PL EN


2017 | 2/2017 (25), cz.2 | 38-46
Article title

Aplikacja teorii istnienia przedsiębiorstw dla podmiotów ekonomii współdzielenia na przykładzie firmy Uber

Authors
Content
Title variants
EN
Application of theories of firm to sharing economy platforms based on Uber example
Languages of publication
PL EN
Abstracts
PL
Artykuł przestawia aplikację teorii istnienia przedsiębiorstw dla podmiotów ekonomii współdzielenia na przykładzie firmy Uber. Celem tego artykułu jest sprawdzenie, czy obecne teorie istnienia przedsiębiorstw, takie jak: teoria kosztów transakcyjnych, teoria zasobowa, teoria akumulacji wiedzy, teoria behawioralna, teoria agencji czy też koncepcja firmy jako artefaktu kulturowego, mogą być użyte w celu wyjaśnienia istnienia platform społecznych. Artykuł opiera się na przeglądzie literatury. Wyniki badania potwierdzają, że wymienione wyżej teorie mogą być zastosowane do wyjaśnienia istnienia firmy Uber. Wyjątkiem jest teoria agencji, która nie znajduje zastosowania w opisywanym przykładzie. Jako obszar przyszłych badań, autor proponuje kwestię relacji między platformami współdzielenia a podmiotami oferującymi usługi za pośrednictwem tych platform.
EN
This paper applies various theories of firms to explain existence of sharing economies platforms based on Uber examples. The purpose of this article is to investigate if existing theories like: transaction costs theory, resource based view, theory of accumulation of knowledge, behavioral theory, and agency theory, can be applied to explain why sharing economy platform exists. The article in based on literature review of existing theories of firm. The article confirms that existing theories of firm can be used to explain why sharing platforms exists. The only exception is agency theory that cannot be used to evidence Uber existence. The article highlights the need to explore relation between sharing platforms and service providers in future studies.
Year
Pages
38-46
Physical description
Dates
published
2017-12-12
Contributors
References
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Document Type
Publication order reference
Identifiers
ISSN
1733-9758
YADDA identifier
bwmeta1.element.desklight-a7a3c9d4-04a1-4835-8f0d-d6ad896eb923
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