Кейси Криму та «Новоросії» у контексті нових викликів європейській безпеці

• Authors: Брусиловська Ольга

Title variants

EN

Crimea and “Novorossiya” Cases in the Context of New Challenges for European Security

• Languages of publication: UK

Abstracts

EN

The aim of this paper is to reveal the evolution of basic principles of international law and main approaches of great powers to regulation of regional conflicts on the basis of analysis of Crimea and “Novorossiya” cases. The works of Nicu Popescu and Andrew Wilson about the special aspects of the Russian power were used as the theoretical foundation of this paper. After the Second World War international law was based on the principle of inviolable borders. And now this principle is being revised. This causes the raise of separatism in all multinational states. And this serves well for the Russian foreign politics. At that time it became a priority for the politicians in the Kremlin to regain geopolitical control of the areas adjacent to the Russian Federation and rebuild the spheres of influence which existed back in the Soviet times. Russian soft power is built on bedrock of historical and cultural affinity - the presence of Russian minorities in neighbourhood countries, the Russian language, post- Soviet nostalgia and the strength of the Russian Orthodox Church. The Russian and the Western soft power differ fundamentally. Russian soft power, civil society, expert networks or analytic schools by definition are not equivalent or similar institutions as those in the West. They serve different functions, namely propaganda. The vectors Russia’s soft power, including the Russian-speaking minority organisations, have organised the referendum in Crimea, and have been destabilising the eastern regions of Ukraine. The proponents of “Eurasianism” claim that there exists a separate civilization and historical community in the territory corresponding to the area of the former Russian Empire. They ascribe a cultural meaning to the Russian-speaking community (so-called Russian world). The concept of “nation” is expanded to include areas where the Russian language and culture are dominant. This ideology has become an instrument for managing the conflicts in the post-Soviet area (Abkhazia, South Ossetia, Crimea, and Novorossiya). On March 6, 2014, the Parliament of Crimea adopted a Resolution No.1702-6/14 that provided for a referendum on secession to be held on March 16, 2014. The referendum was characterized by a complete lack of transparency. Claims on legality of the annexation of Crimea have nothing to do with international law. However, it was reported in Russia that the decision to join Russia was supported by more than 97% of voters. In other words, in Crimea a unilateral secession took place. Even after annexation of Crimea the problem of Russianspeaking is still dangerous for the stability of Ukraine, because they are actively supported by Russian Federation. The notion of “Novorossiya” denotes the confederation of the self-proclaimed republics of Donetsk and Luhansk. Putin first called this part of Ukraine “Novorossiya on 17 March, 2014 after the annexation of Crimea. Russia is not interested to de jure separate Donbas from Ukraine, but interested to make the region economically more viable. In future Russia might return to the plans of carving out a more sizeable Novorossiya. Minsk agreements (February 12, 2015) foresee, among other things, the removal of military hardware from the separatist regions and the monitoring of the Russia-Ukraine border. Some commentators and even some Ukrainians suggested a radical solution: abandoning Donbas altogether. This would free Kyiv so it could focus on reforms and spare it a real economic and political burden. But independence for Donbas is probably unrealistic: many forces in Ukraine would be against it, and so would the West. And it is an option that Moscow neither expects nor wants. Russia wants leverage over Ukraine, not burdensome new obligations. Russian policy that Europe have followed up to now, based on the assumption of cooperation and the respect of commonly agreed rules, is done for the time being. Russia is no longer a partner for stability in the European neighbourhood. For example, the Budapest Memorandum collapsed after Russia annexed the Crimea. Despite that both European and American leaders called on Russia to stop – at 11 first by terminating support to the “men in green”, later by ceasing conflict escalation and supply of weapons, and not carrying out unilateral humanitarian operations – withdrawal from all these “red lines” was made, because the West avoided getting into a direct confrontation with Russia. The situation after the 2008 conflict in Georgia allows Russia to assume that after the end of the conflict in Ukraine, relations with the West will eventually revert to the “business as usual” situation. Russia hopes to repeat this scenario again. It is important to emphasize that the “business as usual” concept includes not only normalization of economic relations, lifting of sanctions, and renewal of the political dialogue, but also recognition of Russia as a veto holder in the security architecture of Europe. The practical manifestation of such recognition could be that the expansion of the transatlantic institutions further to the post–Soviet space would not be possible without Russia’s approval. The Ukraine crisis has altered Europe’s security structure. Europe is now far less secure, and its security architecture altogether is less stable, less predictable. At the same time, Europe has a better chance to exist peacefully if it succeeds in binding Russia into a cooperative order.

Keywords

EN

Europe; Ukraine; Russia; Crimea; “Novorossiya”; international law

• Publisher: Polskie Towarzystwo Naukowe w Żytomierzu
• Journal: Studia Politologica Ucraino-Polona
• Year: 2016
• Volume: 6
• Pages: 10-19

Contributors

author

Брусиловська Ольга

• Одеський національний університет імені І. І. Мечникова (Одеса, Україна)