EN
The paper posits the thesis that there is no methodological shortcut between behavioral genetics and legal sciences, and we are not into position to walk on the bridge between genetics and law (especially, in the courtrooms). The structure of the paper is as follows. First, legal cases where behavioral genetics played some role are presented (Bayout, Stefani, Landrigan). In the next step possible points of intersection of law and genetics are described (culpability, mitigation etc.). The third and fourth part of the paper are devoted to genetic research (i.e. on C. elegans) in order to establish the relation between genes, neurons, environment (and again – genes). The conclusion of the paper is twofold (or even threefold). There is no strong evidence that genetic research can be of any use in legal proceedings. On the other hand, behavioral genetics is already on the courtroom’s doorstep and legal community should be prepared for it. And at the end, the relation between behavioral genetics and legal cases is a very interesting problem for legal philosophy and theory.