The Ottoman Empire at the Beginning of Tanzimat Reforms

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FIRST ATTEMPTS AT CHANGE — THE TULIP PERIOD (LÂLE DEVRI)

The beginning of the 18th century was a turning point in the development of the Ottoman Empire. The era of successful invasions had come to an end, unsuccessful military campaigns had resulted in its borders reducing, rather than expanding as had happened previously due to the feared Ottoman army. The Sultan’s power in outlying provinces had begun to wane in proportion to their distance from Istanbul. Europe, which a few decades ago had looked with respect towards the Bosphorus, now began to view the Ottoman Empire a little like a giant with feet of clay. An ineffective tax collection system hampered the administration of the empire’s expansive territory and the formation of a budget. Despite the empire’s gradual long-term dissolution and its falling behind, conservative elements made any kind of system reform a highly complicated matter.

Despite the obstacles and difficulties, however, there were many reformers, the first of which was Damat İbrahim Paşa Külliyesi. As Sultan Ahmed III’s Grand Vizier from 1718–1730, he introduced a number of innovations which were absolutely key for all his successors. İbrahim Paşa’s 12 years at the head of the Sublime Porte are usually termed the ‘Tulip Period’ (Lâle Devri).1

İbrahim Paşa had been in the Sultan’s close circles since 1716, holding the role of Deputy Grand Vizier for two years before being named Grand Vizier in 1718.2 One of the first things Damat İbrahim did in office was to establish embassies in major European cities before dispatching diplomats.3 Diplomats had been sent to Europe previously, but their missions were of a singular, short-term nature, such as for the signature of a specific treaty. It would appear that İbrahim Paşa was the first Ottoman Grand Vizier to perceive Europe as an indispensable element of the Empire’s policy rather than merely a rival which had to be crushed.

1 A. PALMER, Úpadek a pád Osmanské říše, Praha 1996, p. 38.
3 “Damat” means son-in-law; İbrahim Paşa’s nickname which he took through marriage with the eldest sultan’s daughter.
The task of the newly dispatched ambassadors was not just to negotiate further trading agreements, various treaties and to check old agreements were being fulfilled. Mustafa Efendi and his colleagues were to maintain regular contact with their particular country and above all watch what was happening and inform Istanbul. Grand Vizier İbrahim Paşa was interested in everything — factories, fortifications, weapons, manufacturing processes, goods and culture.⁴

In the context of previous centuries, we can say that the Ottoman Empire during the Tulip Period led by İbrahim Paşa opened itself to Europe as never before. Besides the Ottoman elites already mentioned acceptance of a French lifestyle, also of note is the successful presence of a number of Europeans within the Ottoman Empire itself. In as early as 1716, a French officer, de Rochefort, came up with a project to establish a kind of corps of foreign military engineers within the Ottoman army, although this project eventually fell by the wayside.⁵ His fellow countryman David (known as Gerççek following his conversion to Islam) was more successful, founding the first fire brigade unit in Istanbul in 1720, thus laying the foundations for similar urban reforms which gradually arrived during the course of the 19th and 20th centuries.⁶

Historians (Shaw, Lewis) consider the founding of a printing press as one of the most important innovations of the Tulip Period.⁷ Phanariotes and Jews in Istanbul had already been printing since the end of the 15th century, but only in Hebrew, Armenian, Greek and Latin.⁸ The first printing press to print in Ottoman Turkish was developed thanks to Mehmud Said, the son of the previously mentioned Paris ambassador, Mehmed Celeb Efendi, who was helped in terms of technology by Hungarian convert, İbrahim Müteferrika. The printing press, however, began to be a thorn in the eye of the conservatives, because it jeopardised the existence of professional scribes. It was closed down in 1742.⁹

Under İbrahim Paşa, certain changes also occurred in the Ottoman navy. The key to its modernisation were personnel changes in the Admiralty; it was essential to replace the old rigid cadres with young blood. Another element was the construction of new ships. Although the first triple-deck galleon had already been constructed in Ottoman docks in 1682, only a few had been launched to sea since that time. During the Tulip Period, their construction was begun again and the ships were even improved. The reorganisation of the fleet using triple-deck galleons marked the swansong for the oared galleys, which disappeared for good from the Ottoman fleet during this time.¹⁰

It should also be noted that the Tulip Period was also a period of great intellectual awakening. Support from İbrahim Paşa and other representatives of the elite led to

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⁵ LEWIS, p. 46.
⁶ Ibidem.
⁸ “Phanariotes” means members of prominent Greek families residing in quarter of Constantinople called “Phanar”.
¹⁰ LEWIS, p. 46.
the translation of many major works from Arabic and Persian to Ottoman Turkish, and Ottoman poetry also developed, in which the poets spoke as much of love and wine as they did of the wisdom of Sultan Ahmed III and his family.\textsuperscript{11}

İbrahim Paşa’s era came to an end in autumn 1730 as a result of a people’s revolt led by the conservatives, mainly Janissaries. İbrahim’s opponents, led by Albanian Janissary, Patron Halil, objected to excessive European influence and reforms. They declared that the Sultan, the Grand Vizier and many others had repeatedly flouted God’s law and demanded Damat İbrahim’s head. Sultan Ahmed III, afraid, responded in the common manner. On that same day, 28 September, he had Grand Vizier Damat İbrahim Paşa, the Grand Admiral and a number of ministers executed.\textsuperscript{12}

And thus ended the first great era in which the Ottoman Empire opened itself to Europe, an era of a certain, if in certain aspects only temporary, modernisation, which has been written into history as the Tulip Period (Lâle Devri). Its main legacy was much of the naval reform, the printing press and the beginnings of a network of European embassies. It was thanks to İbrahim Paşa’s reforms (or rather their foundations) that his successors had something to build on in the subsequent two centuries.

THE REFORMS OF SULTAN SELIM III

Historians often consider Sultan Selim III, who was girded by the Sword of Osman in 1789, as a kind of father of the Ottoman Empire’s reforms.\textsuperscript{13} Selim III had stood out from the long line of his predecessors since adolescence. Because of his father, who was Sultan Mustafa III, the young Selim acquired not just a traditional education, but also practical preparation so that he might one day ascend to the throne. He studied foreign languages, visited the Imperial Council with his father, and watched the training of the new artillery units set up by Baron François de Tott in Levend Çiftlik. Since his early youth, the future Sultan had been particularly interested in events outside the Ottoman Empire, something which was unusual at the time. He acquired information on the outside world through his slaves and servants, even after he was declared heir to the throne following his father’s death and the accession of his uncle, Abdülhamid I. One of Selim’s closest intermediaries for contact with the world was his Venetian doctor, who was in the employment of the Austrian and French Embassies in Istanbul.\textsuperscript{14}

Once Selim had been declared heir to the throne, he began regular correspondence with France’s King Louis XVI and it seems he favoured taking on the role of an enlightened absolutist monarch.\textsuperscript{15} Selim III ascended to the throne during the Ottoman Empire’s war with Russia, and the whole of the first three years of the twenty-eight year old Sultan’s rule was taken up with this conflict (Ottoman-Russian War) and dealing with associated problems. In 1792, Great Britain and Prussia me-

\textsuperscript{11} SHAW, Vol. 1, p. 235.
\textsuperscript{12} SHAW, Vol. 1, pp. 239–240; PALMER, p. 44.
\textsuperscript{14} SHAW, Vol. 1, p. 260.
\textsuperscript{15} ZÜRCHER, p. 21.
diated peace in Jassy, which essentially confirmed the state of affairs resulting from the Treaty of Küçük Kaynarca (1774), plus a few further minor territorial losses in Russia’s favour on the shores of the Black Sea. Almost as soon as peace had been declared, the young Sultan began a process which was to bring major internal changes to the Empire.

As early as in autumn 1791, Selim III assigned a group of twenty-two prominent men to prepare memoranda on the state of the Empire, which were to involve an analysis of the Empire’s strengths and weaknesses and to propose options for bridging their weaknesses. The group included twenty Ottoman state dignitaries and religious teachers (members of the ulema). The remaining two places were taken up by a French military advisor and Mouradgea d’Ohsson (Muradcan Tosunian), an Armenian intellectual working for the Swedish embassy in Istanbul. The memoranda which the group put together a few months later in 1792 are sometimes compared to France’s Cahiers of 1789. It is interesting to note that all twenty-two assessments agreed on the necessity to reorganise the Empire in the sense of boosting state power, but were diametrically opposed in their proposals for how to achieve this. Their proposals can be separated into two fundamental perspectives on the matter. The first, conservative, proposals promoted a return to the practices of the Ottoman Empire’s golden era of prosperity, to the time of Suleiman I the Magnificent. The second perspective saw the solution in implementing reforms in the style of the Europe of the time — amongst those sharing this perspective, there was also a group advocating reforms in accordance with the Russian model of Tsar Peter the Great. Content-wise, the memoranda also differed in the areas on which emphasis was placed. Although most stressed the need for military reforms in particular, there were also some authors who further recommended changes in social and economic structures with those directly affected to be involved in the formation of these changes rather than just members of the traditional elites. These changes would subsequently allow for the implementation of further reforms and modernisation in other areas through their economic impact.

Between 1793 and 1796, a series of reforms were finally undertaken which involved traditional methods of fighting corruption and the abuse of power with modern approaches implemented with the assistance of foreign advisors from Europe. Selim’s reforms, in contrast to the attempts of his predecessors, placed particular stress on ‘novelty’ rather than ‘renewal of the original status’. This series of reforms has gone down in history as the New Order (Nizam-ı Cedit).

What was it, then, that led Sultan Selim III to make an attempt at reforms? I believe it involved two matters in particular. First of all, the course and outcome of the Russo-Turkish War of 1787–1792 which had clearly demonstrated the Russian army’s technical, material and organisational dominance over the Ottoman army. Selim III had witnessed the conflict and had had to deal with it every day for almost three years, and as such one can assume he was aware of the Ottoman deficiencies, and

16 Ibidem.
17 M. Ş. HANIOĞLU, A Brief History of the Late Ottoman Empire, Princeton 2010, pp. 42–43.
19 GOMBÁR, p. 40.
likely even more well aware thanks to his contacts and perspective; he knew of the situation in Europe. Second of all, he was motivated by the outcome of his twenty-two memoranda on the condition of the Empire submitted in 1792, whose preparation he had himself asked for.

**MILITARY REFORMS OF SELIM III**

The term New Order (Nizam-ı Cedit) is normally applied to the whole range of administrative, political, economic and military reforms introduced during the almost two decades of Selim III’s rule.\(^20\) Although it was far from being military reform alone, we can often come across a narrower application of the term to just the newly created army corps.

At the time Selim III ascended the throne, the principal Ottoman armed forces had desperately needed reorganisation for a number of years. Proof they were unfit and ineffective was seen in the humiliating rout of 120,000 Janissaries who were defeated at the shores of the Danube in 1789 by a Russian army numbering ‘just’ 8,000 men.\(^21\) The Janissary units remained the central core of the Ottoman army which for many years now had no longer been the elite power Europe had known from the times of Suleiman the Magnificent. Of the 12,000 registered Istanbul Janissaries, for example, only 2,000 were ready for battle, with the remainder comprising craftsmen, traders, women and children.\(^22\) Although their weaponry and capabilities were limited, the Janissaries remained important players in the Ottoman Empire and were a major brake to army reforms. It can be assumed that the Janissary leaders were aware of the dissolution of their corps and could have imagined some kind of reform to the old system, but what they were afraid of was the creation of new corps. M. Şükrü Hanioğlu believes they were afraid the Janissaries might end up with the same fate as the streltsy units who opposed Peter the Great’s reforms in 1698.\(^23\) This fear would explain the Janissaries’ fitful opposition to the creation of new army units.

Paradoxically, the beginnings of the future New Order (Nizam-ı Cedit) corps occurred without Selim III’s awareness at the end of 1791 directly at the front. Here, Grand Vizier Yusuf Paşa formed a small battle group made up of European renegades and members of his bodyguards which practised European battle methods using captured Russian weapons. To begin with, this was nothing more than a pastime for the Grand Vizier and a welcome diversion for the command. When peace was signed in Jassy in 1792 and the Imperial army returned to Istanbul, Yusuf Paşa presented his troop to the Sultan. Selim III was thrilled. The weakness of the old army corps, which the end of the war had demonstrated, and their unwillingness to change, had convinced him that the only solution was the creation of a new army which would exploit new weapons and new tactics. The Sultan was impressed by his visit to the

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\(^{20}\) LEWIS, p. 58.  
\(^{21}\) HANIOĞLU, p. 44.  
\(^{22}\) GOMBÁR, p. 40.  
\(^{23}\) HANIOĞLU, p. 44.
Grand Vizier’s troop’s training and the demonstration of their firepower, and he thus
decided to use these men as the core of his new corps.\textsuperscript{24}

In April 1792, the base in the region of Levend Çiftlik was restored for training,
a site where Baron de Tott’s artillery had trained a few years previously. The site was
chosen for its sufficient distance from Istanbul such that it would not be too visible to
the public and Janissaries. The first shipments of modern weapons of European prov-
enance were secured by the British Ambassador. Four French military advisors were
sent to take part in training, Lieutenant-General Menant and Lieutenants Luzin,
Ranchoup and Pierce Laroque-Monteil.\textsuperscript{25} All these activities were led by the Sultan
and Grand Vizier and to begin with were kept secret from the general public.

When the Sultan’s intention became known, he was given very strong support by
the Ottoman elite, in particular Mehmed Arif Efendi, the influential Molla Tatarcık
Abdullah Efendi and the Sultan’s close friend and advisor, Çelebi Mustafa Reşid Efendi
(who later became the director of the New Order reforms). Differences of opinion
between these men were only seen in the issue of organising and financing the new
forces. Should they be independent, or incorporated into the old structures? Should
they be financed by the Imperial treasury (Hazine-i Amire) or should a new source
of revenue be found for them?\textsuperscript{26} These and other issues would need to be dealt with.

Setting up the facilities, i.e. the barracks, stocks, training grounds, uniforms,
weapons and the founding of new schools — this all cost massive amounts of money,
ever mind foreign (mostly French) advisors. As I have already indicated, there was
no agreement on the financing of the New Order (Nizam-ı Cedit) corps, but a com-
promise was found on 14 May 1792 when firstly the name of the corps was decided
upon, along with separate funding. The independent treasury founded on 1 May 1793
bore the appropriate name of ‘New Revenue’ and was based at a building at Orta Kapısı
at Topkapı Palace. Çelebi Mustafa Reşid Paşa was charged with management of the
New Order (Nizam-ı Cedit) reforms,\textsuperscript{27} and was able to take on the title ‘Secretary of
the New Revenue’ (Irad-ı Cedit Defterdari) and held a post at the level of a member of
the Imperial Council.\textsuperscript{28}

In terms of army hierarchy and organisation, officially Çelebi Mustafa Reşid Paşa
stood at the head of the unit, but in order that he could perform the role while carry-
ing out all his other duties, he was assigned a deputy — colonel (Ağa), with Veli Ağa
awarded the role. The intention of the creators of the reform was to eventually build
up a corps of 12,000 men, of which 1,602 were trained in Levend Çiftlik in 1793, and
this group of soldiers and officers was to serve as a model in terms of its structure.
The so-called ‘Chief of a Thousand’ (Binbaşı) had direct command, and subordinate
to him were two majors, a ‘Right side Major’ (Ağa-yı Yemin) and a ‘Left side Major’
(Ağa-yı Yesar), each of which commanded a division (tabur) 800-men strong. These
two divisions were divided into twelve smaller groups, or troops (bölük) comprising

\textsuperscript{24} S. J. SHAW, The Nizam-I Cedit Army under Sultan Selim III 1789–1807, in: Oriens, Vol. 18/19,
\textsuperscript{25} Ibidem, p. 170.
\textsuperscript{26} SHAW, The Nizam-I Cedit Army..., p. 171.
\textsuperscript{27} It was still the same Çelebi Mustafa Reşid (Efendi) who reached higher title “Paşa”.
\textsuperscript{28} SHAW, The Nizam-I Cedit Army..., p. 172.
90 soldiers and 10 officers, whose head was called the ‘Commander of a Hundred’ (Bölük Başı / Yüzbaşı). The lowest level of the organisation comprised platoons of nine men and one sergeant with the rank of ‘Commander of Ten’ (Onbaşı). Each troop also had one cannon (Top) operated by eight artillery men (Topci) and one cannon master (Top Ustası), as well as five cannon wagoneers (Arabacı) and six orderlies (Qol-luqcu).  

In May 1797, the New Order (Nizam-ı Cedit) comprised a total of 2,536 men and 27 officers. Two years later, at the beginning of September 1799, it had 4,317 men and 30 officers, in April 1800 it had 6,029 men and 27 officers, and in June 1801 it had exactly 9,263 men and 27 officers. At the end of 1806, at the close of Sultan Selim III’s era, the corps had 22,685 men and 1,590 officers located in Anatolia, Istanbul and the Balkans.  

The New Order (Nizam-ı Cedit) units were not, however, the only step made towards modernising the armed forces. Sultan Selim III and his advisors also paid a lot of attention to restoring the Ottoman navy. Although the Imperial Naval Academy which had been founded in Hasköy in 1773 provided the Ottoman navy with a certain level of training, this was incomparable to the European standard. As such, Selim III reorganised the academy in 1796 with French military training serving as a model, just like the reorganisation of the academy for ground forces. Teaching took place in French, and Paris supplied many instructors. In order to boost fleet personnel, a certain kind of naval conscription was restored in the Aegean Sea region, and thorough inspections began to be undertaken of captains who were in the habit of selling food meant for the crew and some of their boat’s weaponry for their own profit. The Imperial shipyards (Tersane) were expanded and modernised with the help of French architects. New local naval shipyards were also built in the provinces. The fleet’s funding was also boosted (in the same manner is for the funding of the Nizam-ı Cedit corps, i.e. the establishment of its own treasury), and wages were increased. Improvements were also made in care for the troops — a military hospital was opened and a school for training military doctors and orderlies who were assigned to units was opened. Thanks to the construction of new ships, Selim III had 22 modern ships of the line with top class weaponry available to him. In this regard, he had built on some previous reform attempts (e.g. the reforms of the Tulip Period). The naval reform is generally considered one of the most successful of Selim’s reforms.  

Other branches of the army, the light artillery (topçu), heavy artillery (humbarcı), miners (lâğımıcı) and gun carters (top arabacı) were also subject to reorganisation. These corps became the most efficient ground troop units under their instructors. As such, the reform was successful.

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31 HANİOĞLU, p. 44.
32 PALMER, p. 59.
34 Ibidem.
35 GOMBÁR, p. 41.
The greatest problem, however, was with the transformation of the traditional sections of the army — the Sipahi and the Janissaries. Here, for their great political influence, it was key to separate the military and administrative functions within the army. Powerful Janissary ağas thus had to be satisfied with just a military role. The system of promotion also underwent changes, with now the numbers of years of service and real merit playing the principal role instead of bribes and connections. Barracks were expanded and wages were improved.36 Despite these innovations (and in part directly because of them), members of traditional corps looked on the New Order (Nizam-ı Cedit) units with undisguised mistrust. Deeper reform of the old corps failed; they remained the least effective and most unreliable part of the Ottoman army.

ADMINISTRATIVE AND DIPLOMATIC REFORMS OF SELIM III

At the end of the eighteenth century, the Ottoman state administration was highly ineffective. It took a long time for a decision to be made, and even longer for it to be applied in practice. In order to make this creaking system more efficient, Selim III founded the Office for Important Affairs (Mühimme Odası) in 1797.37 The traditional changing of the Grand Vizier out of fear that the Sublime Porte might acquire too high a status was also a feature of this period, with the sole advance here being the establishment of an advisory body, the so-called Council of Twelve.38 In general, however, it can be said that Selim’s rule was unable to reorganise the bloated Ottoman administration, and corruption, nepotism, clientelism and chaos continued to rule state authorities.

Much more successful, and in my view more interesting, was the diplomatic reform. As I mentioned at the start of this chapter, with the exception of during the Tulip Period, the Ottoman Empire did not have permanent, or even long-term, diplomatic representation in Europe. Diplomats were only sent to Paris and Vienna on one-off missions whose objectives were to sign a treaty, conclude an agreement, etc. Under Selim III, this was to change. This time, once and for all.

Management of Ottoman foreign policy traditionally fell within the remit of the Chief of the Scribes (Reis-ül küttab / Reis Efendi), but with the Grand Vizier having considerable influence. Sometimes, the job of the Chief of the Scribes (Reis-ül küttab) is equated with European foreign ministers, but this is not entirely accurate. While the Grand Vizier was more powerful than European prime ministers, the Chief of the Scribes (Reis-ül küttab) was less powerful than European foreign ministers.39 The role of the Chief of the Scribes was boosted under Selim III, becoming a kind of ‘Deputy Grand Vizier’, and able to be more involved in the creation of the Empire’s foreign policy. He thus became one of the most important of the Sultan’s advisors, immediately below the Grand Vizier, and at certain points this could also elicit a certain

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37 ZÜRCHER, pp. 22–23.
38 GOMBÁR, p. 42.
amount of mutual rivalry. A strong Grand Vizier usually meant a weak Chief of the Scribes (Reis-ül küttab) and vice-versa.

Because of their lack of language skills of the other party, leading Ottoman representatives and European envoys in Istanbul needed the services of translators, so-called dragomans (tercümans). Dragomans were normally recruited from amongst Jews or Europeans who had converted to Islam, and from the end of the 17th century mostly from Greek Christians living in the Istanbul neighbourhood of Phanar (so-called Phanariotes). The role of dragoman held high prestige, with candidates named in a similar manner to those named in the role of Hospodars of the Danube provinces of Moldavia and Wallachia.40

The reorganisation of Ottoman diplomacy, which Selim III began practically as soon as peace had been concluded in Jassy, included the establishment of permanent embassies in a number of European countries. The Sultan thus built on the acts of Damat İbrahim Paşa during the Tulip Period, who had sent longer-term missions to Europe. Ambassadors were replaced in the posts every three years. In 1793, Yusuf Agah Efendi was named ambassador in London, with an annual salary of 50,000 kuruş and a travel allowance of 15,000 kuruş and his mission included a First Secretary, attaché, two translators and a man who role was not further specified but who was likely considered a business agent.41 Following London, embassies were opened in Vienna (1794), Berlin (1795) and Paris (1796).42

The new network of embassies needed to be in contact with Istanbul, something which wasn’t easy at a time when there were no telephones or telegraphs. The usual method involved, for example, the Vienna Ambassador sending a report to the Danube provinces and the local Hospodar subsequently handing it over at the Bosphorus. The key to messages being sent quickly was ensuring the infrastructure was in good condition. Although the Grand Vizier had ordered the route to Wallachia be repaired, this measure was hardly more than a mere gesture. As such, it took a long time before messages were received by the Porte or the Sultan. If messages did not arrive, Istanbul had to rely on the piecemeal information provided by the local European embassies.43

ECONOMIC REFORMS OF SELIM III

The memoranda submitted to Selim III in 1792 also referred to the economic problems which plagued the Ottoman Empire. Mehmed Şerif Efendi, who held the post of Finance Minister, proposed the gradual abolition of the timars, although it did not involve a complete abolition of the inefficient timar-sipahi system.44 Tatarcik Abdullah

40 Ibidem, p. 300.
41 Ibidem, p. 303.
42 ZÜRCHER, p. 23.
43 NAFF, p. 309.
44 “timar” = a category in Ottoman feudal system. Fiefs were divided by revenue (“timar” up to 20,000 akçe; “zeamet” 20,000–100,000 akçe; “has” more than 100,000 akçe). GOMBÁR, p. 18.
Efendi further criticised the currency depreciation and its devastating impact on the economy. Most memoranda concurred that a new source of funding the costly reforms needed to be found.45

The introduction of modern funding only partially succeeded through the establishment of separate treasuries, such as the new army corps treasury, ‘New Revenue’ (Irad-ı Cedit) and the similar institution securing naval funding. These institutions worked on a modern European accounting principle. The Imperial Council awarded new treasuries the right to collect taxes and duty for alcohol, wool, cotton and oak apples (an ingredient used to produce iron gall ink). By using these means, the new treasuries collected a total of 1,884,803 kuruş between 1793 and 1797, representing about 21% of total expenditure of 8,304,826 kuruş, which while not a poor result was not satisfactory either.46

The economic reorganisation during the period of Selim III’s rule did not succeed; the authorities continually resorted to currency devaluation, confiscation of property from ‘enemies’ and tax increases to acquire resources. Not even the introduction of a regular budget came to pass, and the provision of funding at an Imperial level was chaotic.47 Selim’s approach to Ottoman industry was interesting; although the Sultan promoted himself as a great supporter of weapons manufacturing (manufactories of rifles and guns in Istanbul serving as proof), he was not particular interested in other branches of industry. In general, we can state that insufficient resources for funding new costly reforms were Selim III’s Achilles heel over the whole period of his rule.

FAILURE OF REFORMS? THE END OF THE SELIM III’S ERA

As the beginning of Selim III’s rule was linked to reform efforts, so they mark his end too. Right from the beginning of his rule, the Sultan had had to contend with opposing opinions, mainly made up of conservative ulama, Istanbul Janissaries and the mystical order linked with them, the Bektashi (Bektaşî). Members of the ulema, who found great support in the poor students at religious schools, perceived any kind of advance or innovation as a direct attack on Islamic law and traditions. Janissaries, who did not recognise European battle methods and continued to go to battle armed with yatagans and archaic muskets, had a problem with the newly established military corps, which threatened their status. Despite the Sultan’s efforts at reducing the number of such problematic and unstable elements within the Ottoman army, their members continued to grow. In 1794, the Janissaries totalled 54,458 soldiers, and by 1806 there were already 98,539. This figure, however, includes no-longer relevant data.48 There were also many opponents of the repeated currency devaluations in order to acquire funds for reforms.49 An open revolt erupted at the fort of Rumeli Kavak on

45 HANIOGLU, pp. 45–46.
46 Ibidem, p. 46.
47 GOMBÁR, p. 42.
48 Ibidem, p. 44.
the Bosphorus on 25 May 1807 when auxiliary Janissary units rebelled and murdered an officer of the New Order (Nizamı Cedit) who had ordered them to wear new uniforms of a European style and begin training.\textsuperscript{50} Sultan Selim III called the New Order units back to their barracks and began to negotiate with the rebels, who were supported by the already mentioned conservative groups. He even asked the Ottoman Chief Mufti for advice. Şeyh-ül İslam Mehmet Ataullah Efendi recommended a thorough investigation of the matter, something which further boosted the rebels and prompted them to march on Istanbul. On 29 May 1807, Şeyh-ül İslam Mehmet Ataullah Efendi issued a fatwa in which he declared Selim III incapable of ruling in accordance with Islamic traditions and laws.\textsuperscript{51} The Sultan’s hesitance in crushing the rebellion in time led to the victory of the reactionaries. Selim III was immediately sent to the ‘golden cage’ (kafe)\textsuperscript{52} and he was replaced on the throne by the insane Mustafa IV. The New Order (Nizami Cedit) reforms were annulled.\textsuperscript{53}

The deposing of Selim III marked the beginning of a short interlude in the reform process as an Ottoman conservative response which ended after roughly a year when Bayraktar Mustafa Paşa deposed Mustafa IV. This was followed by the return of a reformist to the throne in the form of Selim’s cousin, Sultan Mahmud II.

\textbf{SULTAN MAHMUD II’S REFORMS}

Mahmud II, cousin of the deposed Sultan Selim III, also known as Mahmud the Just (Mahmut Adli), has gone down in Ottoman history above all as a continuer of reforms. Once Sultan Mustafa IV received reports that the soldiers of Bayraktar Mustafa Paşa were marching on Istanbul, he panicked and ordered his executioner to get rid of potential threats — i.e. the male members of the Ottoman dynasty dwelling in the palace’s harem sector, Selim and Mahmud. While Selim likely resisted the executioner, he was killed in the struggle and his body was thrown into the courtyard. Mahmud in contrast escaped onto the roof of Topkapı Palace with the help of his mother, Nakşidil, where he hid amongst the chimneys. Other versions of events say a pile of carpets served to hide him. Whatever the case, the soldiers of Bayraktar Mustafa Paşa discovered the twenty-three year old prince and a few hours later they had captured the palace and deposed Mustafa IV. Mahmud II was girded by the Sword of Osman in June 1808 in the Eyüb Mosque.\textsuperscript{54} It is highly likely that the new Sultan acquired his positive approach to reforms through the influence of Selim III, with whom he had spent over a year in the ‘golden cage’ (kafe).

During the first half of his rule, the new Sultan was a weak ruler. The steps he took were affected by insufficient numbers of his own armed forces and the peo-

\textsuperscript{50} Ibidem.
\textsuperscript{51} “Fatwa” means a testimonial released by religious authority.
\textsuperscript{52} “Kafe” means a harem section of Topkapı palace, where future successors, deposed sultans and their wives were interned.
\textsuperscript{53} SHAW, Vol. 1, p. 274.
\textsuperscript{54} PALMER, pp. 79–80.
ple who got him on the throne, to begin with Bayraktar Mustafa Paşa in particular. A marked feature of Mahmud’s behaviour was his caution in his actions towards the conservative groups who were behind the fall of Selim III. Although the Sultan was aware of their strength, he did not lack decisiveness and determination in taking tough actions (partially because this was part of his nature, and partly likely also because he had seen how weakness and hesitation had ended — in a pool of blood in the palace courtyard).

During the initial years of his rule, Mahmud II realised that if he wanted to succeed in his reforms, he would have to adhere to these three principles: 1) Reforms can only be successful if they involve all key areas of the Empire’s functions; reorganisation of part of the army is not enough; 2) the only way to ensure newly established institutions can work is to destroy the old ones which could complicate the new institutions’ existence; 3) reforms must be perfectly planned and prepared, and sufficient support acquired for them before they are presented to the public. Mahmud II later acted and collected strength in the spirit of these principles, which became the backbone of his policy of change, such that by November 1826 he could once and for all get rid of his greatest opponents and the brakes on reform — the Janissaries.

An important figure in preparing the reforms was the already mentioned Bayraktar Mustafa Paşa. Although he was a provincial administrator, he felt his own interests were linked with those of the central government (the power of his descendants in Bulgaria could only be maintained if the Empire could resist Russian imperial tendencies). Bayraktar’s first measure was to eliminate Selim’s (and Mahmud’s) greatest opponents, with the Sultan gaining forces it had never had before in him and his army — although conservative groups remained strong, they were pushed out of the top of the pyramid of power and replaced by more flexible cadres. His rise demonstrated that the power of provincial figures could not continue to be disregarded. Proof here is also seen in the positions of Muhammad Ali in Egypt and Ali Paşa in Yanina, which were formed during Mahmud II’s rule.

MILITARY REFORMS OF MAHMUD II

Mahmud II and Bayraktar Mustafa Paşa attempted to restore the New Order (Nizamı Cedit) units from the off in October 1808, but they had to act cautiously in order not to antagonise their opponents. The basis for the restored units was to be 3,000 men armed with rapid-fire rifles brought to Istanbul by Kadi Abdurrahman Paşa, governor of Karaman, one of the most important supporters of the new Sultan. In the same year, the barracks in Levend Çiftlik and Üsküdar were repaired (and expanded) in order that a further 5,000 men could begin training. In order to avoid resistance from the Janissaries, the new units were not named the New Order (Nizamı Cedit), but in-

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55 Bayraktar Mustafa Paşa was an influential Bulgarian notable. He is known as the first provincial governor who became into the highest structures of Ottoman elites.
57 Ibidem, p. 2.
stead the New Keepers of the Hounds (Segban-ı Cedid). Süleyman Ağa, a former officer in the New Order, was named their commander, and he was directly subordinate to the highest military commander, Kadi Abdurrahman Paşa. The anticipated final number of units was to include 160,000 men divided into 100 regiments (bölük), although by 1808 there were only 10,000 men including officers.

It wasn’t long before conservative groups led by the Istanbul Janissaries responded and in November they began a revolt. Because Bayraktar Mustafa Paşa and his men, arrogant and unused to life in the city, were not very popular amongst the population, a part of the Istanbul population (as usual) took the side of the Janissaries. The rebels even broke into the Sublime Porte and Bayraktar Mustafa Paşa was killed when the powder magazine which he was defending blew up. The rebels subsequently sent their conditions to Mahmud II. They demanded a new military commander and Grand Vizier who would correspond more to their ideas. As such, Mahmud II found himself in a similar situation to that which Selim III had been in, but his response was different. He called for reinforcements and rejected the demands. This was followed by a Janissary attack, but they were repelled by the boosted palace troops. Furthermore, Mahmud II insured his position by executing Prince Mustafa, whom the rebels had considered an alternative candidate for the throne. In the end, the Janissary leaders realised they couldn’t win and began to seek a compromise, which became the Document of Obedience (Sened-ı İtaat), signed after long negotiations on 17 November 1808. The Segban-ı Cedid corps were to be disbanded and the Sultan was to retain the throne. At first sight, this may look like another victory for the conservatives, but Mahmud II remained on the throne and was more determined than ever to implement his reforms. A long period of preparations began which came to a climax in 1826.

After the dissolution of the New Keepers of the Hounds (Segban-ı Cedid), Mahmud II concentrated on other reforms, smaller army corps, specifically artillery and guncarters. He also built up a mounted artillery unit (1,000 men) trained and organised according to the model of Western armies, and these became his personal guard (hassā). The Janissaries and Sipahi weren’t overlooked either in the attempts at reorganisation. The Sultan restored the rules which obliged officers to be promoted on the basis of ability and not connections and bribes, and which involved stricter discipline. Without the presence of units such as the New Keepers of the Hounds (Segban-ı Cedid), however, the rules could not be checked up on and the Janissaries ignored them. As such, the Sultan attempted to acquire influence over the Janissaries in a different manner, by appointing his own people amongst their commanding unit, and undertaking stealthy purges. The old and rigid officers were replaced by young officers who did not feel such distaste for the reforms. In this way, the Sultan secured, for example, the co-operation of Hussein Ağa, whom he named commander in chief of the Janissaries (26 February 1823), and subsequently also Grand Vizier

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58 Hounds keepers (Segban) were corps incorporated into Janissary corps in the past. Legacy of that ancient and traditional part of the Ottoman Army should calm Janissaries.
59 SHAW, Vol. 2, p. 3.
60 Ibidem, pp. 5–6.
It was also essential to get the support of the ulema, which Mahmud II acquired by establishing a foundation, building mosques and replacements in the office of Şeyh-ül Islam. He got the Istanbul population on his side through calculated anti-Janissary propaganda. His preparations, fully in accordance with the already mentioned three principles, were drawing to a conclusion — the so-called ‘Auspicious Incident’ (Vaka-ı Hayriye) was approaching.

At the beginning of 1826, the Sultan established a new army division, the so-called Eşkinciyân corps which was incorporated into the Janissaries. These new soldiers were trained in European style and were to be involved in training other Janissaries. The response was easy to predict — on 14 June the Janissaries overturned their soup cauldrons, a traditional symbol of revolt. Şeyh-ül İslam, who was on Mahmud’s side, however, issued a fatwa in which he denounced the rebels and sanctified the presence of the new corps. The Janissaries, who did not receive support from the general population this time, had to retreat to their barracks at Et Meydanı, where they were fired upon by Mahmud’s artillery. The following day, the Janissary corps, along with the mystic Bektashi Order, were officially abolished.

Once the greatest brakes on military reforms had been removed, changes could finally be fully rolled out. The same edict which disbanded the Janissaries appointed a new army made up of infantry, artillery and cavalry. This army bore the name ‘The Victorious Soldiers of Muhammad’ (Asakir-i Mansure-i Muhammediye). The Sultan may have done this to please the ulema should Şeyh-ül İslam not consider the gift of the former Janissary command headquarters a sufficient gesture of friendship. The corps was given control over the Bosphorus fortifications and the nine Istanbul bastions, and they also controlled the Istanbul police through which they were able to suppress opposition. Recruitment began immediately. The corps were organised as for the units of Selim III’s New Order (Nizamı Cedit) except for some minor details. The organisation comprised 12,000 men in Istanbul organised into 8 regiments (tertips), with each headed by a colonel (binbaşı). Each regiment had 12 cannons and the same number of musket companies.

The navy was also in desperate need of modernisation. Following the Battle of Navarino (1827), the Ottoman fleet comprised just four ships of the line, two frigates, three brigs and two corvettes. Because it was impossible for political reasons to invite British or French specialists, American shipbuilders arrived at the Bosphorus. The naval barracks at Galata, a frequent epicentre of revolt, were also closed. French influence on the Ottoman Army, so pronounced during Selim III’s rule, was gradually replaced by British, and later also Prussian, influence during Mahmud II’s era.

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63 “Auspicious Incident” = Vaka-ı Hayriye; term for liquidation of the Janissaries.
64 HANİOĞLU, pp. 58–59.
65 Ibidem, p. 59.
ADMINISTRATIVE AND DIPLOMATIC REFORMS OF MAHMUD II

Major changes took place in the administration of the Empire under Mahmud II’s rule. In his reforms, he sought to achieve centralisation and the strengthening of central authorities. Changes thus affected the Sublime Porte, for example, where competencies were divided out between individual dignitaries, and a type of specialisation model began to be applied, a model where each dignitary covered a particular area of imperial administration. Some of the authorities of the Grand Vizier were delegated to other ‘ministers’.69

The offices of the Commander in Chief of the army and the Grand Admiral had been functioning at the level of ministries for some time, and so now both offices were officially termed ministries and they could thus carry out their duties more effectively. Furthermore, the office of the Grand Vizier’s secretary was transformed into the Interior Ministry, initially known as the Ministry of Civil Administration Affairs (Umur-ı Miilkiye Nezareti), and from 1836, when Pertev Paşa was ousted, the Ministry of the Interior (Nezareti Dahiliye). From 1838, the office was joined to the Grand Vizier function, giving its holder a leading status and primacy amongst the ministers. The title of Grand Vizier was officially changed to Prime Minister (bas vekil) and former viziers/advisors (nazır) were now known as ministers (vekil). Although they were individually named, the ministers remained responsible to the Sultan rather than the Prime Minister. The centre of the cabinet’s activities was the Sublime Porte — a newly rebuilt complex of buildings (formerly made of wood and destroyed by fire numerous times), where a number of the most important ministries were based.70

The establishment of the Ottoman Ministry of Foreign Affairs could take up a whole chapter. As in many other matters, Mahmud II built on Selim’s foundations in the reorganisation of the institute for contact with abroad. Although the network of embassies in European cities established by his predecessor worked until 1820, only representatives of the rank of chargé d’affaires, the lowest rank in diplomacy, had been based at the embassies since 1811 (due to insufficient numbers of qualified people). After the outbreak of the Greek War of Independence, consular and diplomatic representation was forgotten.71 Later (in 1834), the diplomats’ posts were filled again. One of the cornerstones of the new ministry was the Sublime Porte’s Translation Office (Bah-ı ali terçüme odası). In March 1836, Mahmud II changed the title of the Chief of the Scribes (Reis-ül küttab) to that of Foreign Minister (Hariciye Nezâreti), and its new institutional ministry didn’t take long to be established. Pertev Efendi became the first minister, and his competencies included matters regarding domestic reforms, and this remained a part of the Foreign Minister’s role for the whole of the rest of the century.72

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69 GOMBÁR, p. 120.
70 SHAW, Vol. 2, p. 36.
72 Ibidem, pp. 407–408.
The Çavuşbaşı and Tezkereci departments of the Sublime Porte were reorganised into the Ministry of Judicial Pleas (Deâvi Nezâreti), later renamed the Ministry of Justice (Adliye Nezâreti). The Army Treasury (Mansure Hazinesi), which collected most state revenue and served for the rapid expansion of the armed forces, was transformed into the Ministry of Finance (Maliye Nezâreti) and also assumed administration of the former Imperial Treasury (Hazîne-i Âmire) and state mint (Darphane Hazinesi). Only the Treasury of the Sultan (Ceb-i Hümayun) remained independent of the new ministry, although it was subject to it in a number of matters.\(^73\) The Supreme Legislative Council (Meclis-i Vâlâ-yi Ahkâm-i Adliye) is considered one of the most important institutions established by the acts of Mahmud II, as an advisory assembly which was to play a key role in further political reform a few years later.\(^74\)

**ECONOMIC REFORMS OF MAHMUD II**

Sultan Mahmud II paid economic matters somewhat more attention than his predecessor Selim III, but he could not deal with the many problems either. Selim had already begun to eradicate the timar system of land tenure, but he did not complete this. Mahmud II was more thorough, and in 1831 he abolished the timar system completely, replacing it with a tax farm system (iltizam).\(^75\)

Even during Mahmud II’s era, however, the economy was not considered a field which required its own ministry, with only international trade falling within the remit of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. In 1838, the Council of Agriculture and Trade was created, which then became the Council of Public Works, and in 1839 a Ministry of Trade (Ticaret Nezâreti) was established, which included various sub councils to deal with trade, agriculture and public works.\(^76\)

Currency devaluation, resulting in wild inflation, remained a serious problem in the Ottoman Empire. During Sultan Mahmud II’s rule, the value of the Ottoman piastre fell by 500% against the British pound. Also important was the boosting of international traders, who began to ply their trade more, thanks in particular to the Treaty of Balta Liman.\(^77\) Like Selim III, Mahmud II also had to continuously battle against insufficient financial resources to fund his costly reforms.

**EVENT AT THE ROSE PAVILION AND THOSE BEHIND IT**

Few events in modern Ottoman history are paid such academic attention as the issuance of the Supreme Edict of Gülhane. It seems that no historian looking at the Ottoman Empire during the 19\(^{th}\) or 20\(^{th}\) century can get away without at least briefly mentioning the events of the Rose Pavilion (Gülhane). The main reason for this is the fact

\(^{74}\) ZÜRCHER, p. 42.  
\(^{75}\) LEWIS, pp. 91–92.  
\(^{77}\) GOMBÁR, p. 120.
that the Supreme Edict of Gülhane’s message resulted in a lot of permanent changes, and opened the door to further reforms in society and the imperial administration. The edict, which was the first of a number of edicts lit the fuse for the tanzimat period (tanzimat dönemi) — the period of ‘reorganisation’, which is usually defined as being between 1839 and 1876. Historians traditionally divide it into two phases. Within the context of the previous chapter, the question arises as to how one can differentiate this reform period from, for example, the governance of Selim III and Mahmud II. In my opinion, the difference is that the driver for reform was no longer the Sultan himself, but rather educated people around him, most of whom furthermore had personal experience of Europe and its systems of government. This fact, however, does not mean the Sultan had absolutely no involvement in the reform.

The Sultan’s edict, which has gone down in history as the ‘Supreme Edict of Gülhane’ (Gülhane Hatt-ı Şerif-i), was read out on Sunday 3 November 1839 in the gardens between Topkapı Palace and the city walls bordering the Golden Horn estuary. The edict is sometimes also called the ‘Noble Edict of the Rose Garden’, which may give some idea of the location. The edict acquired this alias as a result of the garden mentioned, in which there was a cluster of small, extensively decorated buildings with brick chimneys, fireplaces, stained glass windows and wrought golden trellises decorated with climbing flowers. This group of buildings, or pavilions, were used by the palace confectioners to process the rose petals, from which they acquired their sweet essence to be used in traditional confections, and hence the name ‘Rose pavilion’.

At an official ceremony in the presence of the highest state officials, religious dignitaries, prominent elites, Istanbul’s upper class, foreign diplomats and visitors (including the Prince de Joinville, French King Louis Philippe’s third son), Grand Vizier Mehmed Husrev Paşa and Sultan Abdülmecid I, Foreign Minister Mustafa Reşit Paşa read out the wording of the whole edict.

The document was issued in the name of Abdülmecid I, the sixteen-year old Sultan who had ascended to the throne just four months earlier after the death of his father, Mahmud II, of tuberculosis. The Sultan’s role in the issuance of the Gülhane Edict is often marginalised, with some contemporary works tending to depict him as a ‘passive witness’ to the November event, according to historian, Butrus Abu-Manneh. The main reasoning for doing so is Abdülmecid’s age and inexperience.

Another figure of the November event who still today remains little discussed was Grand Vizier Mehmed Hüsrev Paşa, despite his anti-reform stance. Although he was long past the height of his political and physical strength, and under the rule of Mahmud II he had been excluded from the highest office, he had managed to acquire

80 Ibidem. Detailed description of the appearance and purpose of “pink pavilions” is known through the English travelers from the 17th century.
81 HANIOĞLU, p. 72.
the young Sultan’s favour, taking on a new role and being an active participant in events at the Rose pavilion. Nevertheless, eclipsing his fame (and not entirely without reason) was the already mentioned Mustafa Reşid Paşa, the principle architect of the Edict of Gülhane.

Mustafa Reşid Paşa (1800–1858) is often referred to as the ‘Father of the Tanzimat’, who helped the Ottoman Empire take a number of further wary steps forward on the path to a modern state. At the time the edict was issued, Mustafa Reşid Paşa actually held the position of Minister of Foreign Affairs, and not that of Grand Vizier, as some books erroneously claim.83

In order to comprehend the actual issuance of the edict, one needs at least an elemental knowledge of the Ottoman Empire’s legislative system. According to the system which had operated in the Empire without major change until 1838, all new acts were declared in the form of so-called ‘Sultan’s fermans’ or (for key measures) through so-called ‘Imperial rescripts’ (hatt-ı hümâyûn). This system, however, was inadequate for the new central administration concept. The new cabinet and its ministers did not have sufficient time or expert knowledge to cover the broad and detailed government agenda. As such, on the advice of Mustafa Reşid Paşa, Mahmud II had begun establishing specialist advisory bodies (like expert commissions) from 1838 which reviewed proposed legislation and were able themselves to originate new proposals. Following the ratification process in cabinet, the Sultan naturally had to approve and sign the proposal, and on his will (irade) the act was subsequently declared.84 This was also the route by which the Supreme Edict of Gülhane (Gülhane Hatt-ı Şerif-î) came into being, in a fairly standard manner in terms of legislative procedure.

THE ROOTS OF THE SUPREME EDICT OF GÜLHANE — INTERNAL AND EXTERNAL INFLUENCES

Although the actual issuance of the edict in the Rose Garden took place in the usual way, its content was highly unusual. Academics have discussed to what extent the edict’s contents were affected by European countries, the situation regarding the Egyptian crisis, religious, the mindset of the liberal reformers around Reşid Paşa and prior attempts at modernisation. I will now try to analyse some of these factors.

The wording of the edict is usually regarded to have been inspired by British and French models; Niyazi Berkes, for example, says there can be no doubt about this, because the ideas contained within the text cannot be found in any Islamic political thought of prior periods.85 Stanford Share, as an example, stresses the French model, noting what I consider an interesting point in that the Supreme Edict of Gülhane is based on many ideals contained within the French revolutionary Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen issued in 1789.86 It may appear unusual that

83 KREISER — NEUMANN, p. 161.
the Ottoman Empire would wish in any way to borrow from the ideas of the French Revolution, which was closely tied with secularism, a highly unattractive phenomenon for Muslims. On the other hand, European secularism defined itself as opposing Christianity, not Islam, and as such the Muslim world could hope to acquire the ‘Western secret of progress’ without the need for any kind of compromise with its own religious customs and traditions. French influence on reforms in the Ottoman Empire had also been very strong in the era of Selim III, and especially Mahmud II, when military and specialist schools were established using the French model, along with certain changes in the administration system, diplomacy reorganisation, etc. The Supreme Edict of Gülhane can also be looked at as a continuation of the reforms of Sultan Mahmud II, as something which originated in the atmosphere created by his reform efforts. Furthermore, we should not forget that the wording of the decree was formed while Mahmud was still alive and the Sultan’s ideas thus undoubtedly affected it. Britain and France’s influence on the reorganisation of the Ottoman Empire during the Tanzimat period (of which the Edict of Gülhane was its first cornerstone) can be demonstrated according to Bernard Lewis by the fact that all the major reformists of the period were working at embassies in these countries. Mustafa Reşid Paşa had worked from 1834 in Paris and later in London, Fuad Paşa in London (1840), Mehmed Şekib (1841) and Ibrahim Sarim Paşa (1834) also in London. Residence at the embassies also conferred the benefit that those there could learn another language and use this to gain an insight into the political culture of the country in question, this being French for Mustafa Reşid Paşa. British ideas could be found, for example, in the weakening of the Sultan’s absolute power, which meant a de facto strengthening of parliamentary institutions (in any form). Her Majesty’s ambassador, Lord Ponsonby, who served in Istanbul until 1841, however, did not directly support Mustafa Reşid Paşa and the people around him at the time the edict was issued.

Butrus Abu-Manneh gives a different interpretation regarding the roots of the Supreme Edict of Gülhane, referring to a possible Islamic interpretation of the text. Abu-Manneh considers only the form to be Western — i.e. the language with which the edict is written. The ideas, values and overall spirit of the document he considers Islamic. He claims that Islam pervades the text from start to finish. In his papers, he also describes the importance of the Sunni Sufi brethren on the edict, in particular the Naqshbandi sect. He also looks at the difference between Sultan Mahmud II and his son. While Mahmud attempted to boost the Sultanate’s position and the power of the palace, Abdülmeclid I strived to build up the image of a virtuous ruler governing in line with Islam in all respects. The young Sultan’s fairly strong religious tendencies can also be seen in the fact that at just ten years old he had read the Quran himself. Abdülmeclid also had three major ulema as teachers.

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87 LEWIS, p. 54.
88 BERKES, p. 144.
89 LEWIS, pp. 88–89.
91 ABU-MANNEH, pp. 175–183.
An oft-mentioned factor in the issuance of the reforming edict which was to lead to a truly extensive reorganisation of society, is the attempt of the Ottoman Empire representatives to draw the attention of the liberal European powers (especially Great Britain) and gain their support in their fight against the autonomous governor of Egypt, Muhammad Ali. As such, some historians consider the Supreme Edict of Gülhane to be a controversial document which to some extent represented a diplomatic move. It was designed to showcase the Ottoman Empire to the world as a modern, dynamic country. More important to the Sultan than international support from outside, however, was the support of his own citizens. It can be assumed that they were hoping to acquire the sympathy of the masses, including the population of Egypt. Who would dare to oppose a ruling Sultan (in contrast to Muhammad Ali) who was in compliance with Islam, especially when the new edict guaranteed certain rights and freedoms? Although from today’s perspective it seem naïve, I think that Istanbul may have calculated on a strategy like this.

**THE SUPREME EDICT OF GÜLHANE — AN ANALYSIS OF THE TEXT**

There is no doubt that the document presented to the Empire and the world on 3 November 1839 was an act which was unparalleled until that time in the Ottoman Empire. Some historians (Niyazi Berkes), however, tend to consider the edict a kind of embryonic Ottoman constitution — they refer to the restrictions, the essentially absolute power of the Sultan until that time, and the anchorage of basic legal principles. I would be more cautious in these regards, and would agree more with Stanford Shaw, who says that the Supreme Edict of Gülhane cannot be considered a constitution (or ‘protoconstitution’) in any regard. Could the document really limit the Sultan’s powers when he had issued it himself, and had the power to withdraw it any time he chose? On the other hand, we should recognise that Abdülmecid promised to delineate certain boundaries to his authority by obeying the laws which came out of the legislative process (at the end of which the Sultan’s seal would none the less be placed on). Sultan’s ‘de jure’ promise to the government thus cannot in the end be considered a serious limit to the Sultan’s unlimited power, but it can certainly be considered the first step in this direction.

In any case, the edict determined a new method for interpreting (not just) the legal framework and the state’s duties towards its citizens. Suddenly, terms such as protection of life, honour and property appeared, along with the principle of equality amongst people to the letter of the law regardless of faith. It is here in these ground-breaking changes for Ottoman society that I believe the greatest benefit of the Rose Garden edict can be found.

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92 GOMBÁR, p. 142.
94 BERKES, p. 144.
96 Ibidem.
“All the world knows that in the first days of the Ottoman monarchy, the glorious precepts of the Kuran and the laws of the empire were always honored. The empire in consequence increased in strength and greatness, and all its subjects, without exception, had risen in the highest degree to ease and prosperity. In the last one hundred and fifty years a succession of accidents and divers causes have arisen which have brought about a disregard for the sacred code of laws and the regulations flowing therefrom, and the former strength and prosperity have changed into weakness and poverty; an empire in fact loses all its stability so soon as it ceases to observe its laws... Full of confidence, therefore, in the help of the Most High, and certain of the support of our Prophet, we deem it right to seek by new institutions to give to the provinces composing the Ottoman Empire the benefit of a good administration.”

These words form the preamble to the Supreme Edict of Gülhane. One can find a reference to God, God’s laws, the Prophet or his statements in almost every sentence. At first sight, it might appear to the reader that they are looking at a deeply religious text, but the opposite is actually true. These religious decorations only appeared in the document during the final phase, doing the job of a kind of pacifier for rigorous members of the ulema, and were designed to refute any accusations of copying the practices and systems of the unbelievers, i.e. European powers. The ceremony at the Rose Pavilion was also likely undertaken as ‘Islamic concealment’, with the presence of powerful elites including top representatives of the ulema whose presence in some way might sanctify the edict’s legitimacy. The wording of the edict in the spirit of Islamic tradition was also important for its presentation to the general public, both in the capital city and in the remotest provinces of the vast Empire. The edict was read on squares in Istanbul, in all the administrative centres of the different sanjaks, and even in the centres of lower administrative units — districts (kazas), something which was very unusual at that time.

Three principles formed the linchpin of the Supreme Edict of Gülhane: 1) securing the sanctity of life, honour, dignity and property of the Sultan’s subjects; 2) securing a fair system for calculating and collecting taxes; 3) securing a fair and equal system of army conscription and period of military service.

“And, in fact, are not life and honor the most precious gifts to mankind? What man however much his character may be against violence, can prevent himself from having recourse to it, and thereby injure the government and the country, if his life and honor are endangered? If, on the contrary, he enjoys in that respect perfect security, he will not depart from the ways of loyalty, and all his actions will contribute to the good of the government and of his brothers.” The protection of the life and honour of all the Empire’s citizens without exception, i.e. not just Muslims, but also Jews and Christians, was a ground-breaking measure. The honour and reputation of everyone became sacrosanct. If anyone was accused of a crime, they could not be charged, executed or punished in any way unless their defence had been heard and a court had found them guilty. The document also contained a clause directed against secret executions (it explicitly mentions ex-

98 HANİOĞLU, p. 73.
99 The Rescript of Gülhane.
100 Ibidem.
execution by poison) and the disappearance of inconvenient people, so that the court process should from then on be held in public and in accordance with Islamic law. If the accused was convicted of a crime and the guilt of his family was unproven, then their rights of inheritance would not be withdrawn, something that had hitherto been standard practice; the family property was no longer confiscated in its entirety.101 Measures of this type were probably aimed to help avoid fabricated processes which had been used by the Palace in the past to paper over holes in the budget by confiscating the property of political opponents. The protection of ownership and property rights were also an important part of the edict: “If there is an absence of security as to one’s fortune, everyone remains insensible to the voice of the Prince and the country; no one interests himself in the progress of public good, absorbed as he is in his own troubles. If, on the contrary, the citizen keeps possession in all confidence of all his goods, then, full of ardor in his affairs, which he seeks to enlarge in order to increase his comforts, he feels daily growing and bubbling in his heart not only his love for the Prince and country, but also his devotion to his native land.”102 In other words, if measures securing the protection of the Empire’s citizens’ property were not put into practice, then strength, stability and prosperity could not be achieved.

The Supreme Edict of Gülhane became a springboard for large reforms to the Ottoman Empire justice system which occurred over the following years during the first phase of the Tanzimat period. Many changes related to the already mentioned awarding of equal rights to non-Muslim communities and the majority Muslim population. This issue opened up the issue of the status of Islamic sharia law. The Ottoman Empire had worked for centuries on the basis of a kind of two-track system incorporating both Islamic sharia law and the Sultan’s edicts, which theoretically also had to be in accordance with Islamic law. 1839 was a turning point in this regard. Although Islamic sharia law had never been completely abandoned, its role during the Tanzimat period was gradually weakened until it was reduced to only the field of family law. One piece of evidence of this effect is the 1844 abolition of the death penalty for apostasy from Islam.103 A year earlier, a new penal code was issued which now worked from the principle of equality of the population and this was followed by a commercial code (1850) inspired by the French model, and a maritime commercial code (1867). Any business disputes which were to involve foreigners were now to be dealt with by special mixed commissions — thus secular judicial institutions gradually began to replace traditional religious judges (kadı).104

The second ‘great principle’ of the Supreme Edict of Gülhane expressed the ambition to establish a fair system for calculating and collecting taxes: “As to the regular and fixed assessment of the taxes, it is very important that it be regulated; for the state which is forced to incur many expenses for the defense of its territory cannot obtain the money necessary for its armies and other services except by means of contributions levied on its subjects. Although, thanks be to God, our empire has for some time past been delivered from the scourge of monopolies, falsely considered in times of war as a source of revenue,
a fatal custom still exists, although it can only have disastrous consequences; it is that of venal concessions, known under the name of iltizam. As early as in 1840, laws were introduced based on the promises of the Supreme Edict of Gûlhanî which launched a large reorganisation of the tax machinery. The new measures de facto instated three basic types of tax: 1) fixed head tax (cizye) paid by non-Muslims; 2) ‘tithes’ (așar); 3) a kind of ‘services tax’ (mürettebat).

The edict’s wording includes a condemnation of the tax farming system (iltizam) through the sale of concessions. From the second half of the 16th century to the era of Mahmud II’s rule, this system began to replace the outdated timar-sipahi system based on fixed payments from fiefs according to yield, but which nonetheless had not managed to achieve satisfactory returns. As such, some historians consider the tax farming system (iltizam) a continuation of the failed traditional model. The 1840 law replaced iltizam with direct tax collection, which was to be secured by state-paid collectors (muhasilîs) — this was done in the hope that the treasury’s income would be increased and the burden on the payer would be decreased, but neither actually occurred. Problems were caused both by provincial notables sabotaging the new system because it was not as advantageous for them as the old one, and also insufficient information on population numbers and land (for an idea of the picture, a complete registry of the lands of the extensive Empire began in 1858 and was not completed until 1908). The situation was also complicated by insufficient numbers of people qualified to be able to undertake the role of collector (muhasilî). Thus despite all the efforts of the reformists to resuscitate the tax system, the Empire found itself drowning in massive financial problems which in the end led to the fall of Mustafa Reşid Paşa. The iltizam system was restored and a system of direct tax collection was not implemented on most of the Ottoman Empire territory until the end of the 19th century. In terms of equal status of the population, the tax per head was abolished, although immediately a tax waiving military service (bedel-i askeri) was implemented, which for non-Muslims meant essentially the same thing as the fixed head tax before it. As such promises made regarding fairer taxes and officially signed at the Rose Pavilion did not come too much.

“The laws regulating the military service shall be discussed by a military council holding its sittings at the palace of Serasker. As soon as a law shall be passed, in order to be forever valid, it shall be presented to us; we shall give it our approval, which we will write with our imperial sign-manual.”

The vision of the military reorganisation, which had been the backbone of almost all reform attempts in the history of the Ottoman Empire, was also seen in the Supreme Edict of Gûlhanî, and in fact was one of its three main principles. Besides the promise of a comprehensive solution to the military service concept, the document directly ordained the length of service at 4 to 5 years. This measure was motivated by a fear that greater conscription might give “a mortal blow to agriculture and to industry”.

105 The Rescript of Gûlhanî.
106 ZÜRCHER, p. 59.
107 GOMBÁR, p. 18.
108 ZÜRCHER, pp. 59–60.
109 The Rescript of Gûlhanî.
110 Ibidem.
This comprehensive solution was presented in 1845. Its greatest novelty was probably, as for other laws from the Tanzimat period, its equalising element. Christians acquired the opportunity to serve in the army alongside Muslims. It was anticipated that this new measure might result in a wave of tension amongst conscripts, and so non-Muslims were also allowed to purchase their way out of military service through the already mentioned military exemption tax (bedel-i askeri), which began to be used extensively. This option was also open to Muslims. In terms of the organisation of the Imperial forces, the law of 1841 was crucial. It established provincial armies, with their leaders subordinate to the central headquarters led by the highest commander (Serasker) in Istanbul. The law also ended the control of provincial fortresses by notables and local governors — with centralisation the direction of travel. The most noticeable sign of the military reforms was likely the construction of a modern navy using new armoured ships, although despite all the efforts of the reformists these remained far below the standard level in Europe.111

SUCCESS OR FAILURE OF THE REFORMS?

The obstacles which the various Ottoman reformists had to deal with were diverse in nature. In the cases of Damad Ibrahim Paşa, the pro-European Grand Vizier from the Tulip Period (Lâle Devri) and Selim III, it was conservative groups who were the great brakes on reform, mainly made up of strict ulema and Janissaries. The Janissaries, as an armed force in fear of losing its status, were responsible for Selim III’s fall, and the end of the Tulip Period. Mahmud II also had to deal with the conservatives, but he was better able to take advantage of his political and military means and the options available to him. Furthermore, in contrast to his predecessors he had the advantage of historic experience. The traditional opposition during the Tanzimat period was no longer as strong as it had been before. The Ottoman concept of modernisation was mostly perceived as a Europeanisation, yet it was this reorganisation in European style which caused the population to look suspiciously at the new measures. For the Sultan’s reforms and the Tanzimat period, the situation was also complicated by multiple centres in the establishment of new institutions without the original ones being abolished. Typical examples include Selim’s military reform and the judiciary reforms of the 1840s. The greatest obstacle to any kind of attempts at reform in the Ottoman Empire, however, was always a fatal lack of financial resources.

As to whether there were shared characteristics in the reform plans of Selim III, Mahmud II and the Gülhane programme, I would say there were. Reforms were focused on the same fields — a priori the military field, and subsequently the administrative, diplomatic, education and economic fields, which were unfortunately always dealt with half-heartedly and ineffectively.

In terms of fulfilment of the three main principles of the Supreme Edict of Gülhane: 1) securing the sanctity of life, honour, dignity and property of the Sultan’s subjects; 2) securing a fair system for calculating and collecting taxes; 3) securing a fair and equal system of army conscription and period of military service, the out-

111 ZÜRCHER, p. 57.
come was somewhat mixed. Laws based on the edict’s first principle gave the accused the guarantee of a transparent court and restricted deliberate confiscations and fabricated processes. On the other hand, the establishment of this new court system gave rise to the already mentioned problem of institutional duplicity, resulting in a chaotic system. The second principle regarding fair tax calculation and collection essentially failed, despite the great efforts of reformists. Although military reforms brought greater control and centralisation of command, they failed to achieve fairer conscription and service length.

In light of these facts, it might appear that the mission of the Supreme Edict of Gülhane was not achieved, and the reforms were more a failure than a success. But I do not believe such a harsh assessment is fair. The Supreme Edict of Gülhane opened the doors to great social changes which would have been hard to imagine before, in particular the rule of law and an equal society. Although for this study and the context of the period analysed, the Rose Pavilion Edict is the de facto culmination of the reform efforts, in fact this was just the beginning. The Supreme Edict of Gülhane began the Ottoman Empire’s, and later Turkey’s, journey towards the modern state.

THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE AT THE BEGINNING OF TANZIMAT REFORMS

ABSTRACT

This article deals with analysis of publication of Gülhane noble decree (3 November 1839) which is an eminent event in the modern history of the Ottoman Empire. Promises of sultan Abdülmecid I contained in this document in fact opened the door for a reform period called tanzimat, which is mostly put between years 1839–1876. This article also focuses on earlier attempts of reorganization and modernization of the empire, especially on reforms of sultan Selim III and sultan Mahmut II. Knowledge of these reforms is necessary for understanding the events of 1839. An important part of this article is formed by analysing circumstances of Gülhane decree origins and the English version of its text.

KEYWORDS

Ottoman Empire; Reform; Selim III; Mahmud II; Abdülmecid I; Gülhane Decree; Tanzimat

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