Empowering the ‘Unempowerable’.Behavioural Insights into Informing Consumers about Internet Access Services in the European Union under Regulation 2015/2120

• Authors: Nałęcz Andrzej
• Languages of publication: EN

Abstracts

EN

The European consumer policy relies on the ideal of consumer empowerment, which involves providing all consumers with detailed information on the goods on offer. This policy also applies to the electronic communications sector, and empowering consumers who are the end-users of internet access services. The author reviews behavioural law and economics literature that pertains to consumer empowerment and applies the resulting insights to interpret Article 4 (1) of Regulation 2015/2120 laying down measures concerning open internet access in a way that would truly empower the sophisticated consumers. The author also proposes advising or obliging the providers of internet access services to label those services to provide even the unsophisticated consumers with meaningful and understandable information

FR

La politique européenne des consommateurs repose sur l’idéal de l’autonomisation des consommateurs (consumer empowerment), qui consiste à fournir à tous les consommateurs des informations détaillées sur les produits proposés. Cette politique s’applique également au secteur des communications électroniques et habilite les consommateurs qui sont les utilisateurs finaux des services d’accès à Internet. L’auteur passe en revue la littérature sur les analyses économiques du droit relative à l’autonomisation des consommateurs et applique les idées qui en résultent pour interpréter l’article 4, paragraphe 1, du règlement 2015/2120 établissant des mesures relatives à l’accès ouvert à l’internet pour le bénéfice des consommateurs sophistiqués. L’auteur propose également de conseiller ou d’obliger les fournisseurs de services d’accès Internet à étiqueter ces services afin de fournir aux consommateurs moins sophistiqués des informations utiles et compréhensibles.

Keywords

EN

consumer empowerment; sophisticated consumers; unsophisticated consumers; internet access services; labelling contracts; open internet

• Publisher: Uniwersytet Warszawski. Wydział Nauk Ekonomicznych
• Journal: Yearbook of Antitrust and Regulatory Studies
• Year: 2018
• Volume: 11(18)
• Pages: 13-34

Dates

published

2018-12-30

Contributors

author

Nałęcz Andrzej

• Faculty of Management, University of Warsaw

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Identifiers

DOI

10.7172/1689-9024.YARS.2018.11.18.1