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2016 | 13 | 239-250

Article title

Presupozycje w perspektywie logicznej

Authors

Content

Title variants

EN
Presupposition from a logical perspective

Languages of publication

PL

Abstracts

EN
The main aim of this article is to show the problem of presupposition from the side of the logical analysis of language. Deliberations on the topic derive from the nineteenth century and are connected to Gottlob Frege. In his work titled "On sense and reference", he asks how the expressions with a referring function should be translated into logical language. He also emphasizes "assumptions for the existence of referent (designation)", whose characteristic feature is that their authenticity is a crucial condition to provide a sentence with a logical meaning. Therefore, Frege highlighted the crucial feature of presupposition that is constancy under negation. However, Frege's concept lacks unity when it comes to the level of the language on which the assumptions should be made. An opposing view on presupposition is presented by Russell and his idea of definite descriptions, which solves the problem of sentences with non-existent subject terms, of which Frege's language philosophy does not provide a precise explanation. Russel claims that denoting phrases can be expressed in the form on conjunction of the value of the sentence and thus sentences predicating on something that does not exist happen to be false. However, Russel's view differs from the one presented by a twentieth-century philosopher, Peter Strawson. The latter maintains that the problems mentioned derive from the fact that scholars do not notice the difference between sentences and sentences used to have an assertive meaning and, consequently, that the sentences cannot be true or false since this is a characteristic feature of statements. He also emphasizes a connection between them, in which one statement is a primary condition to give a logical value to another statement. Strawson called the phenomenon a presupposition and claimed that it can be recognized as a specific kind of pragmatic deduction/presupposition. The article focuses on showing the three views on presupposition on the grounds of the philosophies of language presented by scholars mentioned above.

Year

Issue

13

Pages

239-250

Physical description

Contributors

  • Uniwersytet Mikołaja Kopernika w Toruniu, Instytut Języka Polskiego

References

Document Type

Publication order reference

Identifiers

YADDA identifier

bwmeta1.element.desklight-b086536b-22c7-4cb5-bec2-5e0f7f4a1b28
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