The British Government and the Naval Disarmament Conference in Geneva (1927)

• Authors: Krystian Maciej Szudarek

Title variants

PL

Brytyjski rząd wobec morskiej konferencji rozbrojeniowej w Genewie (1927)

• Languages of publication: EN

Abstracts

EN

The Naval Disarmament Conference was held in Geneva between 20 June – 4 August 1927 on the initiative of the American President Calvin Coolidge. It was a continuation of the process initiated during the Washington Conference (12 November 1921 – 6 February 1922). It was then that Great Britain, the United States of America, Japan, France and Italy determined the ratio of the naval forces in the class of battleships and aircraft carriers in line with the following: 5 : 5 : 3 : 1.75 : 1.75. During the so-called Coolidge Conference (1927) the American party did its best to conclude an international treaty and consequently achieve parity between the US Navy and Royal Navy in all classes of warships. The British government accepted an invitation to the Geneva Conference (1927) assuming that their delegation would succeed in forcing through the disarmament plan formulated by the Admiralty. The plan was aimed at modifying the Washington Treaty in order that the British Empire could make savings and at the same time improve her national security. The British plan was aimed at prolonging the service life of battleships and aircraft carriers, reducing the displacement and calibre of guns carried by battleships, and, last but not least, dividing the cruisers into heavy and light as well as imposing limitations only on the number of the former. The British plan met with strong objection from the American delegation. Attempts made to reach a consensus over parity between the Royal and US Navy in the class of cruisers were unsuccessful, and the conference eventually turned into a fiasco. Such a state of affairs had to do with strategic, political and economic issues. The Admiralty opposed to reaching an agreement which put the security of the British Empire at a serious risk, and the majority of the British ministers were inclined to believe that the conference breakdown would be lesser evil than agreeing to the American demands. The British diplomats strove for adopting a common stance with the Japanese delegation in order that the responsibility for the conference collapse rested with the American party.

PL

Morska konferencja rozbrojeniowa w Genewie (20 czerwca – 4 sierpnia 1927 r.) została zwołana z inicjatywy amerykańskiego prezydenta Calvina Coolidge’a i miała stanowić kontynuację procesu zapoczątkowanego na Konferencji Waszyngtońskiej (12 listopada 1921 r. – 6 lutego 1922 r.). Na konferencji w Waszyngtonie ustalono stosunek sił morskich Imperium Brytyjskiego, Stanów Zjednoczonych, Japonii, Francji i Włoch w klasie pancerników i lotniskowców według ratio: 5 : 5 : 3 : 1,75 : 1,75. Na konferencji Coolidge’a w 1927 roku strona amerykańska dążyła do uzyskania w traktacie międzynarodowym parytetu pomiędzy US Navy i Royal Navy we wszystkich klasach okrętów wojennych. Brytyjski rząd przyjął zaproszenie na konferencję w 1927 roku wychodząc z założenia, że delegacja brytyjska zdoła w Genewie przeforsować własny plan rozbrojenia opracowany przez Admiralicję. Polegał on na modyfikacji zasad traktatu waszyngtońskiego w taki sposób, aby zapewnić oszczędności finansowe, ale jednocześnie zachować bezpieczeństwo Imperium Brytyjskiego. Głównymi elementami brytyjskiego planu było: wydłużenie okresu pozostawania w służbie pancerników i lotniskowców, redukcja kalibru dział i wyporności pancerników, wprowadzenie traktatowego podziału krążowników na ciężkie i lekkie oraz nałożenie ograniczeń ilościowych tylko na krążowniki ciężkie. Brytyjski plan spotkał się ze zdecydowaną opozycją delegacji amerykańskiej. Próby opracowania kompromisowego porozumienia w sprawie parytetu pomiędzy flotą brytyjską i amerykańską w klasie krążowników zakończyły się niepowodzeniem, a konferencja zakończyła się fiaskiem. Przesądziły o tym względy strategiczne, polityczne i ekonomiczne. Admiralicja była przeciwna porozumieniu, które narażało na szwank bezpieczeństwo Imperium Brytyjskiego, a większość członków rządu brytyjskiego uważała, że niepowodzenie konferencji będzie mniejszym złem niż kapitulacja przed żądaniami amerykańskimi. Dyplomacja brytyjska dążyła do ustalenia wspólnego stanowiska z delegacją japońską, aby odium za niepowodzenie konferencji skierować na przedstawicieli Waszyngtonu.

Keywords

EN

Great Britain; naval disarmament; Coolidge Conference

• Publisher: Wydawnictwo Naukowe Uniwersytetu Szczecińskiego
• Journal: Studia Maritima
• Year: 2014
• Volume: 27/I
• Pages: 87-151

Contributors

author

Krystian Maciej Szudarek

• Uniwersytet Szczeciński

References

• British Documents on Foreign Affairs. Reports and Papers from the Foreign Office Confidential Print, general editors K. Bourne & D. C. Watt, Part II: From the First to the Second World War, Series C: North America, 1919–1939, ed. by D. K. Adams, vol. 18: Arbitration, Arms Control and Pact of Paris, 1927–1929, Frederick Md. 1995
• British Documents on Foreign Affairs: Reports and papers from the Confidential Print, general ed. K. Bourne and D. C. Watt, Part II: From the First to the Second World War, Series J: The League of Nations, 1918–1914, ed. P. J. Beck, vol. 6: The Question of Disarmament 1934–1938, and Naval Disarmament Discussions, 1924–1936, Frederick Md. 1992; II, ser. J, vol. 6; II, ser. C, vol. 18
• The British Library, Cecil Papers, Add. MSS 5121; Add. MSS 5108
• Records of the Conference for the Limitation of Naval Armament held at Geneva from June 20 to August 4, 1927, Geneva 1927
• The National Archives, Foreign Office Papers; Cabinet Papers 24/185; CAB 2/5; CID 228th Meeting; CAB 23/54; CAB 23/55; CAB 24/185; CAB 24/188; CAB 24/189 (27); CAB 27/350, LNA (27); CAB 4/16; CAB 63/39; FO 800/261
• Command Paper 2964 (1927) further: Cmd. 2964 (1927)]
• Documents on British Foreign Policy 1919–1939, Series I, vol. III, ed. by W. N. Medlicott, D. Dakin & M. E. Lambert, London 1970
• Documents on Irish Foreign Policy, vol. III: 1926–1932, eds. R. Fanning & al., Dublin 2002
• Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States 1927, vol. I, Washington 1942
• Parliamentary Debates. House of Commons. Official Report, 4th Series, vol. CCCXXXIII; 5th Series, vol. CCIX; 5th Series, vol. CCX
• Parliamentary Debates. House of Lords. Official Report, 5th Series, vol. LXVIII; 5th Series, vol. LXIX
• “The Times” 1927
• Andrade E., Jr., Arms Limitation Agreements and the Evolution of Weaponry: The Case of the “Treaty Cruiser”, in: Naval History. The Sixth Symposium of the U. S. Naval Academy, ed. by D. M. Masterson, Wilmington Del. 1987
• Andrade E., Jr., The Cruiser Controversy in Naval Limitations Negotiations, 1922–1936, “Military Affairs” 1984, vol. XLVIII, No. 3
• Andrade E., Jr., United States Naval Policy in the Disarmament Era, 1921–1937, Ph. D. dissertation, Michigan State University, 1966
• Anglo-American Naval Relations, 1919–1939, ed. by M. Simpson, Farnham 2010
• Asada S., From Mahan to Pearl Harbor. The Imperial Japanese Navy and the United States, Annapolis Md. 2006
• Asada S., From Washington to London: The Imperial Japanese Navy and the Politics of Naval Limitation, 1921–1930, “Diplomacy & Statecraft” 1993, vol. IV, No. 3
• Bell Ch. M., Winston Churchill, Pacific Security, and the Limits of British Power, 1921–1941, in: Churchill and Strategic Dilemmas Before the World Wars. Essays in Honor of Michael I. Handel, ed. by J. H. Maurer, London 2003
• Bickel W.-H., Die anglo-amerikanischen Beziehungen 1927–1930 im Licht der Flottenfrage. Das Problem des Machtausgleich zwischen Großbritannien und der Vereinigten Staaten in der Zwischenkriegszeit und seine Lösung, Dissertation, Zürich 1970
• Blatt J., France and the Washington Conference, “Diplomacy & Statecraft” 1993, vol. IV, No. 3
• Blatt J., The Parity that Meant Superiority: French Naval Policy towards Italy at the Washington Naval Conference, 1921–1922, and Interwar French Foreign Policy, “French Historical Studies” 1981, vol. XII, No. 2
• Bongiorno J.A., Fascist Italy and the Disarmament Question, 1928–1934, New York 1991
• Brode M.J., Anglo-American Relations and the Geneva Naval Disarmament Conference of 1927, Ph. D. dissertation, University of Alberta, Edmonton, 1972
• Brzeziński A.M., Rozbieżności pomiędzy Francją i Stanami Zjednoczonymi w sprawie rozbrojenia w dwudziestoleciu międzywojennym [Disarmament Differences between France and United States in Inter-War Period], “Acta Universitatis Lodziensis” 1995, Fo¬lia Historica 53
• Brzeziński A.M., Stanowisko Francji wobec waszyngtońskiej konferencji rozbrojeniowej (12 XI 1921–6 II 1922) [The Attitude of France towards Disarmament Conference at Washington (12 XI 1921–6 II 1922)], “Acta Universitatis Lodziensis” 1986, Folia Historica 28
• Carlton D., Great Britain and the Coolidge Naval Disarmament Conference of 1927, “Po¬litical Science Quarterly” 1968, vol. LXXXIII, No. 4
• Cecil R., A Great Experiment. An Autobiography, New York 1941
• Cecil R., All the Way, London 1949
• Chaput R.A., Disarmament in British Foreign Policy, London 1935
• Clemensen A.B., The Geneva Tripartite Conference of 1927 in Japanese-American Relations, Ph. D. dissertation, The University of Arizona, 1975
• Davis T.G., A Navy Second to None. The Development of Modern American Naval Policy, reprint edition, Westport Conn. 1971
• Dingman R., Power in the Pacific. The Origins of Naval Arms Limitation, 1914–1922, London 1976
• Dubay R.W., The Geneva Naval Conference of 1927: A Study of Battleship Diplomacy, “Southern Quarterly” 1970, vol. VIII, No. 2
• Epstein M.A., Naval Disarmament and the Japanese: Geneva, 1927, Ph. D. dissertation, State University of New York at Buffalo, 1995
• Fanning R.W, Peace and Disarmament. Naval Rivalry and Arms Control 1922–1933, Lexington 1995
• Fanning R.W., The Coolidge Conference of 1927: Disarmament in Disarray, in: Arms Limitation and Disarmament...
• Ferrell R.H., Frank B. Kellogg – Henry L. Stimson, New York 1963
• Ferris J.R., ‘It is our business in the Navy to command the Seas’. The Last Decade of British Maritime Supremacy, 1919–1929, in: Far-flung Lines. Essays on Imperial Defence in Honour of Donald Mackenzie Schurman, ed. by G. Kennedy and K. Neilson, London–Portland OR 1997
• Ferris J.R., The Symbol and the Substance of Seapower: Great Britain, the United States and the One-Power Standard, 1919–1921, in: Anglo-American Relations in the 1920s. The Struggle for Supremacy, ed. by B. J. C. McKercher, London 1991
• Gamble R.C., Decline of the Dreadnought: Britain and the Washington Naval Conference, 1921–1922, Ph. D. dissertation, University of Massachusetts, 1993
• Gibbs N.H., Grand Strategy, vol. I: Rearmament Policy, London 1976
• Gibbs N.H., The Naval Conferences of the Interwar Years: A Study in Anglo-American Relations, “Naval War College Review” 1977, vol. XXX, No. 1
• Gilbert M., Winston S. Churchill, vol. 5: 1922–1939, London 1976
• Gilbert M., Winston S. Churchill, vol. V: Companion Part I Documents. The Exchequer Years 1922–1929, London 1979
• Goodfellow G.F., Calvin Coolidge: A Study of Presidential Inaction, Ph. D. dissertation, University of Maryland, 1969
• Gow I., Military Intervention in Pre-War Japanese Politics. Admiral Katō Kanji and the ‘Washington System’, London 2004
• Gow I., The Royal Navy and Japan, 1921–1941, in: The History of Anglo-Japanese Relations, 1600–2000, vol. III: The Military Dimension, ed. by I. Gow, Y. Hirama, J. Chapman, Basingstoke 2003
• Grayson R.S., Austen Chamberlain and the Commitment to Europe. British Foreign Policy, 1924–1929, London 1997
• Hall Ch, Britain, America and Arms Control, 1921–1937, New York 1987
• Hall M., Anglo-American Relations and Naval Policy 1919–1930, Ph. D. dissertation, McGill University, Montreal 1990
• Harasimowicz A., Dyplomacja brytyjska wobec zagadnienia rozbrojenia 1921–1937 [British Diplomacy and Disarmament Problem 1921–1937], Łódź 1990
• Harris T.W., A Treaty is Better than a Battleship: Canada, Autonomy and Interwar Naval Disarmament, Ph. D. dissertation, Wilfrid Laurier University, Waterloo 2013
• Howland Ch. P., Survey of American Foreign Relations, vol. 1, New Haven 1928
• Hyde H.A., Scraps of Paper. The Disarmament Treaties Between the World Wars, Lincoln, Nebraska 1988
• Ishii K., Diplomatic Commentaries, Baltimore 1936
• Johnson G., Lord Robert Cecil. Politician and Internationalist, Farnham 2013
• Jones Th., Whitehall Diary, vol. II: 1925–1930, ed. by K. Middlemas, London 1969
• Kaufman R.G., Arms Control during the Pre-nuclear Era. The United States and Naval Limitation between the Two World Wars, New York 1990
• Kennedy G.C., Britain’s Policy-Making Elite, The Naval Disarmament Puzzle and Public Opinion, 1927–1932, “Albion” 1994, vol. XXVI, No. 4
• Kitching C.J., Britain and the Problem of International Disarmament, 1919–1934, London 1999
• Kitching C.J., Sunk Before We Started? Anglo-American Rivalry at the Coolidge Naval Conference, 1927, in: Arms and Disarmament in Diplomacy, ed. by K. Hamilton and E. Johnson, London–Portland OR 2008
• Kuramatsu T., Britain, Japan and Inter-War Naval Limitation, 1921–1936, in: The History of Anglo-Japanese Relations, 1600–2000, vol. III: The Military Dimension, ed. by I. Gow, Y. Hirama, J. Chapman, Basingstoke 2003
• Kuramatsu T., British and American Naval Power: Politics and Policy, 1900–1936, Westport Conn. 1998
• Kuramatsu T., The Geneva Naval Conference of 1927: The British Preparation for the Conference, December 1926 to June 1927, “Journal of Strategic Studies” 1996
• Kuramatsu T., Viscount Cecil, Winston Churchill and the Geneva Naval Conference of 1927 – si vis pacem para pacem versus si vis pacem para bellum, in: Personalities, War and Diplomacy. Essays on International History, ed. by Th. G. Otte & C. Pagedas, London – Portland OR 1997
• Łaptos J., Rojek W., Francja wobec problemu zbrojeń na konferencji waszyngtońskiej 1921–1922 [France vis-à-vis Armaments Problem at the Washington Conference 1921–1922], “Dzieje Najnowsze” [“Contemporary History”] 1986, R. XVIII, nr 1
• Limitation of Naval Armaments. Records of the Conference for the Limitation of Naval Armament held at Geneva, Switzerland, from June 20 to August 4, 1927, (Senate Document No. 55, 70th Congress, 1st Session), Washington DC 1928
• MacGregor D., Former Naval Cheapskate: Chancellor of the Exchequer Winston Churchill and the Royal Navy, 1924–1929, “Armed Forces & Society” 1993, vol. XIX, No. 3
• Matthews J.J., Alanson B. Houghton. Ambassador of the New Era, Lanham 2004
• McCoy D.R., Calvin Coolidge. The Quiet President, New York 1967
• McDonald K.J., The Washington Conference and the Naval Balance of Power, 1921–22, in: Maritime Strategy and the Balance of Power. Britain and America in the Twentieth Century, ed. by J. B. Hattendorf & R. S. Jordan, Basingstoke–London 1989
• McKercher B. J. C., Between Two Giants: Canada, the Coolidge Conference, and Anglo-American Relations in 1927, in: Anglo-American Relations...
• McKercher B. J. C., Esme Howard. A Diplomatic Biography, Cambridge 1989
• McKercher B. J. C., The British Diplomatic Service in the United States and the Chamberlain Foreign Office’s Perceptions of Domestic America, 1924–1927: Images, Reality, and Diplomacy, in: Shadow and Substance in British Foreign Policy, 1895–1939, Memorial Essays Honouring C. J. Lowe, ed. by B. J. C. McKercher & D. J. Moss, Edmonton 1984
• McKercher B.J.C, The Second Baldwin Government and the United States, 1924–1929. Attitudes and Diplomacy, Cambridge 1984
• McKercher B.J.C., ‘A Certain Irritation’: the White House, the State Department, and the Desire for a Naval Settlement with Great Britain, 1927–1930, “Diplomatic History” 2007, vol. XXXI, No. 5
• McKercher B.J.C., A Sane and Sensible Diplomacy: Austen Chamberlain, Japan, and the Naval Balance of Power in the Pacific Ocean, 1924–1929, “Canadian Journal of History” 1986, vol. XXI, No. 2
• McKercher B.J.C., Belligerent Rights in 1927–1929. Foreign Policy versus Naval Policy in the Second Baldwin Government, “Historical Journal” 1986, vol. XXIX, No. 4
• McKercher B.J.C., Of Horns and Teeth: The Preparatory Commission and the World Disarmament Conference, 1926–1934, in: Arms Limitation and Disarmament...
• McKercher B.J.C., The Politics of Naval Arms Limitation in Britain in the 1920`s, “Diplo¬macy & Statecraft” 1993, vol. IV, No. 3
• McKercher B.J.C., Wealth, Power, and the New International Order: Britain and the American Challenge in the 1920s, “Diplomatic History” 1988, vol. XII, No. 4
• Middlemas K., Barnes J., Baldwin. A Biography, London 1969
• Murfett M.H., Look Back in Anger: The Western Powers and the Washington Conference of 1921–1922, in: Arms Limitation and Disarmament. Restraints on War, 1899–1939, ed. by B. J. C. McKercher, Westport Conn. 1992
• Newton Ch.E., Anglo-American Relations and Bureaucratic Tensions, 1927–1930, Ph. D. dissertation, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, 1975
• O’Brien P.P., Churchill and US Navy, 1919–1929, in: Winston Churchill. Studies in Statesmanship, ed. by R. A. C. Parker and C. Barnett, London 1995
• O’Brien Ph.P, British and American Naval Power: Politics and Policy, 1900–1936, Westport Conn. 1998
• Parliament and Politics in the Age of Baldwin and MacDonald. The Headlam Diaries 1923–1935, ed. by S. Ball, London 1992
• Ranft B.M., Admiral David Earl Beatty (1919–1927), in: The First Sea Lords. From Fisher to Mountbatten, ed. by M. H. Murfett, Westport Conn.–London 1995
• Richardson D., The Evolution of British Disarmament Policy in the 1920s, New York–London 1989
• Rojek W., Spory o władanie morzem. Polityczno-dyplomatyczne aspekty zbrojeń morskich w okresie międzywojennym 1919–1939 [Disputes about Ruling the Seas. Political and Diplomatic Aspects of Naval Armaments in the Interwar Period 1919–1939], Kraków 1994
• Roskill S., Hankey. Man of Secrets, vol. II: 1919–1931, London 1972
• Roskill S., Naval Policy Between the Wars, vol. I: The Period of Anglo-American An¬tagonism 1919–1929, London 1968
• Shorney D.J., Britain and Disarmament 1916–1931, Ph. D. dissertation, Durham University, 1980
• Sullivan B.R., Italian Naval Power and the Washington Conference of 1921–1922, Diplomacy & Statecraft” 1993, vol. IV, No. 3
• Swerczek R.E., Hugh Gibson and Disarmament: The Diplomacy of Gradualism, in: U.S. Diplomats in Europe, ed. by K. P. Jones, Santa Barbara 1981
• Swerczek R.E., The Diplomatic Career of Hugh Gibson, 1908–1938, Ph. D. dissertation, University of Iowa, 1972
• The Austen Chamberlain Diary Letters. The Correspondence of Sir Austen Chamberlain with His Sisters Hilda and Ida, 1916–1937, ed. by R. C. Self, London 1995
• The Beatty Papers. Selections from the Private and Official Correspondence and Papers of Admiral of the Fleet Earl Beatty, vol. II: 1916–1927, ed. by B. M. Ranft, Aldershot 1993
• The Leo Amery Diaries, vol. I: 1896–1929, ed. by J. Barnes & D. Nicholson, London 1980
• The Modernisation of Conservative Politics. The Diaries and Letters of William Bridgeman 1904–1935, ed. by Ph. Williamson, London 1988
• The Neville Chamberlain Diary Letters, vol. 2: The Reform Years, 1921–1927, ed. by R. Self, London 2001
• Tomes J.H., Balfour and Foreign Policy. The International Thought of a Conservative Statesman, Cambridge 1997
• Towle Ph, Winston Churchill and British Disarmament Policy, “Journal of Strategic Studies” 1979, vol. II, No. 3
• Toynbee A.J., The Conduct of British Empire Foreign Relations since the Peace Settlement, Oxford 1928
• Toynbee J.A., Survey of International Affairs 1927, London 1929
• Tracy N., Admiral Sir Charles E. Madden (1927–1930) and Admiral Sir Frederick L. Field (1930–1933), in: The First Sea Lords...
• Trimble W.E., Admiral Hilary P. Jones and the 1927 Geneva Naval Conference, “Military Affairs” 1979, vol. XLIII, No. 1
• Trimble W.F., The United States Navy and the Geneva Conference for the Limitation of Naval Armament, 1927, Ph. D. dissertation, University of Colorado, Boulder 1974
• Twomey P., Small Power Security through Great Power Arms Control? – Australian Perceptions of Disarmament, 1919–1930, “War and Society” 1990, vol. VIII, No. 1
• Waszczykowski W., Problemy redukcji i ograniczenia zbrojeń morskich w polityce zagranicznej Stanów Zjednoczonych na Konferencji Waszyngtońskiej (12 XI 1921–6 II 1922) [Problem of Reduction and Limitation of Naval Armaments in the US Foreign Policy at Washington Conference (12 XI 1921–6 II 1922)], “Acta Universitatis Lodziensis” 1986, Folia Historica 28
• Watt D. C., Succeeding John Bull. America in Britain’s Place 1900–1975. A Study of the Anglo-American Relationship and World Politics in the Context of British and American Foreign-Policy-Making in the Twentieth Century, Cambridge 1984
• Westphal R.W., Jr., Naval Defence Policy & the House of Commons: A Study of Parliamentary Commentary Over Naval Issues, 1919–1929, Ph. D. dissertation, University of Exeter, 2005
• Westphal R.W., Jr., Politics or Posturing: A Legislative Debate on Naval Expenditures 1925–9, “Mariner’s Mirror” 2004, vol. XC, No. 2
• Wheeler G.E., Prelude to Pearl Harbor. The United States Navy and the Far East, 1921–1933, Columbia Missouri 1963
• Wheeler-Bennett J.W., Disarmament and Security since Locarno, 1925–1931. Being the Political and Technical Background of the General Disarmament Conference, 1932, London 1932
• Żurawski vel Grajewski P.P., Cele i metody negocjacyjne dyplomacji amerykańskiej w dziedzinie kontroli zbrojeń w latach 1925–1930 [The Negotiation Purposes and Methods of American Diplomacy Dealing with Arms Control in 1925–1930], “Dzieje Najnowsze” [“Contemporary History”], 2001, vol. XXXIII, No. 1
• Żurawski vel Grajewski P.P., Stany Zjednoczone wobec problemu kontroli zbrojeń w dobie Komisji Przygotowawczej do Genewskiej Konferencji Rozbrojeniowej 1925–1930 [The United States and Arms Control Problem in the Era of the Preparatory Commission for the Geneva Disarmament Conference 1925–1930], Warszawa 2000
• Żurawski vel Grajewski P.P., Zabiegi dyplomacji amerykańskiej na rzecz zwołania Genewskiej Konferencji Morskiej w 1927 roku [The Action of the American Diplomacy for the Convocation of the Geneva Naval Conference of 1927], “Acta Universitatis Lodziensis” 1995, Fo¬lia Historica 53