2014 | 50 | 4(202) | 263-280
Article title

No Miracles: What does it mean that science seeks the truth?

Title variants
Nic dziwnego. Co znaczy, że nauka poszukuje prawdy?
Languages of publication
The purpose of the following pages is to show that the rejection of Metaphysical Correspondentism doesn’t force us to reject Default Correspondentism and that the rejection of Metaphysical Realism doesn’t force us to reject Default Realism. As a consequence, we aim to disentangle the analysis of the (standard, robust, ordinary but also scientific) notion of truth from the debate between realism and anti-realism. The independence of the analysis of notions such as knowledge and assertion from the metaphysical debate follows too.
Celem artykułu jest pokazanie, że odrzucenie metafizycznego korespondentyzmu nie pociąga za sobą odrzucenia domyślnego korespondentyzmu i że odrzucenie realizmu metafizycznego nie pociąga za sobą odrzucenia domyślnego realizmu. W związku z tym, staramy się oddzielić analizę (standardowego, odpornego, potocznego, ale także naukowego) pojęcia prawdy od debaty między realizmem a anty-realizmem. Wynika z tego niezależność analizy pojęć, takich jak wiedza i asercja, od debat metafizycznych.
Physical description
  • Department of Philosophy I, University of Granada (Spain)
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Document Type
Publication order reference
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