This turn shaped the assumption of rational economizing man, which was used in the theory of general equilibrium of markets. This theory, as static and idealizational, has been criticized in the new branches of economics in which there are lifted idealization assumptions of neoclassical economics to more comprehensive explanation of economic reality. Experiments and other methods of incomplete induction are a complementary tool to raise awareness about the economic reality. The conclusions states that inductive reasoning is unreliable and there should be used the best possible explanation of intentional human actions, such as intentional explanation. In contrast, the search for causes of economic behavior in cognitive limitations poses a risk of reduction of economics as a science of social relations in economy to natural sciences.
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