Kant, Husserl, McDowell: The Non-Conceptual in Experience

• Authors: Corijn van Mazijk
• Languages of publication: EN

Abstracts

EN

In this paper I compare McDowell′s conceptualism to Husserl′s later philosophy. I aim to argue against the picture provided by recent phenomenologists according to which both agree on the conceptual nature of experience. I start by discussing McDowell′s reading of Kant and some of the recent Kantian and phenomenological non-conceptualist criticisms thereof. By separating two kinds of conceptualism, I argue that these criticisms largely fail to trouble McDowell. I then move to Husserl’s later phenomenological analyses of types and of passive synthesis. Although Husserl appropriates McDowell’s idea of conceptually ‘saddled’ intuitions as a ‘secondary passivity’, I argue that he also provides a strong case for non-conceptual synthesis.

Keywords

EN

McDowell; Husserl; Non-Conceptual Content; Phenomenology; Kant; Conceptualism; Passive Synthesis

• Publisher: Instytut Filozofii - Uniwersytet Jagielloński
• Journal: Diametros
• Year: 2014
• Issue: 41
• Pages: 99-114

Contributors

author

Corijn van Mazijk

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