Nadzór korporacyjny wobec krytyki koncepcji shareholder value

• Authors: Maria Aluchna

Title variants

EN

Corporate governance and the criticism of shareholder value

• Languages of publication: PL

Abstracts

EN

The complexity of corporate governance and the need to consider a set of various economic, social, legal, historical and cultural determinants lead to the development of different research perspectives. Despite the multi-theme approaches the concept of shareholder value, the fundamental assumption of principal-agent theory, appeared to become the paradigm for research of the efficiency of corporate governance mechanisms and evolution and gave rise to many regulations or best practice. Corporate governance inefficiencies identified with the outbreak of the financial crisis cast doubt not only on the effectiveness of the shareholder value approach, but also on its economic and social argumentation. The current critic of this perspective may have impact on the corporate governance practice and regulation.

Keywords

PL

krytyka maksymalizacji shareholder value; nadzór korporacyjny

EN

criticism of MSV; corporate governance

• Publisher: Łódzkie Towarzystwo Naukowe, Stowarzyszenie
• Journal: Studia Prawno-Ekonomiczne
• Year: 2014
• Volume: XCI (91)/2
• Pages: 9-24

Dates

published

2014

Contributors

author

Maria Aluchna

• Katedra Teorii Zarządzania, Szkoła Główna Handlowa

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• Strony internetowe:
• Wartzman R., The long view: Why „maximizing shareholder value” is on its way out, Time: Business and Money, 25.09.2013, http://business.time.com/2013/09/25/the-long-view-why-maximizing-shareholder-value-is-on-its-way-out/; stan na dzień 20.02.2014 r.

Identifiers

ISSN

0081-6841