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2018 | 11(18) |

Article title

The Judicial Review of the Standard of Proof in Cartel Cases:Raising the Bar for the Croatian Competition Authority Case comment to the Judgment of the Constitutional Court of the Republic of Croatia No. U-III-2791/2016 of 1 February 2018 (Sokol Marić d.o.o.)

Content

Title variants

Languages of publication

EN

Abstracts

EN
The Security agencies case represents another example of the procedural diversity among Member States in applying national competition rules that mirror Articles 101 and 102 TFEU. In its infringement decision the Croatian NCA specified that the presence at the meeting with competitors and participation in the discussion concerning minimum prices was sufficient to impute to the parties participation in an anti-competitive agreement prohibited under the national equivalent of Article 101 TFEU. As the Croatian NCA investigated an agreement ‘by object’, it considered itself relieved of the burden to demonstrate the anti-competitive effects. The Constitutional Court has taken a different approach and held that the fact that the participants of the meeting have not publicly denounced the results of the meeting, cannot serve as evidence of an anti-competitive agreement. The court also found that the Croatian NCA did not manage to provide a reasonable explanation why the ‘hourly cost of service’ apparently discussed by competitors is the same as ‘hourly price of service’ that appears in the NCA’s decision. As a result, the Constitutional Court’s approach deviated from several substantive presumptions developed by the EU Commission and the EU courts when applying competition rules in relation to anti-competitive agreements. This places a heavier burden of proof on the Croatian NCA in cartel cases when compared to its own preceding practice or the enforcement practices of the EU Commission or other European NCAs.
FR
L’affaire des agences de sécurité représente un autre exemple de la diversité des procédures entre les États membres dans l’application de règles de concurrence nationales qui reflètent les articles 101 et 102 du TFUE. Dans sa décision d’infraction, l’autorité croate de la concurrence a précisé que la présence à la réunion avec les concurrents et la participation à la discussion sur les prix minimaux étaient suffisantes pour imputer aux parties la participation à un accord anticoncurrentiel interdit par l’équivalent national de l’article 101 du TFUE. L’autorité croate ayant enquêté sur un accord ‘par objet’ s’estime déchargée du fardeau de démontrer les effets anticoncurrentiels. La Cour constitutionnelle a adopté une approche différente et a jugé que le fait que les participants à la réunion n’ont pas dénoncé publiquement les résultats de la réunion ne peut servir de preuve d’un accord anticoncurrentiel. La Cour a également conclu que l’autorité croate n’avait pas réussi à expliquer de manière raisonnable pourquoi le ‘coût horaire du service’ apparemment discuté par les concurrents était identique au ‘prix horaire du service’ figurant dans la décision de l’autorité. En conséquence, l’approche de la Cour constitutionnelle s’écartait de plusieurs présomptions de fond développées par la Commission et les tribunaux de l’Union européenne lorsqu’elle appliquait les règles de concurrence relatives aux accords anticoncurrentiels. Cela alourdit la charge de la preuve incombant à l’autorité croate dans les cas des accords anticoncurrentiels par rapport à sa propre pratique antérieure ou aux pratiques répressives de la Commission de l’UE ou d’autres autorités européennes.

Year

Volume

Physical description

Dates

published
2018-12-30

Contributors

  • University of Macau, Faculty of Law

References

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Document Type

Publication order reference

YADDA identifier

bwmeta1.element.desklight-a7243948-c27b-484c-aafa-366ebb297a1a
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