Kilka uwag o teorii interpretacji konstytucyjnej Ronalda Dworkina na przykładzie klauzuli wolności słowa

• Authors: Machaj Łukasz

Title variants

EN

Some remarks on Ronald Dworkin’s theory of constitutional interpretation on the example of the freedom of speech clause

• Languages of publication: PL EN

Abstracts

EN

The article analyses the concept of constitutional interpretation of Ronald Dworkin, one of the most eminent representatives of contemporary liberal legal thought. Its basic assumption is the conviction that fundamental laws contain abstract concepts which are the domain of political philosophy (e.g. ‘freedom’, ‘property’, ‘due process’), and that those who interpret them – judges in particular – must refer to axiological, ontological or epistemological findings in an attempt to find the best possible interpretation of such terms. Dworkin rejects the originalist paradigm of interpretation, which assumes a static content of the provisions of the Basic Law. The interpreter is obliged to search for the proper meaning of the constitution, regardless of both the intentions of its drafters and its original public meaning. The article also shows Dworkin’s application of this theory to the First Amendment to the United States Constitution in the area of freedom of speech.

Keywords

EN

Ronald Dworkin; First Amendment; freedom of speech; originalism; interpretation

• Publisher: Kancelaria Sejmu / Chancellery of the Sejm
• Journal: Przegląd Sejmowy
• Year: 2021
• Issue: 5(166)
• Pages: 77-98

Contributors

author

Machaj Łukasz

• Dr hab. Łukasz Machaj, prof. UWr Uniwersytet Wrocławski, Wydział Prawa, Administracji i Ekonomii, Polska University of Wrocław, Faculty of Law, Administration and Economics, Poland [e-mail], https://orcid.org/0000-0002-7247-0138

References

• Anhang G., Separation of powers and the rule of law. On the role of judicial restraint in “secur[ing] the blessings of liberty”, “Akron Law Review” 1990, vol. 24.
• Balkin J.M., History, rights, and the moral reading, “Boston University Law Review” 2016, vol. 96.
• Berger R., Government by judiciary. The transformation of the Fourteenth Amendment, Liberty Fund, Indianapolis 1977.
• Berger R., Ronald Dworkin’s The Moral Reading of the Constitution: a critique, “Indiana Law Journal” 1997, vol. 72.
• Berman M.N., Our principled Constitution, “University of Pennsylvania Law Review” 2018, vol. 166.
• Black H.L., The Bill of Rights, [w:] One man’s stand for freedom. Mr. Justice Black and the Bill of Rights, red. I. Dilliard, Alfred A. Knopf, New York 1963.
• Bork R.H., The tempting of America. The political seduction of the law, Simon&Schuster, New York 1990.
• Brink D.O., Originalism and contructive interpretation, [w:] The legacy of Ronald Dworkin, red. W. Waluchow i S. Sciaraffa, Oxford University Press, Oxford–New York 2016.
• Brown A., Ronald Dworkin’s theory of equality. Domestic and global perspectives, Palgrave Macmillan, Basingstoke 2009.
• Ciszewski W., Demokratyczny status sądowej kontroli konstytucyjności prawa, „Filozofia Publiczna i Edukacja Demokratyczna” 2016, t. 5, nr 1.
• Dworkin R., Biorąc prawa poważnie, tł. T. Kowalski, Wydawnictwo Naukowe PWN, Warszawa 1998.
• Dworkin R., Freedom’s law. The moral reading of the American Constitution, Harvard University Press, Cambridge 1996.
• Dworkin R., Is democracy possible here? Principles for a new political debate, Princeton University Press, Princeton 2006.
• Dworkin R., Justice for hedgehogs, Belknap Press, Cambridge–London 2011.
• Dworkin R., Justice in robes, Belknap Press, Cambridge–London 2006.
• Dworkin R., Law’s empire, Fontana Press, London 1991.
• Dworkin R., Life’s dominion. An argument about abortion, euthanasia, and individual freedom, Alfred A. Knopf, New York 1993.
• Dworkin R., A matter of principle, Harvard University Press, Cambridge–London 1985.
• Dworkin R., Religion without God, Harvard University Press, Cambridge 2013.
• Dworkin R., Sovereign virtue. The theory and practice of equality, Harvard University Press, Cambridge 2002.
• Dworkin R., The Supreme Court Phalanx: the Court’s new right-wing bloc, New York Review of Books, New York 2008.
• Emerson T.I., The system of freedom of expression, Random House, New York 1970.
• Fallon R.H., Jr., How to choose a constitutional theory, “California Law Review” 1999, vol. 87.
• Fleming J.E., Are we all originalists now? I hope not!, “Texas Law Review” 2013, vol. 91.
• Gitlow vs. New York, 268 U. S. 652 (1928).
• Goldford D.J., The American Constitution and the debate over originalism, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge–New York 2005.
• Goldsworthy J., Dworkin as an originalist, “Constitutional Commentary” 2000, vol. 17.
• Graber M.A., Old wine in new bottles. The Constitutional status of unconstitutional speech, “Vanderbilt Law Review” 1995, vol. 48.
• Guest S., The role of moral equality in legal argument, [w:] The practice of integrity: Reflections on Ronald Dworkin and South African law, red. F. du Bois, Juta & Co., Cape Town 2008.
• Guest S., Ronald Dworkin, Stanford University Press, Stanford 2013.
• Hentoff N., Free speech for me but not for thee. How the American Left and Right relentlessly censor each other, Harper Collins Publishers, New York 1992.
• Hunt A., Law’s empire or legal imperialism?, [w:] Reading Dworkin critically, red. A. Hunt, Berg Publishers, Providence 1992.
• Hunter T., Interpretive theories: Dworkin, Sunstein, and Ely, “Bond Law Review” 2005, vol. 17.2.
• Latham A., Dworkin’s incomplete interpretation of democracy, “Washington University Jurisprudence Review” 2018, vol. 10.
• Levinson S., Hercules, Abraham Lincoln, the United States Constitution, and the problem of slavery, [w:] Ronald Dworkin, red. A. Ripstein, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge–New York 2007.
• Lyons D., Moral limits of Dworkin’s theory of law and legal interpretation, “Boston University Law Review” 2010, vol. 90.
• McConnell M.W., The importance of humility in judicial review. A comment on Ronald Dworkin’s “moral reading” of the Constitution, “Fordham Law Review” 1997, vol. 65.
• Meiklejohn A., The First Amendment is an absolute, “The Supreme Court Review” 1961, vol. 1961.
• Monsma S.V., Soper J.C., The challenge of pluralism. Church and state in five democracies, Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc., Lanham 2009.
• Polenberg R., Fighting faiths. The Abrams case, the Supreme Court, and free speech, Penguin Books, New York 1989.
• Rawls J., Liberalizm polityczny, tł. A. Romaniuk, Wydawnictwo Naukowe PWN, Warszawa 1998.
• Raz J., Speaking with one voice. On Dworkinian integrity and coherence, [w:] Dworkin and his critics, red. J. Burley, Wiley-Blackwell, Malden 2004.
• Scalia A., Common-law courts in a civil law system. The role of United States federal courts in interpreting Constitution and laws, [w:] A matter of interpretation. Federal courts and the law, red. A. Gutmann, Princeton University Press, Princeton 1997.
• Steamer R.J., Contemporary Supreme Court directions in civil liberties, “Political Science Quarterly” 1997, vol. 92.
• Strauss D.A., Freedom of speech and the common-law Constitution, [w:] Eternally vigilant. Free speech in the modern era, red. L.C. Bollinger, G.R. Stone, University of Chicago Press, Chicago–London 2000.
• Warciński M., Służebności gruntowe według kodeksu cywilnego, Wolters Kluwer, Warszawa 2013.
• Whittington K., Dworkin’s “originalism”. The role of intentions in constitutional interpretation, “Review of Politics” 2000, vol. 62.

Identifiers

DOI

10.31268/PS.2021.61