PL EN


2017 | 105 | 243-258
Article title

Corporate Governance Theories in the New Institutional Economics Perspective. The Classification of Theoretical Concepts

Content
Title variants
PL
Teorie nadzoru korporacyjnego w świetle założeń nowej ekonomii instytucjonalnej. Próba usystematyzowania koncepcji
Languages of publication
EN
Abstracts
EN
The inter-disciplinarity and multi-paradigmatism of corporate governance issues results in a lack of clear categorization of the theories. This paper attempts to systematize theories of corporate governance with special emphasis on the new institutional economics (NIE) framework and suggests new concepts for systematization. It allows us to understand better the limitations of each theory, and thus to choose the best one in particular circumstances, as well as provide them with the best available methodology. Bringing all the theories into the paradigm of NIE makes them closer to real market conditions and enables us to use methods attributed to neo-institutional research.
PL
Interdyscyplinarność i wieloparadygmatyzm zagadnień związanych z nadzorem korporacyjnym utrudnia wskazanie jednolitej klasyfikacji teorii corporate governance. W artykule podjęto próbę usystematyzowania teorii nadzoru oraz skonfrontowania ich założeń z paradygmatem nowej ekonomii instytucjonalnej. Przeprowadzony przez autorkę przegląd podejść teoretycznych podkreśla ograniczenia każdej z zaprezentowanych koncepcji, pozwalając tym samym wybrać optymalną w określonych warunkach teorię oraz metodologię badań. Analizowane teorie zinterpretowane zostały również w świetle założeń NEI, co, w opinii autorki, zbliża je do rzeczywistych warunków, w jakich funkcjonują współczesne podmioty gospodarcze, oraz umożliwia wykorzystanie instrumentarium metodologicznego używanego w analizie neoinstytucjonalnej.
Year
Volume
105
Pages
243-258
Physical description
Dates
published
2017
Contributors
References
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Document Type
Publication order reference
Identifiers
ISSN
0081-6841
YADDA identifier
bwmeta1.element.desklight-a9c30957-d9f8-4fd7-a217-af98b7a5ef55
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