MAPPING NEW RESEARCH DIRECTIONS IN THE SOCIOLOGY OF MORAL PANIC

This article maps the evolution of moral-panic studies, and in particular its recent developments, which strive to link the sociology of moral panics to social theory informed by the sociology of moral regulation. This new body of literature has not yet been systematically analysed. It emerged—after the initial British contribution and American-Israeli functionalist ‘second wave’—as a response to a perceived deficiency in the conventional model, which commonly conceptualized moral panics as irrational societal reactions to alleged threats. The recent approach explores moral panics as short-term global moral-governance techniques of advanced liberal societies. The author also discusses new lines of inquiry into the ‘productive’ function of moral panics by elaborating Durkheimian insights on moral panics, which are viewed as the claims-making that construct universal interpretations of an antagonistic situation and provide a surface for the inscription of the proponents’ collective identities.

Key words: moral panic; moral regulation; Durkheim; late modernity, affect; ontological insecurity.

Introduction

The concept of moral panic as Kenneth Thompson (2011: VII) has noted is one of a few sociological terms like bureaucracy, charisma or anomie that exceeded specialist jargon and was successfully incorporated into colloquial language. It was mainly the mass media, as David Altheide (2009) and Alan Hunt (1997) demonstrated, that contributed to the introduction of this concept into popular culture, particularly in the UK and Anglo-Saxon countries, where moral panic is commonly used in reports (Altheide 2009: 79) and it covers social problems mostly related to sexual deviance, youth delinquency, drug and alcohol abuse, violence. Besides popular usage, starting with Stanley Cohen’s (2002 [1972]) seminal study Folk Devils and Moral Panics on the function of
the media and social control agents in misrepresenting youth subculture deviance, this concept is tested in various currents of sociology, media studies, criminology, social and cultural theory. Usually panics are in the literature identified with deep-seated problems emerging during social, economic and cultural change, and as such according to David Garland (2008: 14) are symptoms of “threats to existing hierarchies; status competition; the impact of social change upon established ways of life; and the breakdown of previously existing structures of control”. The perceived threats lead to the surge of collective concern towards an alleged menace to society’s moral order, which is usually embodied by the folk devils; these persons but also certain conditions (e.g. global warming, AIDS) become according to the often cited Cohen’s (2002: 9 [1972]) passage: “defined as a threat to social values; its nature is presented in a stylized and stereotypical fashion by the mass media, politicians, and interest groups”. Despite the folk devils, there are other critical elements for moral panic to take place, that were analytically developed particularly by Erich Goode and Nachman Ben-Yehuda (1994): the presence of moral entrepreneurs who define given social problem (e.g. mass media, law enforcement, politicians), heightened level of social concern (usually measured in increased number of press articles), hostility directed at deviants, a consensus appearing among public confirming that “the threat is real, serious” (1994: 34), the crucial element of disproportionality (the concern is considerably disproportionate to a given threat, its nature is exaggerated and overstylized), and the last indicator relates to the volatility of panics, which emerge for a certain period of time and then subside.

This article is concerned with the mapping of the approaches which emerged as a response to a perceived deficiency of conventional moral panics studies, which according to one of leading “moral panic revisionists” Sean Hier (2011: 12-13) conceptualized moral panics as atypical and irrational societal reactions towards alleged threats. Revisionists in turn attempt to broaden the scope of conventional moral panics analysis by bringing, among others, insights on the growing moral differentiation of late modern societies, the proliferation of new social movements, micro and niche media that blur the conventional division between moral entrepreneurs and folk devils (McRobbie 1994; McRobbie and Thornton 1995), the interplay between long term civilizing and decivilizing processes that affect the course of emerging moral panics in the wider structural perspective (Rohloff and Wright 2010; Rohloff 2011; Rohloff 2011a), or analyzing moral panics as short-term global moral governance techniques of contemporary advanced liberal societies. All these interventions emphasized the need of adjusting sociology of moral panics to the revised social theory that would fit the changing framework of the late modern society. In order to achieve this aim the revisionists employed among other approaches risk society theory and
moral regulation studies that revealed new function of the folk devils and social control agents for the recreation of normative frontiers of late modern society. This paper will consider also the possibility of opening new lines of inquiry on moral panics understood as affective claims making that reaffirm ontological security of certain social groups whose symbolic universe was challenged by the growing normative differentiation. This consideration gains special relevance in the context of post-foundational society where as Claude Lefort (1986) asserted “markers of certainty” lost their relevance and social control agents in order to efficiently exercise power need to construct points of resonance with lived experiences of the public to legitimize their claims making.

**Origins of the concept**

The concept of moral panics has entered the field of sociology in the early 1970s with British criminologists criticizing the essentialist approach in studying deviance. Young’s (1971) paper on societal reactions towards drug taking, where the concept of moral panics is mentioned for the first time and then Cohen’s (2002 [1972]) systematic work on the subculture of Mods and Rockers defined moral panics as volatile social dynamics reaffirming norm and constructing deviancy aligned them with the functionalist tradition exposing the productive agency of crime/conflict for the social fabric (Durkheim 1982 [1895]); Coser 1956). On the other hand, the overreacted process of creation a collective concern about the British subcultures that maintained little adequacy to the alleged menace these youth groups posed, which stands in the centre of Cohen’s research was heavily informed by the early 1960s American label theory (e.g. Schur 1971) expressed by famous Howard Becker’s (1963: 9) definition: “deviant behaviour is behaviour that people so label”. Within the labelling perspective function of morality is thus “to orient and direct social actions and to define the boundaries of cultural matrices” (Ben-Yehuda 1986: 495). For moral panic scholars particularly crucial were inspirations demonstrating the role of various interest groups, moral entrepreneurs, moral crusade campaigners in creating and maintaining certain types of deviancy that was menacing to their particular values and interests – alleged sorcery for Massachusetts puritans (Erickson 1966), non-protestant migrants for temperance movement activists (Gusfield 1986) or drug users for law enforcement agents (Becker 1963).

Indicating sources out of which the concept of moral panic grew, this is not to deny that it has maintained its analytical specificity. Cohen’s seminal work that explores how deviance is defined and amplified by social control agents was organized along the lines of moral panic indicators (e.g. exaggeration and distortion, prediction, symbolization, the presence of moral entrepreneurs and folk
devils and changes in the law as a consequence of panic) which consequently
inspired a whole range of literature that tested indicators against different social
occurrences comprising drug use, media violence, anti-migrant claims, child
abuse, social reactions to single mothers, new religious movements etc. Usually
this body of “conventional” moral panic literature offers analysis understood as
a heuristic device (Rohloff and Wright 2010) that identified logic of dispropor-
tion in moral entrepreneurs’ claims which as a result bore little relation to the
harm attributed to a given deviancy as for example presented in Paul Campos’ et
al. (2006) article on alarmist claims about an epidemic of obesity that allegedly
consist of “conventional” moral panic literature offers analysis understood as
constitute a major contributor to mortality, but as this study argues: “the current
inspired by cultural and political factors than by any threat increasing body weight may pose to
rhetoric about an obesity-driven health crisis is being driven more by cultur-
public health” (2006: 55), or explored normative boundaries or life styles main-
talence with strongly exposed role of interest groups as demonstrated in Revital
and political factors than by any threat increasing body weight may pose to
examined reactions of British public and media in the 1970s to mugging, specifically, urban
stress assaults committed mainly by Black youngsters of Caribbean descent.
concern about mugging as “an index of disintegration of social order” (1978:
concern about mugging as “an index of disintegration of social order” (1978:
VIII), and examined the function of panic as a strategy employed by the British
This piece produced by Stuart Hall and his colleagues was not only concerned
political elites, accompanied by media, in order to divert attention from the
social and economic crisis in Britain of the 1970s. This important Marxist-in-
inspired study has refined the concept of intentional activity of moral panic entre-
and economic crisis in Britain of the 1970s. This important Marxist-in-
tened through lifting it from the level of interest groups to the elite-engineer-
ing level, which analytical application was later systematically elaborated in the
another seminal publication in the moral panics literature, namely, Ben-Yehuda
and Goode’s (Goode and Ben-Yehuda 1994) Moral Panics. The latter book rep-
resents a functionalist American-Israeli wave in the sociology of moral panics,
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and Goode’s (Goode and Ben-Yehuda 1994) Moral Panics. The latter book rep-
resents a functionalist American-Israeli wave in the sociology of moral panics,
focused on societal strategies of coping with various forms of deviance in an
effort to reaffirm moral boundaries (see also Ben-Yehuda 1985, 1986). Goode
and Ben-Yehuda offered a systematic examination of the interplay between de-
viance and norm within the constructionist perspective, and what is probably
understood today as a major benefit of this book is that they conceptualized
with a great analytical clarity three models of panics that relate to the problem
which Amanda Rohloff and Sarah Wright (2010: 407) called “the question of
intentional action vs unintentional developments” of actors involved in panic occurrences: the grassroots model (that proposes that panic reactions are initiated by unorganized or loosely organized grassroots public), the interest group model (the most common model attributing the responsibility of triggering a particular heightened concern over a particular issue to a well-defined group, e.g. the police) and the elite-engineered model of panics (which neatly embodied the well-known Hall et al. example of “law and order” campaigns of political elites against inner-city youth delinquency, which won the consent of public for conservative sentiments and paved the road for Tory victory in 1979). In Moral Panics and Media Chas Critcher (2003) named “processual model” of panics as developed by Cohen and “attributional model” of Goode’s and Ben-Yehuda’s ideal types that rarely, if ever, take shape with analytical sharpness and distinctiveness in empirical social settings. Indeed, existing literature offers a number of examples confirming Critcher’s insights that panics are complex and hybrid².

Shifting the original parameters of moral panic concept

The analysis of the role of niche media and new youth subcultures’ strategies in subverting moral panics marked by two frequently cited articles in the sociology of moral panics, namely with Angela McRobbies’ (1994) “Folk Devils Fight Back” and McRobbie and Thornton’s (1995) “Rethinking Moral Panics” have considerably shifted the original parameters of the Cohen, Hall et al. and Goode and Ben-Yehuda’s original models. Firstly, McRobbie and Thornton (1995), in contrast to what conventional concept of moral panics stipulate that mass media cover moral panic irregularly and thus these phenomena represent a rather untypical societal upheaval, argued that mass media in the contemporary advanced liberal societies (especially British tabloids) are not a subject of exceptional episodes of panics but instead panics becomes a routine means of producing news. However, what is of utmost significance in this article is the argument that the British society, and to larger extent European societies, have profoundly changed since the conventional concept of panics was formulated.

² E.g. Ben-Yehuda (1986) demonstrated how functionalist moral perspective should be integrated with interest group approach in order to better grasp the meaning of panic occurrences; Schinkel (2008) argued that only a combination of grassroots and interest-group models represented by the media and civil campaigners may shed some light on the phenomenon of panic over “senseless-violence”. Moreover, Schinkel argued that also the canonical parameters of panic, that is to say, the volatility in his example was somehow problematic, since that anxiety was institutionalized and a moral panic persisted for several years. Also, folk devils, which are perceived as a constitutive element of moral panic, in some documented cases of panics were not present, as it happened with the panic over global warming.
The original model, according to the revisionists, was formulated in a homogen- 
ous British moral culture, which empirically differs greatly from a much more 
complex social fabric and its means of communication in late 20th-century soci-
eties, in which moral centre and unified figures of deviancy have been consid-
erably reshaped, which according to Ben-Yehuda (2009: 2) posited a challenge 
for the sociology of moral panics which should be focused on “…how different 
moral ideas and concepts struggle for attention and domination in a social and 
cultural landscape that allows and tolerates such rivalry”. David Garland (2008), 
on the other hand, noted that contemporary moral panics are taking place in the 
increasingly pluralized ideological landscape resembling the situation of Ameri-
can cultural wars shifting away: “from moral panics as traditionally conceived 
(involving a vertical relation between society and a deviant group) towards 
something more closely resembling American-style ‘culture wars’… where it is 
difficult to find any public issue on which there is broad public agreement and an 
absence of dissenting voices” (2008: 17).

There is probably no other aspect of moral panic than the position of folk 
devils which needed redefinition since “the old moral guardians have dispersed 
and fragmented” (McRobbie 1994) and “monolithic social reactions” towards 
them disappeared or are steadily disappearing. A number of contemporary 
 moral panics do not succeed with vilifying certain individuals and stigmatiz-
ing former categories of folk devils does not enter “the vocabulary of common 

sense”, because as McRobbie writes using a British example: “The old boundar-
ies... between black and white, between ‘us’ and ‘them’, have also to a certain 
extent broken down. Through a generation of young people who have grown 
up and been educated in a multicultural society, those divides are slowly being 
blurred” (1994), but secondly because the old folk devils have possessed the 
anti-stigmatization skills, they are not passive anymore and they do fight back3. 
This active “fighting back” shift applies particularly to youth and subculture 
groups which since the very beginning of moral panic studies have been com-
monly targeted as folk devils. Not only are subculture deviants able to produce 
nowadays their own niche media, efficiently use the internet, chat communica-
tors, social networking in order to fight back “moral guardians”, but more im-
portantly “negative news coverage baptizes transgression” and as such negative 
societal reactions are exploited by youth deviants as their marketing strategies,

3 This is not to deny that social actors are constrained by structural conditions of depen-
dency which limit the possibilities of fighting back. For instance Central and Eastern European 
migrants who arrived in Great Britain after the EU enlargement in 2004 were considerably 
powerless while confronted with the British anti-migrant bias. Deprived of social capital, po-
orly equipped with the language skills in certain situations required external agency that would 
assist them in producing a counter-hegemonic discourse which might eventually challenge panic 
claims making and improve e.g. labour relations (Chan et al. 2014).
for example for their publishing and record companies (McRobbie and Thornton 1995: 565). Given the multi-mediated nature of contemporary society McRobbie and Thorton (1995: 560) in their revisionist manifesto stipulated: “The proliferation and fragmentation of mass, niche and micro-media and the multiplicity of voices, which compete and contest the meaning of the issues subject to ‘moral panic’, suggest that both the original and revised models are outdated”. This call was followed by a number of studies that on the one hand showed the multi-mediated reality of contemporary panics and the folk devil’s fighting back agency in different settings, but also opened up the debates that were articulating the necessity of widening the scope of the scholarship and linking the sociology of moral panics with social theory not only restricted to sociology of deviance (Hier 2002a; Smoczynski 2011; Fitzgerald and Smoczynski 2015a).

**Moral regulation and panics**

It seems however, that the most systematic attempt to broaden the scope of panics studies has recently become related to an extended area of research that links up sociology of moral panics, moral regulation, and to some extent risk governance studies\(^4\). It is important to note at the outset, that although moral panics and moral regulation show close affinities, and as time progresses these approaches have been conceptualized in an integrated framework, nevertheless the evolution of these concepts needs to be perceived separately as “they grew up independently and took little interest in each other” (Hunt 2011: 53), and the analysed scholars maintain their distinct scholarly interests, namely they are concerned with either the sociology of moral panics (e.g. Hier), the sociology

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\(^4\) Another possible area of testing moral panic studies that has recently attracted considerable attention was elaborated in a series of publications (Rohloff and Wright 2010; Rohloff 2011, 2011a) whose authors proposed to incorporate the concept into Eliasian (Elias 2000 [1939]) sociology, exploring the historical process of civilizing/uncivilizing tendencies, which is concerned among others with the gradual shift of Western societies’ external coercive social control measures to self-governing tendencies of “civilized individuals”. Placed in such a contexts moral panics function as: “a heightened campaign or sense of concern about a particular issue (or set of issues), where there is a perceived crisis in the ‘civilizing’ of the self and the other; where the regulation of one’s own, or another’s, behavior is seen to be failing or out of control, or where it is believed that we need a drastic change in the regulation of the self and/or the other in order to avoid a potential crisis.” Rohloff and Wright’s contribution point to the structural interplay between short-term moral campaigns and long-term civilizing processes that was intended by the authors to move the scholarship beyond the vicious circle of assessing proportionality, ritual checks of moral panic indicators and the “inherent normative presuppositions” returning in a number of panic studies (for examples of normative bias see Rothe and Muzzati 2004; Miller 2006; Shepard 2007).
of moral regulation (e.g. Hunt), social and legal theory (e.g. Valverde), or risk governance studies (O’Malley), understood as conceptually and analytically distinct.

It was Sean Hier (2002) who first systematically connected moral panics studies with the sociology of moral regulation. The latter starting with the work of Philip Corrigan and Derek Soyer (1985) and further contribution of Hunt (1997, 1999, 2003) has been examining the practices of moralization that was gradually spreading in Western societies and were based on discursive and institutionalized routines to form subjectivities of modern “prudent individuals” capable of managing risks and avoiding harm. According to Hier (2008), moralization understood as a governance strategy in contemporary advanced Western liberal societies, brings about strategic convergence between risk, responsibility and morality and “involves myriad discourses, symbols, feelings, actors, and truth-claims that are always rationally ‘productive’ in the sense that they continually generate ways of thinking about oneself and others” (2008: 181). Consequently against this backdrop of routine processes moral panics constitute the episodes of the failure of the long-term moral regulation processes which stipulates coercive measures to discipline folk devils perceived as individuals who avoid risk-management strategies and pose threat to wider strata of the society. In other words, according to this conceptualization, moral panics are short-lived volatile manifestations of the global project of moral regulation, and as Hier (2002: 330) states: “whilst moral regulation involves one set of persons acting on the conduct of others over a wide range of discursive sites with the ultimate goal of ethical reconstitution at some future point, panic narratives as political resources reduce the field of regulatory intervention to the extent that a tangible object is designated for immediate intervention”.

Hier and his colleagues (Hier 2008; Hier et al. 2011) formulated a position in line with the dialectical mechanism of neo-liberal moral regulation discourses of risk-management and harm avoidance that set in motion the every-day relation between the self and the other: “[M]oralization finds expression through the proxies of risk, harm, and personal responsibility. One common feature of moralization in everyday life is that people are called upon to engage in responsible forms of individual risk management that exist in tension with collective subject

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5 This body of literature spanning more than a decade is almost exclusively confined to a series of publications of Canadian social scientists who rejuvenated the panics scholarship, what after British and American-Israeli constitutes the “Canadian turn” in sociology of moral panic.

6 The genealogy of moral regulation usually traces its origin to the development of urbanization processes in the late medieval period, which according to Hunt (2003: 179): “was a response to an increasend demand for labour, the drift from country to towns and increased social density; all of which generate pressures towards ‘new modes of life’ that were characterized by great variation in lifestyle, that, in turn, generated a perceived need for more discipline.”
positions of “harmful others”” (Hier et al. 2011: 263). This is the moment where dialectic process takes place: “individualizing discourses calling upon people to take personal responsibility to manage risk (e.g. drinking responsibly) are situated against collectivizing discourses representing the subject position of harm (e.g. the drunk driver)…” (Hier et al. 2011: 263).

The subject or condition revealed as a cause of harm is empirically contingent and changes over the course of the subsequent panic eruptions, however the dialectics which governs individual risk management against collective representation of harm embodied by different categories of folk devils acted upon in the form of social grievances is cyclical (Hier 2008). This assumption contradicts the thesis of the atypical nature of moral panics, or to put it differently, panics in contrast to their conventional conceptualization (e.g. exaggerated collective reaction to the denounced threat) but, in a similar way, to the functionalist position (e.g. panics as a societal mechanism reconfirming norm in opposition to deviancy), are perceived as an element of a rational social dialectics that restore the uninterrupted dynamics of the meta-project of moral regulation that have been at work to different degrees in Western, particularly Anglo-Saxon societies for a long period of time.

Although the “Canadian turn” scholars temporal eruptions of panics deliberately analyze in a broader context of historically cumulating moralizing practices that stand in the centre of moral regulation literature inquiring into long-run societal actions orchestrated by moral campaigners; we should, however, retain the analytical distinctiveness of these concepts. To put it simply, panic studies address temporally limited incidents and regulations scholars are concerned with the long-term moralizing processes: “Whereas panic scholars are preoccupied with tapping into the ‘real’ source of anxieties that motivate disproportional and exaggerated representations and responses, regulation scholars increasingly emphasize how subjectivities are enacted, promoted, institutionalized, internalized and performed” (Hunt 2011: 55). Hier (2011a), in turn, in response to Critcher’s (2009) criticism that moral panics conceptualized as a form of moral regulation may pose a certain tautological risk to subsume any social issue, stated that these concepts should not be conflated analytically, though they may “overlap empirically” within the perspective of the advanced liberal societies governance techniques of “totalized responsibility”.

Besides the factor of temporality, moral regulation scholars claim their normative neutrality, namely, as Hunt argues, in the long-run perspective of the rise of Western urban societies moral politics embraced all sectors of the society, irrespective of their ideological inclinations: “Moral politics was everywhere, and not just in traditional fields such as prostitution, alcohol and obscenity…moral politics was being generated from all across the political spectrum. Alongside the moral traditionalism of religious fundamentalism, with its appeal to family
values and sexual austerity, moral campaigns were promoted by social forces with self-consciously transformative agendas. Radical feminism attacked pornography, sexual abuse and harassment in the name of progressive goal or transformed gender relations. Race activists promoted projects to criminalise racial abuse and hate-speech” (Hunt 1999: IX-X). Valverde (2008) analysing “social purity movements” that were active particularly at the turn of 20th century in English speaking Canada emphasized their informal character that comprised “church people, educators, doctors, social workers’ (2008: 17) who were engaged in “the moral regeneration of the state, civil society, the family and the individual” through combating obscene literature, prevention of prostitution and rescue of fallen women, and shelters for women and children”.

At this point, it is also important to note the gradual historical shift of social control practices from external coercive measures to positive forms of self-governance7, emphasized by moral regulation scholars. The positive nature of these changing practices, were particularly instructive in the paradigmatic example of the Canadian social purity movement that constituted a mixture of philanthropic and preventive means mostly focused on sexual vice to “preserve and enhance certain type of human life” (Valverde 2008: 24), thus according to Mariana Valverde (2008: 27) “the criminal, the fallen, and the destitute were being increasingly seen as subjects of treatment.” The persistent positivity of the moral regulation processes is clearly contrasted with the stark negativity of moral panics campaigners, who are not concerned with reforming a deviant character and do not attempt to produce a stable framework of responsible conduct to be followed by social actors. However, both moral regulation and moral panics, according to Hier (2002: 330), involve “one set of persons seeking to act on the conduct of others, and they both contain an inherent linkage between the identity of the regulator and the identity of the regulated”, thus panics could be considered as a specific form of moral regulation that covers urgent regulation problems. In other words, panics function as “last resort technologies” where individuals do not successfully internalize the proposed conduct of the moral governance project and the subjectification is perceived as in the state of crisis or willingly or unwillingly the subject resists interpellation of the regulators (Hier 2002), in such dislocatory situations moral panic occurs, to paraphrase Laclau (1990), as “suture moment” in the dislocated symbolic order.

The shift of 19th-century’s discourses preoccupied with shaping the “virtues” to the 20th-century’s discourses on “personal character”, indicates the changing position of centralized authority (e.g. family, dominant class) and an increasing impact of secularization in modern societies where normative categories

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7 It should be added that the moral regulation project of self formation is always mediated by society, though not restricted to official authorities (Hunt 1999).
are being increasingly replaced by “the utilitarian claims about the personal or social harm associated with the wrong” (Hunt 1999: 7), and – what is crucial for a proper understanding of further developments in moral panic studies – this shift is indicative of the proliferation of anxiety in modern advanced liberal societies.

However, in contrast to Sheldon Ungar’s (2001) thesis about the demise of moral panics in risk societies, Hier (2003) points out that the growing social anxiety contribute rather to the emerging convergence of risk and panic sites what according to Hier (2008) who follows O’Malley (1992, 1996) is particularly visible in the context of the transformation from the Keynesian welfarism that regarded risks (e.g. crime, health care) as problems that require social management to neo-liberal techniques of privatized risk management that Western, particularly Anglo-Saxon societies have witnessed over a few decades of late 20th century. As Pat O’Malley (1996) showed the traditional welfare subordination of the civil client to the state perceived as agent capable of risk management has been considerably diminished (O’Malley 1996: 203), and the neo-liberal “prudentialist” approach is inclined to transfer significant number of risks (e.g. unemployment, sickness, crime prevention) on individuals, who are supposed to manage them “as a part of their rational and responsible existence” (1996: 204). And this is precisely here, as Hier (2011a) observes, that the “realization and limitation of liberal freedom” constructs space for antagonism where moral panics find its relevance, namely the limits of prudentialism are gauged “to the harm that one person’s exercise of freedom poses to another person’s right to pursue their own freedom free of harm caused by others” (2011a: 538), and folk devils are singled out as those individuals “who are judged unable or unwilling to exercise that capacity” (2011a: 539).

The relevance of the interplay between panics and “prudentialist era” was empirically tested in e.g., study (Hier et al. 2011) analysing a 2005 moral panic over young Britons who through hooded dressing style associated with criminal activity that according to moral panic proponents posed a threat to the moral order in urban spaces. According to Hier and his colleagues, the panic over hoodies developed as a direct responses to the failure of moral regulation procedures calling upon youth to engage in “prudential” self-conduct related to the risks associated with the public sphere. And as such moral panic claims making have to be connected with the wider “themes of risk” that were circulating in British society, namely the on-going debate regarding the governmental measures regulating behaviors in public places (Anti-Social Behavior Act and Anti-Social Behavior Order codes), which signifies that each panic hinges upon long-run regulation processes and it cannot be properly perceived as “irrational” eruption of social behavior. Another example comes from the study on societal reactions of British public towards Polish labour migrants whose inflow after
2004 EU enlargement has caused the growth of the sense of employment insecurity among certain segments of the British indigenous population (Fitzgerald and Smoczyński 2015). This paper showed how anti-Polish moral panic campaign has developed as a response to the failure of moral regulation procedures that call on the British to engage in prudential self-conduct related to labour market risks. Ian Fitzgerald and Rafał Smoczyński (2015) argued that claims-making blaming Polish migrants for employment insecurities fulfilled a productive function insofar it helped to restore “the coherence of the social symbolic order that has been dislocated by the cyclical forces of employment instabilities. Moral panic’s stylisation of Polish folk devils as ‘stealing jobs’ has acted as an ‘anti-subversive’s fantasy that both concealed the structural dynamics of late capitalist society and provided a narrative justification of the failure of individual responsibility for managing employment insecurities.”

Discussion and conclusion

Analysed above approaches included a series of theoretical and empirical re-formulations of the conventional model which firmly situated sociology of moral panics in new conceptual context informed, among other aspects, by social risk theory, moral regulation, risk governance studies. The revisionists underlined also the need to conceptualise the normative pluralisation of contemporary societies, what has reduced sharp isometric antagonisms between folk devils and moral entrepreneurs, they have called for analysis of discursive strategies of social control agents which seek to resonate with the sensitiveness of the public8, new scholarship acknowledged the rise of new sites of collective insecurities that triggered hybrid forms of panics. Arguably one the most

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8 According to Colin Hay (1996), who analyzed a highly publicized episode of British panic over murder of 2 year old boy, the contemporary panics capabilities driven by media rest in their ideological ability to create a resonance with the public. Specifically, the media’s agency to recruit individuals into panic agency resides in the potential of the event to transcend its particularity onto the level of universal concern that might be linked with the lived experiences of the public: “Through the process of discursive amplification, the ’event’ is translated from a particular conjuncture that must be understood in its own terms, to an event which is seen as emblematic and symptomatic of broader processes – moral decay, social malaise and the destruction of the social fabric of the family and thus society itself” (1996: 204). Only on condition of linking particular idiosyncrasies with the wider field of family resemblance moral panic takes off. Other contributions (Hier and Greenberg 2002; Watney 1987; Parnaby 2003; Critcher 2003; Jenkins 1992; De Young 2004; Krinsky 2008; Goldberger et al. 2010) pointed out that recurring events of panics cannot be properly understood without placing them in the broader discursive framework of anxieties embedded in contemporary media and society such as “the war on drugs”, “bogus asylum seekers”, “sexual predators”, or paedophiles or kidnappers.
insightful contributions of the analysed revision implies a detailed elaboration of moral panics as “productive” moral regulation instruments what situates this approach far from the Le-Bonian tradition that would perceive them as eruptions of mob ridden anger. Interestingly however, these contributions have not paid much attention to the role of moral panics understood as discursive instruments which re-affirm ontological security especially for groups whose symbolic and indeed moral universe has been disoriented as a consequence of rapid social change. The major concern of moral regulation scholars has been mainly with the macrostructural level of governance techniques, the possible function of claims-making perceived as a productive instrument that is able to reconstruct “from below” an ontological security for groups from which typically moral entrepreneurs are recruited has not received systematic attention in the analysed literature. This function capable to restore an ontological security refers to initial Durkheimian intuitions of moral panic studies. The fact that normative differentiation of modern societies may bring social unsettlement and deteriorate ontological security for some segments of society is a paradigmatic notion in social sciences (La Capra 2001). For instance studies marked originally by Emile Durkheim (1964 [1893]) show how the growing differentiation undermines the coherence of social bond based on collective representations, this disorientation may produce the inflow of anomic occurrences exemplified not only by deviant behaviour but also – what is important for this line of inquiry – by the decomposition of symbolic universe of various traditional communities relying on homogeneous resemblance of their members (Marsden 1980). One of the symptoms of this disruption might take a form of the excessive responses to the self-reported anomic anxiety: the growth of society of fear (Furedi 1997) but also the rise of moral panics (Critcher 2003). It is not surprising that moral panic studies typically identify representatives of conservative and religious groups as vocal moral entrepreneurs who are frequently inclined to stir alarm in relation to alleged menace that threatens their cherished values and traditional institutions in rapidly changing world9. These groups, which are confronted with the state of dislocation (Laclau 1990)10, frequently initiate panic occurrences covering such diverse social problems as the plight of abused children,

9 Another standard problem relates to an imagery of threatened children, which is associated with the growing difficulties of parental control over children in the environment that challenges a traditional structure of family.

10 According to Laclau (1990) the category of dislocation relates to the situation where the elementary conditions of the traditional communities but also relations of power are rapidly changing what forces the process of the emergence of new collective identities. At the same time dislocation leads to the rise of antagonistic tensions since social actors affected by dislocation seek to mobilize members of the dislocated communities against the alleged subversive forceses.
pornography, single mothers, sectarian movements, violence. Perhaps it is worth considering the possible further lines of inquiry which may carry on analysis on the productive function of moral panic claims-making, which as Fitzgerald and Smoczynski (2015) noted “restores the rational meaning of social objectivity and guarantee its uninterrupted coherence during a crisis period” for these specific groups whose symbolic universe has been dislocated in the modern era of disenchantment. Therefore, while reflecting on possible ways of developing the neo-functionalist insights in sociology of moral panics I am concerned here especially with widening the discussion by including some Durkheimian insights on the role of affective naming for the re-creating the coherence of social group. Namely, it is argued that in the context of changing structures of traditional authorities (family, church-oriented religions), a revised distribution of power relations and the advent of new forms of legitimization of social hierarchies, moral panic claims making might be conceptualized as a performative act of naming, which creates the very ground for the reaffirmation of collective moral boundaries for certain conservative circles affected by the social dislocation. An act of naming, implies the performative action, which is visible in Durkheim’s (1965 [1912]) emphasises on the role of symbols which re-create the coherency of the social group11. Moreover, this discussion may assume a certain added value when performativity of claims making is understood as a populist strategy in line with the recent elaborations of Ernesto Laclau (2005). According to the latter populism constitutes a social mobilization strategy that aims at construction a universal meaning of “the people” in the context of contemporary society which is characterised following Claude Lefort’s (1986) notion by “the dissolution of the landmarks of certainty” in which “power, law and knowledge are exposed to radical indetermination” and no social structure can be described “from the perspective of single point of view”. Populism similarly as moral-panic claims making takes place always in antagonistic circumstances – the mobilization of a “we” requires the construction of a “they” – and ultimately – efficient populism is constituted by systematic series of articulations which cement the social group’s identity.12 Importantly, both Laclau (2005: 111) and Durkheim accentuate that the collective identity building which involves naming

11 “Because the clan cannot exist without a name and an emblem, and because this emblem is continually within eyeshot of individuals, it is to it and to the objects whose image it is that the sentiments which society awakens in its members are directed ... a collective sentiment can become conscious of itself only by fixing onto a material object, and, by that very fact, it participates in the nature of that object ann conversely” (Durkheim 1965 [1912]: 338–339).

12 Politically and historically this concept should be situated within the context of democratic revolutions of the 19th century that made it impossible to delimit a final source of legitimation for actors’ performances (Mouffe 2005). This impas eventually reveals the contingency of all discourses. In meta-tehoretical terms the critique of ultimatre foundations is usually associated
does not limit itself only to signifying operations but is supplemented by the agency of affectivity. The latter is able to bring the glue for collective representations which consequently provide the symbolic space for the inscription of the “people”. Clearly, moral panic as a specific type of the collective effervescence based social action resonates mainly with their participants through identifying folk devils and constructing universal interpretations of antagonistic situations. The emotional component of panics as intertwined with their performativity – as it is vivid in Durkheimian approach – provides a necessary “weight” that increases the integration of dispersed individuals. Of course, this is not to deny that moral panic participants rarely if ever constitute well defined social movements, in most cases moral panic proponents represent shortly-lived inchoate “epistemic communities” (Haas 1992), which are not cemented by any durable bond. On the other hand, moral panic claims-making offers one of the available discursive strategies frequently used by conservative and religious movements which might be understood as an affectively charged articulation seeking to restore the compromised symbolic sense of their ontological security. Once employed, this strategy relies mainly on labelling different categories of wrong-doers who are allegedly responsible for subverting the cherished moral order. La Capra (2001: 5) reminds us that for Durkheim collective consciousness always “arouse in response to doubt, disorientation, and anomic anxiety caused by the breakdown of the tradition”.

Let’s take as an example the ritual abuse moral panic which burst out in the 1990s in the US when alleged Satanists were nominated to act as the folk devils. This campaign managed to certain extent mobilize and recreate a collective moral frontiers of American fundamentalists (La Fontain 1998; De Young 2004; Victor 1993; Smoczynski 2010, 2013), who in coalition with other social movements acted as a primary collective actor initiating and then universalizing the traditional Sabbath myth leading to a series of arrests and highly publicized legal proceedings of the alleged Satanists. Obviously there were a number of instrumental gains involved in this XX-th century witch-hunt, these should not however obscure its more fundamental function related to ontological insecurity of the ritual abuse moral panic proponents, particularly fundamentalist groups. This peculiar moral panic as Smoczynski (2010) demonstrated should be analysed within the broader context of the historical emergence of “modernist crisis” which undermined the symbolic universe of the Protestant culture in American society. While confronted with the growing dislocation of the traditional social arrangements informed by the Protestant culture, starting in the late 1800s fundamentalist community began to employ as a means of defence

with the well known post-structuralist tradition of questioning of the transparency of the sign (Marchart 2007).
of its traditional life style various symbolic crusades (Gusfield 1986) which were based on affectively charged claims making denouncing different categories of deviants who allegedly undermined the stability of society based on “Christian family values”. A number of fundamentalist symbolic crusades and moral panics that occurred during the XIXth and XXth centuries actively used an imagery of the “wrong-doers”: the temperance movement campaign, campaigns against the idea of evolution, homosexual indecency, humanistic atheism and ritual abuse. These upheavals on the one hand acted as a hermeneutic explanatory tool that provided a principle of reading the social change within the “conspiracy perspective”, on the other hand, through attributing the responsibility of the failure of the “family values” based society to the Big Other (e.g., Satanists, atheists, corrupted politicians etc.), who allegedly pull the strings of the politics and history, this claims-making was able to recreate certain level of consistency of symbolic meaning and through this operation paradoxically revive their moral normative frontiers.

In other words, the ontological security of certain social groups especially those as described above fundamentalists whose perception of symbolic universe has been dislocated requires to arrange on periodical basis “rituals” of naming, which expose the perpetrators of their plight. Productive functionality of moral panic crisis reminds in this sense the agency of the Sorelian myth, which as Laclau (1990: 61) explained: „is to suture that dislocated space through the constitution of a new space of representation. Thus, the effectiveness of myth is essentially hegemonic: it involves forming a new objectivity by means of the rearticulation of the dislocated elements.” The moral panic-claims making allows its proponents to represent certain dislocated social reality as arranged around clear-cut Schmittian opposition – “friend” and “enemy”, what as in an David Bromley’s (1991: 64) example of subversive myth may bring about a certain “unity of consciousness”. Subversive myth explains why cherished institutions and social practices are in the state of crisis mostly by constructing the field of meaning that is built on opposition of the imagery of the “natural” social order and “unnatural” social order. According to Bromley the former resonates with traditional patriarchal and authoritarian imageries of society and the latter social order is being described as subverting familial ties, contributing to the erosion of parental control over children, rise of divorces and children born out of wedlock along with other symptoms of the decline of “naturalness” (prostitution, sexual promiscuity, massive rejection of the traditional religious practices, etc.) (see Ammerman 1987). In such polarised discursive conditions the subversive myth has a valuable potential of identifying the sources of social strain which consequently activates the very possibility of rearticulating normative boundaries of the group in opposition to emotionally depicted “unnatural social order” (see Laclau 1996:38).
The proposed analytical terrain allows therefore to broaden the conceptualisation of moral panics, which do not limit themselves to the terrain of instrumental rationality but can be framed within the terms of social ontology, in which moral panic participants are defined not merely as collective actors seeking for interest gains, but as collective subjects which re-create social reality against the forces of dislocation and anomie. Such inquiry may link also the reflection on moral panics with broader context of social theory accentuating changing mechanisms of collective identity building and legitimation of social control measures in post-foundational society.

References


**Nowe kierunki badań w socjologii paniki moralnej**

Streszczenie

W artykule przeprowadzono krytyczną analizę ewolucji socjologii paniki moralnej, zwłaszcza jej ostatnich przekształceń, które wypracowane zostały w kontekście dyskusji z badaniami nad zarządzaniem ryzykiem i socjologią moralnej regulacji. Ten nowy nurt badań opiera się na przekonaniu socjologów o nieadekwatności dotychczasowego modelu studiów nad panikami moralnymi, które konwencjonalnie określały wybuchy panik jako irracjonalne zachowania społeczne. Tymczasem analizowane przekształcenia konceptualne dla odmiany identyfikują panikę moralną w perspektywie neofunkcjonalistycznego paradygmatu jako krótkookresowe techniki „moralnego zarządzania” współczesnych społeczeństw ryzyka. Artykuł przedstawia także wybrane wątki socjologii durkheimowskiej, które mogą pogłębić studia nad panikami moralnymi w dobie późnej nowoczesności.

Główne pojęcia: panika moralna; moralna regulacja; socjologia durkheimowska; późna nowoczesność.