Richard Rorty and the analytic tradition: radical break or partial continuity?

• Authors: Tadeusz Szubka

Abstracts

EN

It is quite widely assumed that at the beginning of his career Richard Rorty was an orthodox analytic philosopher, working in its then current mainstream, and especially fascinated by the linguistic turn taken by this tradition. Subsequently he supposedly radically and dramatically changed his views, turning himself from a staunch analytic philosophers into a vigorous critic of the analytic tradition and ultimately paradigmatically postmodern and continental thinker. It is argued in the paper that this common picture exaggerates changes in Rorty’s philosophical views. He certainly has never become fully postmodern and continental philosopher, whatever it means. And what seems more important, he always had a lot of reservations about analytic philosophy and had less hopes of it than one or two passages from his early writings suggest.

• Publisher: Instytut Filozofii - Uniwersytet Jagielloński
• Journal: Diametros
• Year: 2010
• Issue: 25
• Pages: 146-158

Contributors

author

Tadeusz Szubka

References

• Blanshard [1962] – B. Blanshard, Reason and Analysis, Open Court, La Salle, Ill. 1962.
• Guignon, Hiley [2003] – C. Guigon, D.R. Hiley (eds.), Richard Rorty, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 2003.
• Rorty [1961] – R. Rorty, Recent Metaphilosophy, “The Review of Metaphysics” (15) 1961: 299-318.
• Rorty [1962] – R. Rorty, Realism, Categories, and the “Linguistic Turn”, “International Philosophical Quarterly” (2) 1962: 307-322.
• Rorty [1963] – R. Rorty, [Review of] Reason and Analysis by Brand Blanshard, ”The Journal of Philosophy” (60) 1963: 551-557.
• Rorty [1967] – R. Rorty, Do Analysts and Metaphysicians Disagree?, “Proceedings of the American Catholic Philosophical Association” (41) 1967: 39-53.
• Rorty [1967/1992] – R. Rorty, Metaphilosophical Difficulties of Linguistic Philosophy, [in:] idem (ed.), The Linguistic Turn: Essays in Philosophical Method (with Two Retro- spective Essays), The University of Chicago Press, Chicago 1992: 1-39.
• Rorty [1970] – R. Rorty, Strawson’s Objectivity Argument, ”The Review of Metaphysics” (24) 1970: 207-244.
• Rorty [1971] – R. Rorty, Verification and Transcendental Arguments, ”Noûs” (5) 1971: 3-14.
• Rorty [1978] – R. Rorty, Epistemological Behaviorism and the De-Transcendentalization of Analytic Philosophy, ”Neue Hefte für Philosophie” (14) 1978: 115-142.
• Rorty [1979] – R. Rorty, Transcendental Arguments, Self-Reference, and Pragmatism, [in]: P. Bieri, R.-P. Horstmann, L. Krüger (eds.), Transcendental Arguments and Science, Reidel, Dordrecht 1979: 77-103.
• Rorty [1992] – R. Rorty, Twenty-Five Years After, [in:] idem (ed.), The Linguistic Turn: Essays in Philosophical Method (with Two Retrospective Essays), The University of Chicago Press, Chicago 1992: 371-374.
• Rorty [1999/2000] – R. Rorty, Analytische Philosophie und verändernde Philosophie, übersetzt von C. Mayer, [in:] idem, Philosophie und die Zukunft. Essays, Fischer Taschenbuch Verlag, Frankfurt am Main 2000: 54-78 (quoted from the unpublished English original Analytic Philosophy and Transformative Philosophy; page references to the German translation).
• Rorty [2003/2007] – R. Rorty, Analytic and Conversational Philosophy, [reprinted in:] idem, Philosophy as Cultural Politics: Philosophical Papers, vol. 4, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 2007: 120-130.
• Sellars [1962/1963] – W. Sellars, Philosophy and the Scientific Image of Man, [reprinted in:] idem, Science, Perception and Reality, Routledge, London 1963: 1-40.
• Strawson [1982] – P.F. Strawson, [Review of] Transcendental Arguments and Science, P. Bieri, R.-P. Horstmann, and L. Krüger (ed.), ”The Journal of Philosophy” (79) 1982: 45-50.

Identifiers

DOI

10.13153/diam.25.2010.410