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**INTRODUCTION: THE TRANSATLANTIC CIVILISATION
AND MODERNITY TODAY**

Disintegration of the Soviet Union and the demise of communism as a world ideology, the creation of the European Union as a global player, and the acceptance of East European, post-Soviet countries into the latter created a new dynamic in transatlantic relations. Yet the optimism that the world can finally be organized according to peaceful liberal-democratic order quickly disappeared. In 2001, in the wake of the 9/11 attacks on America, the world entered the era of a profound instability and the nervous reactions of the major players in the liberal-democratic world: the United States, the European Union, and within the latter – Eastern Europe, the new partner. These immediate political developments brought to the fore, much deeper differences, mainly of cultural nature. This brings forth a question whether the transatlantic civilization as conceived after the Second World War was just a handy name for the immediate political and military common front against the communist enemy. The differences manifested themselves both between the United States and the European Union, and within the European Union itself between the Western and newly accepted Eastern sections.

All these developments emphasized the tensions of late modernity as a cultural project; it took on a new shape at the turn of the 20th century, and corresponding developments in modernization patterns, theoretical as well as practical. These concerns especially two issues: a profound reconsideration of culture as an independent variable, and the limited validity of the so-called secularization theory.

There exists no set definition of modernity and modernization; they have no permanently set shape: there is only the constantly changing world. The essence of modernity, the meaning of this ‘constant present’, has been the question occupying the western mind since at least the 16th century. The most obvious feature of modernity is its fluidity. Modernity ends for good with things permanent at the social and cultural but also at the personal and mental levels. It considers speculations about the essence of being, man, and eventually also morality and virtue to be a futile enterprise. Philosophically, the breakthrough was prepared by the nominalist revolution of late Middle Ages. But its consequences were of double nature: individual, social or experimental, and scientific. At the individual level, modernity was born with the rise of individual consciousness as a sovereign mover of human’s orientation in the world. At the social level, the individual was to apply this insight into what was real, not speculative, what science – whether corroborated by government or a machine – could solve. The religious wars of the 16th and 17th centuries paved the way both for the rise of modern individualism and practical political philosophy and for the institutional solutions corresponding to this philosophical revolution. The main aim of human well-being was a peaceful political order, possible to achieve if the things ultimate were to be removed from the immediate political concerns. Humanity was to lower decisively its sight from nature, God, religion of command, in wit from all transcendent meaning and permanent things passed since antiquity to Christianity of the Middle Ages. At the individual level this unfolding of this inner potential and the rise of the ‘self’ was visible in Michel de Montaigne, William Shakespeare, Miguel Cervantes and René Descartes. Introspection is the name of modernity, but a peculiar one. Introspection of course looms already large at the center of the first great autobiographical work of Western civilization St Augustine’s *Confessions*, but at that time it was firmly geared to the higher moral order, captured by the Saint’s immortal line ‘love and do whatever you want’. Introspection of modernity is geared to individual freedom unbound by limitations, as a road of the mind wherever it takes itself.¹

¹ In the middle of the religious wars Montaigne wrote what must have been the first justification of modern individualism: “The greater thing on earth is to know how to belong to oneself. Everybody looks in front of them. But I look inside myself. I have no concerns but my own. I constantly reflect on myself; I control myself; I taste myself [...]. We owe some things to society, but the greater part to ourselves. It is necessary to lend oneself to others, but to give oneself only to oneself. M. de Montaigne, *Essais* (1580), quoted by N. Davies, *Europe. A History*, Oxford 1996, p. 483. Shakespeare was already a modern man in his *Sonnets* as well as in his great tragedies. In *Otello* (1604–1605) we find this strikingly modern line “I am nothing if not critical”. Cervantes in *Don Kichote* (1604) puts the stirring homage to human freedom into the mouth of his hero. Descartes in turn located moral authority and self-sufficiency within the individual, going in fact one step further and establishing the fully sovereign self, long before Kant turned it into a sophisticated autonomy principle, grasping for a point of moral objective support. Descartes told queen Christina of Sweden that “free will is the noblest thing we can have, because it makes us in a certain manner equal to God and exempts us from being his subjects”. Thus for the first time, the individual was required and allowed to create and originate own philosophy of life. The ‘thinking self’, the rational individual was implied in his most famous maxim ‘I think, therefore I am’. Quoted in R. Koch, Ch. Smith, *Suicide of the West*, London 2007, p. 143. Descartes ‘seized on the mind and boosted man into an angel’ – S. L. Jaki, *Angels, Apes and Men*, La Salle 1983, p. 41.

Machiavelli in the 16th and John Locke in the 17th centuries stated essentially the same observation (though they expressed it differently), namely that the human reason was the only way to appreciate reality. The English revolutions of 1640–1660 and 1688 went further than only to reject the arbitrary rule of the monarch: Protestantism destroyed the Church's authority, claiming that a sound moral judgment could be based on an independent reading of Scripture alone. Enlightenment philosophers soon developed the ideas of social contract and theories of individual rights, where an individual was the only source of legitimate authority and human happiness, the measure of good political order and public policy. Immanuel Kant developed a theory of secular morality, allegedly to be ontologically sound, where citizens had their mutual rights and obligations, and where the innate soul of each individual (with its identity) found its fuller fulfillment with relations with the other.² With Rousseau, man became autonomous with respect to duty and moral law, which came dangerously close to a statement that man became a function of his sentiments and longings, where there would be a world governed by instincts and where stability, order and logic would be perilously degraded.³ This immersion in nature was considered sufficient to recover the depth of humanity, the feeling and self expression which civilization, including the arbitrary system of thought, suppressed.

Romanticism added one fiery element to individuality, namely, the notion of originality, distinctive existence, richness of life, and diversity where each individual has a certain degree of originality: incomparable, inimitable, and impossible to be repeated by anyone. The idea became the most visible modern expression of combining one's life with being noticed, thus decoupling it from the worth of earthly life as absolute in the mind and reason of God. With this idea fear crept into an individual soul but at the same time so did enormous creativity and enmity. The other person was a subconscious enemy, against which one had to distinguish himself, so his life could be considered worth living.⁴ Then came Carl Darwin and *The Origins of the Species*, which despite Darwin's disclaimers instantly deprived man of the spiritual side of his nature.⁵

² Modern liberal individualism was also developed by Romantic writers like Jean-Jacques Rousseau (1712–1778), Johann Gottfried von Herder (1744–1803) and Johann Wolfgang von Goethe (1749–1832) who perceived nature as benign, nurturing mutual human solidarity and brotherhood.

³ No wonder that Rousseau threw his hands up in despair crying that 'all on earth is in a continual flux which does not allow anything to take on a constant form', Rousseau in *Emille*, quoted in S. L. Jaki, *Angels, Apes...*, p. 48. Rousseau developed Descartes' logic, but was not focused on the mind. He took the sentiments, but 'having no eyes for the head, he aimed at the heart and hit the target somewhat lower, where the beast loves to reside in man', *ibidem*, p. 41. This prompted Jacques Maritain to remark that "Rousseau's man is Descartes' angel, playing the beast"; J. Maritain, *Three Reformers: Luther – Descartes – Rousseau*, New York 1929, p. 100.

⁴ P. Watson, *The Modern Mind: An Intellectual History of the 20th Century*, New York 2001, pp. 11–39.

⁵ The iron logic of Darwin's norm forced one, so it seemed, to the state of absence of all norms, beckoning 'towards unfathomable whirls in which one was no more than flotsam hurled round and round by the blindest of blind fates', and in effect 'turning time into a hopeless treadmill', subverting, so it seemed at the time, first of all Christianity. S. L. Jaki, *Angels, Apes...*, pp. 50–55; P. Haffner, *Creation and Scientific Creativity: A Study in the Thought of S. L. Jaki*, Front Royal 1991, pp. 71–72. It was Judaism, but first of all Christianity, which was

Darwinian theory was a shock to the European mind, but not as strong as it might seem. The European elites were essentially careless about Christianity, having embraced the political doctrine of liberalism and assigning the fate of humanity to the Enlightenment reason, with Christianity fighting the rearguard battle. But in America it was different. The European developments had of course some implications for the United States' cultural, religious, and political landscape. European Protestantism, just a fraction of the cultural life in Europe, confronted the Darwinian theory (and Nietzsche), essentially by giving up and accepting the liberal interpretation of the Biblical teachings, turning Protestantism into a disguised department of the welfare state and tepid morality. Yet in America the issue was confronted differently. Protestantism was the very core of American identity. Its language, imagery, references, and rhetoric formed the very essence not only of religious life but of the very cultural code of the civilization. Until liberal Protestantism hit the American soil, there had been no philosophical, conceptual challenge with powerful metaphysical consequences to the very identity of American self perception. The liberal, European Protestantism hit the American counterpart ferociously, causing an enormous rupture and throwing its mainline churches into crisis, resulting with massive culture wars, both within Protestantism and with the rising secular New Humanism, still defining the contemporary American scene, influencing society and politics, and sharply distinguishing the United States from Europe.⁶

In relation to these developments within modernity, which worked differently on the two sides of the Atlantic, the question of modernization – in a much narrower sense of rationalization, bureaucratization, and humanization of modern societies – became a pressing issue. For Western civilization, the 20th century with its totalitarian experiences generated a profound sense of doubt, guilt, and even a celebration of self-contempt, mainly in Europe. This prompted a search for a new type of civilization in an upheaval against its own past, defined as having within itself the seeds of destruction. This insurrection against the past assumed a form of a rebellion against all absolutes, whether religious or totalitarian, finally accepting the premise that any strong value judgment may breed intolerance and – according to the ‘ad Hitlerum’ logic – may lead into barbarism. In consequence, a fetish of New To-

challenged by Darwin, mostly by its radical different understanding of time. Christian revelation and Incarnation liberated man from a tragic and pessimistic imprisonment without end within a world-picture based on eternal and inexorable cycles in time. The ancient pagan visions crept into the European mind again, with its cyclic world views and with essentially reduction of religious belief to a convention of the terrified mind, seeking sense in home-made beliefs in face of the inexplicable cosmos. Yet, as Darwin's implications seemed to indicate, such attempts were just superstitions, the chemical reactions to the inexplicable world, creating self-explicable and circular arguments. Their efficacy of explaining human existence, and even more importantly their ability to create a valid, ontologically grounded moral system of duties and rights was a sham, just a convention of a terrified mind, a private superstition to be dismissed by the will of the rational scientific thought. S. L. Jaki, *Angels, Apes...*, pp. 66–67; P. Haffner, *Creation and Scientific Creativity...*, p. 72.

⁶ See: *Religious Issues in American History*, ed. E. Scott Gaustead, New York 1968, pp. 173–185, 198–212; on American New Humanism see: A. R. Heinze, *Jews and the American Soul: Human Nature in the 20th century*, Princeton 2004, pp. 87–194, 261–290.

lerance has been celebrated, in the accompaniment of an extreme nervousness about any moral claim which might bear a sign of absolute truth, even if put forth just for a public discussion. Paradoxically, this signified at the same time a profound distrust of rationality, in wit of a conviction that a reasoned argument may make reasonable people agree on anything. But at the same time, the new creed was a 'religion' of human rights, rooted in the idea of human dignity. This approach has increasingly began to dominate the Western discourse, but it has also been ridden by contradictions and has played itself differently in the United States and the European Union, and within the latter in Eastern Europe, where an assertion of moral absolutes was part and parcel of the fight against communism. The distinctive cultural, religious and political traditions emphasize numerous tensions and misunderstanding within the transatlantic civilization.⁷

Americans responded to this challenge of modernity by a thorough revision of their religious culture and its public operation, while Western Europe essentially abandoned any pretensions that the religious language can be of any use in moral discussions or that it can be accorded a status of anything more than a mere superstition privately held. As an implication, the private, autonomous institutions, whether families or churches, would have to redefine their roles, making their claims reformulated in an acceptable language or face persecution, more or less mild, with the public, state education geared to the total neutralization of their message. For several reasons, the Americans took up this challenge in a process of a fascinating religious and political evolution, absent in Europe. It began with a different form of Enlightenment on the other side of the Atlantic. It did not pit Christianity against liberalism, the way Europeans in the French Revolution did. Second, the American tradition was a covenantal, providential one that from its very beginning blended with the republican, constitutional practices. Third, from the earliest days, the American cultural code was – at least until the beginning of the 20th century – a Protestant monolith. Unlike in Europe, there was no viable challenge to such a culture: there was never a split of the cultural identity in America. Fourth, the religious grassroots and freedom oriented culture coupled with material wealth and self organization was able to prevent pushing religion to the margins of politics and

⁷ A part of a problem stems from a contradiction in the very concept of contemporary human rights theory and the implicit anthropology which it takes for granted. This anthropology is essentially based on a conviction that a major source of personal and social action is rooted in the radical autonomy of each individual's moral auto-creation, decoupled from any ontological roots which have become a matter of individual choice. This conviction assumes a radical secularization of moral, public language and the gradual pushing of the religious imaginary and argument into a purely private domain, a transformation of colossal consequences. If the autonomous moral auto-creation is a source of personal obligation that has been taken for granted, and human dignity is at the same time the ultimate source of human rights as fundamental and only legitimate basis of the new political, cultural, and moral order of the liberal West, then it would follow that human dignity is nothing more than the subjective creation of the individual wishes. The tacitly accepted idea that this human rights doctrine, having rejected religious grounding, can be construed on the basis of commonly accepted cooperation of autonomous wills searching for accommodation and having as its object a fuzzy state of humanity is of course an illusion, the old Kantian and Mill's dream which has long since then become dispelled. The result being that human dignity is nothing more but an individual having rights which stem from his auto-creation, the circular argument.

society, letting it in this way retain a legitimate public role⁸. As a result, a discussion in religious terms has always been part of the public language, even after the most serious challenge of the 1960s. The battle which is now being waged in America, with religious language being used, shocks secularist Western Europe, although not necessarily Eastern Europe, especially Poland, which recognizes a familiar pattern of development in confrontation with West European culture after the unification of the European Union.

East European culture is considered by the dominant Western cultural elites. Not only because strong common particularities were defined as dangerous, but also because the implications of working for ‘humanity’ as such made the individual the only conceivable unit of this endeavor. Humanity not only was to transcend nations, national histories, memories, community mores, religious conflicts, but even the classical distinctions between the private and the political. It was in fact the only feasible way to create a ‘safe’ universalistic ethic, the final complete universalism available, which was allegedly to create peaceful society, based on solidarity of its citizens. Humanity was to be a kind of benevolent disposition towards every person as a human being, regardless of any distinction, be it nation, race, religion, class, opinion or recently sexual orientation. West Europeans came essentially to a conclusion that humanity had come of age and the maximum possible universalism had been achieved. With such an approach every human being was now simply a fellow human being. This was going to be the final accomplishment of Kant’s idea suggested in the 18th century, that humanity as a whole was capable of making a leap of imagination, and accomplish a moral conversion outside of the existing collective structures including the state, nation, religion and even culture. The end of history was at last to arrive and what was needed was the last effort, one final battle to end all conflicts and wars. The anticipations of the possible peace made people act as if the destination point was already known and wage internal and external wars to that end.⁹

⁸ On this story, see: N. Feldman, *Divided by God: America’s Church–State Problem and What We Should do About It*, New York 2005; F. Lambert, *Religion in American Politics*, Princeton 2007.

⁹ Kant thus came up with a universal cosmopolitan right, or humanitarian right which he proposed in his *Project of Perpetual Peace* of 1795. The universal peace, or the rule of law, was morally desirable, so it followed that it was morally necessary. If the universal peace is desire that humanity was capable of making, a “humanitarian awakening of conscience” was necessary. This link between the internal transformation and the external behavior could thus be done through law. I. Kant, *Perpetual Peace and Other Essays*, Indianapolis 1983, p. 124. This was essentially the western equivalent of the Soviet Union fight for peace by different means. What the European Union as the avant-garde of western civilization was finally to accomplish was engagement in “a moral lie on a grand scale. We have lied to ourselves about what we were doing. Instead of telling the simple truth that we were waging war for reasons that were inseparably political and moral, we have adopted a simple moral posture. We have placed ourselves at the pinnacle of all the virtues, we were simply waging the pure fight of justice and right [...] the adversary had to appear as a criminal pure and simple [...] the Western councils were in some way awed by the pure idea of humanity on the one hand and the pure idea of crime against humanity on the other. Our leaders seemed incapable of thinking or saying anything without having recourse to this contrast. We want to envisage only a purely moral politics [...]. Torn between what is and what ought to be, we do not consider what is possible politically. In the name of humanitarianism, we are inhuman”. P. Manent, *A World beyond Politics? A Defense of the Nation-State*, Princeton 2006, pp. 184–185.

The Western elites and European Union in its capacity of a new political entity have continued to become increasingly fundamentalist: in the case of the European Union, this is the fundamentalism of righteousness. The Union turned itself into a slave of an idea. Leo Strauss summed up the paradox of such a thinking, remarking that the right and a continuous progress towards perpetual peace and order, the state of non-violence and non-discrimination amounted in fact to a state of a perpetual war, in a situation when war, conflict, all discrimination, nay, politics as such, was declared to be an unmitigated evil, a crime against the ideal of humanity already discovered.

Modern liberty in this context means that a human being is a sovereign self, and as such the maker, the author, by right and in reality, of the human world.¹⁰ Once this concept of human sovereignty was turned into ‘religion’ of humanity and human rights, there came a desire to regulate this independence. Paradoxically, an escape from absolutes led to the establishment of a new one, whose sources are increasingly shaky. But respect for choice excludes any possibility of moral judgment on them. Whatever choice was made, it is accepted as good, since taken by an autonomous moral individual with dignity. An indispensable part of this dignity is moral freedom to shape one’s own life at will, which manifests itself in political, social and cultural rights whatever they might be. This is the essence of the prevailing liberal-left notion of the New Tolerance and radical multiculturalism. In essence, it is a destruction of the classical concept of truth, moral truth which essentially depends on the human capacity and need to distinguish between good and evil acts: the essence of humanity as such, enabling it to form the bonds of solidarity and focusing instead on the most radical utilitarianism, the question what is useful and working for myself. Moral freedom is essentially an invitation to hold the argument of immorality against the others, because the self will always find reasons to obey the easiest possible choice based on the principle of being useful for the individual. This is a radical rejection of Kantian autonomy principle. His respect for human dignity was respect for humanity itself. Kant wanted to discover the space of the moral precepts which would be binding for all without any reservations.

¹⁰ This idea of separation of external and internal forces to create a sovereign human space is of course long in the making, although it culminated in modernity. The Greeks already divided reality into natural world and moral world which was to be subject to reflection. See: J.-P. Vernant, *The Origins of the Greek Thought*, Ithaca 1994. Christianity introduced the concept of autonomous conscience and free will. But it was Rousseau and Kant who formulated this modern separation in a radical way, in a form a subject who determines for himself the law of the universe, because he is sovereign towards his inner liberty. The process was analyzed in P. Ma-nent, *The City of Man*, Princeton 1998, esp. pp. 183–222. All external forces: nature, gods, the Christian God, have to be banished. This existential new situation shows itself dramatically in democracy. If we can discern then the real laws of life and society and we are sovereign to do with them what we want, than reality is really, as Rousseau remarked, an enemy. We are ‘everywhere in chains’ waiting for emancipation. This was a liberating idea and at the same time a dangerous one, where the will to recreate one’s world according to the preconceived will, decoupled from any objective moral standard as e.g. the natural law, was pushing humans into hubris. This has been a constant theme of criticism of modern conservatives beginning with Burke and continuing to de Maistre and Bonald until Eliot.

The task was colossal. If the discovery that we cannot extrapolate any clear rules of what is good and bad from human behavior, what is any definite rule of what we as humans should do, then – as Kant implied – we have to search for such rules in the confines of the autonomous practical reason, and Kant was sure that it was possible. In the conditions of radical epistemological and ontological break wrought by the Enlightenment and an abandonment of Christianity's justifications, Kant wanted to rescue humanity from slipping down into the most debasing utilitarianism. A question of all questions, which since then has occupied the Western mind can be formulated as follows: can one ever pretend to discover such norms in practical reason, without rejecting the religious sources of morality and its definite distinction at the same time. Can Enlightenment rescue itself from a gradual degeneration to nihilism, having once rejected the radical ontological – and in consequence ethical – significance of the Book of Genesis and its parable about the tree of good and evil in Paradise.¹¹

Kant answered this fundamental question positively. For him it was obvious that the order of morality had an ontological grounding, even if the road to it was torturous through an autonomous subject's reasoning. Yet, asking a question of what human dignity was, contemporary moralism in fact rejects the Kantian question.¹² Respect for human dignity becomes simply a respect for the 'contents of life', whatever it may be, of another human beings. The same words are used, but with an altogether different moral perspective because human dignity and morality are increasingly conflated with rights as decoupled from a moral, ontological grounding. Once human dignity is conflated with rights, this makes them the province of the administrative state and the judiciary, beyond legislative let alone executive supervision. The administrative state governed through law, not so much as a will of the sovereign, but as a ruler recognizing simply the general rules of humanity,

¹¹ On this, see the fascinating book by Kass: L. Kass, *The Beginning of Wisdom: Reading Genesis*, Chicago 2003.

¹² This has been the essential question of Western philosophy. Dostoevsky rejected the Kantian effort as futile and said 'only Christianity can save us', Nietzsche rejected it too but opted for a solution to create one's life and its rules on the basis of the sheer will to be heroic in the face of meaninglessness. Darwin's late disciples sided with Nietzsche adding a sinister twist to it and – not unlike the thinkers of the Enlightenment – considering religion to be a superstition, a nice consequence of the unpredictable combination of chemical reactions in the brain. Heidegger was equally in despair thinking that the utilitarian civilization of scientific discovery makes human civilization a morally senseless enterprise, adding 'Only God can save us'. Some time later, postmodernists, as e.g. Rorty responded 'save from what, peace, pleasure, conformity'. This questions stands today. It is essentially a question whether the reality has a meaning or is it just a development of protein. A question was asked whether our civilization "can survive without faith, so the distinction between good and evil, the distinction what is ordered to and what is forbidden, does not depend on our day to day decisions, and would not be tantamount to what is useful and what is detrimental? If this what is useful for one human being or one group, is detrimental for another or other people, if it is equally obvious that what is for this human being or this community, can in the long run be useful, if, in wit, there is no criteria what is useful and detrimental in a situation, particular than the moral regulations are tantamount to utilitarian criteria, which means that there are no moral rules. Kant of course knew it, and when he rebelled against the popular utilitarianism of the Enlightenment, he also knew that what was at stake was not the fate of one or another moral codex, but the very existence of a distinction between good and evil, in wit a fate of man". L. Kołakowski, *Kant i zagrożenie cywilizacji*, [in:] idem, *Czy diabeł może zostać zbawiony*, Kraków 2006, p. 187.

means increasingly in practice the rule of the judges and the corresponding total juridization of life and castration of politics as such¹³.

America has been definitely affected by such developments of modernity but it has played itself there differently. In Eastern Europe, the difference is even starker. Eastern Europe did not go essentially through the modernity's Enlightenment revolution, and it did not go through a radical fulfillment of this Enlightenment impulse on a massive scale, that is the counter cultural revolution of the 1960s, which established the idea of the moral autonomous self the basis of the cultural, social and political order. These cultural differences play themselves in the immediate political realm, in a language being used and expectations expressed, visible at all levels of relations between the United States, The European Union, and – within the latter – Eastern Europe.

A major part of the present volume of the “Krakowskie Studia Międzynarodowe” is devoted to numerous aspects of modernity and modernization described above and to the way they manifest themselves in the aforementioned societies. The current issue contains a variety of material touching the issue of modernity and modernization in comparative perspective, showing how the United States, quintessentially a modern nation, is at the same time a profoundly conservative one in many aspects, which from the European, and especially the Western, perspective seems to be a striking oddity.

Kenneth Minogue, arguably the most perceptive conservative critic of liberal modernity living today, tackles the problem of social equality, one of the questions most crucial for contemporary liberal societies, standing at the very center of the most principal values of inclusion and non-discrimination. Inequality, another name for a more generic problem of discrimination of any conceivable sort, has become the main culprit of all social and economic ailments of the liberal-democratic society: the fundamental evil which stands at the very center of public policy¹⁴. This

¹³ This new power of judges illustrates here “the impatience with mediations, in particular political mediations, and our desire to recognize and achieve humanity immediately. This desire is natural to our democratic societies dominated by the sentiment of human resemblance, by the self evident character of the humanity of the other person [...] the ‘natural’ order of politics and the project of a new metapolitical or post-political order of unified humanity” which refuses the classical “political order [...] still largely determined, and peoples’ s lives still largely defined by political circumstance and context, by the political regime and form [...]. There are two principal ways to conceive a metapolitical humanity that has overcome or transcended its political condition. It can be humanity organized according to law or humanity living in accord with morality, which is humanity living with respect for human dignity”; P. Manent, *A World beyond Politics?*..., p. 186. This is a very deft development since it means that the judiciary is immediately transformed, and in consequence has a tendency to look at itself as an ‘impartial’, non-political power, beyond an ordinary tumble of politics, as an impartial arbiter of objective rights. This is in itself nothing new. In the European context, this trend towards confluence of justice with rights was visible in The Declaration of the Rights of Man of the French Revolution of 1789, which in the French doctrine has had “a constitutional standing and is taken as the ultimate foundation of all judgments [today]. One could say simply that the judicial power is a power that seems not to be a political power and appears to be a spiritual power. [This is] the advancement of the ‘government of judges’, within nations. Of course, an ‘empire of laws’ is not limited to the internal order but encompasses the international order”. *Ibidem*, pp. 176–178. The Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union reflects such way of thinking.

¹⁴ On this see: J. Keke, *The Illusions of Egalitarianism*, Ithaca 2003.

is clearly visible, for instance, in the obscure and ideological language of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, whose Art. 21 forbids all forms of discriminations: the sentiment propelled by the underlying value of equality, yet very imprecisely defined. Minogue concentrates on a narrower issue of economic inequality and contemporary aspects of the welfare state. The latter operates according to some assumptions: sometimes contradictory, sometimes ideological. It also constitutes the battling ground for many lobbying groups. In this context, Minogue brings up the 19th-century, distinction allegedly discredited between the ‘deserving’ and the ‘non-deserving’ poor, now universally abandoned in the public policy language. Such a distinction resulted from accepting interpretation of moral actions as being predominantly a function of social conditions.

The entirely new anthropology became predominant in the awareness-forming intellectual circles of the liberal-democratic West, where a human being is rarely perceived as a moral subject, responsible for its own deeds. A growing number of judgments concerning human beings has begun to be formed through the lens of constraints on social conditions in which people have come to live. This proclaimed weakening of moral autonomy of man, his alleged independence from the individual moral judgments, and the corresponding dependence of the latter on social conditions constitute together not only a crude form of behavioralism, but parallels the creeping increase of the power of the modern liberal welfare state charged with the task of combating and ameliorating inequalities. If the overreaching objective of the state is to fight all forms of discrimination in the name of the controlling and legitimizing value of equality, then the state must wield power to control human preferences. Discrimination is in this case recognized as an extreme form of injustice which contravenes the democratic principle of equal participation, and thus it is defined as ‘social exclusion’. A prevalence of this metaphor of social exclusion changes the discourse about inequality and discrimination, making the amendment of inequalities an immensely imprecise, volatile, ideological, and therefore dangerous task. To prove the existence of social inequalities that need to be leveled up, the ‘gap metaphor’ is used. This makes a task of assessing inequalities both an extremely one-dimensional, and at the same time arbitrary and subjective endeavor. The hard realities of inequality are construed with statistical data, which use approximate averages to define ‘social exclusion’, saying not only nothing about the reasons behind the inequalities themselves, but also fuelling a growing resentment.

All these may lead to solutions that absolutely miss real problems of social needs, but in turn create new categories of inequalities, which again require endlessly recurrent solutions on the basis of an extremely limited base of utilitarian calculus and a narrow anthropology – taken for granted, and in fact primitive. This metaphor of social exclusion, the amelioration of which is a task of the modern liberal state, gives rise to public policy which seeks uniformity and homogeneity by means of the bureaucratic machinery. Tocqueville in *Democracy in America* perceived this danger well, but he was not alone in this perception and apprehension of

the affinity between equality and power in the modern welfare state. It was Edmund Burke who already in *Reflections on the Revolution in France* of 1792 pointed out this passion for leveling, stating that these ‘who attempt to level, never equalize’.¹⁵ Equality has thus become a kind of a preeminent modern ideology drawing upon both political and religious energies, of which the latest institutional embodiment is the modern welfare state employing a new metaphor of social exclusion and nondiscrimination as the controlling value of a legitimate society. This metaphor of social exclusion is as narrow as it is sentimental, referring to the positive aspects of human magnanimity, solidarity, and fairness. To perform its task, it employs the most crude of the tools: the bureaucratic state.

It is this state which – drawing into itself all responsibilities for securing nondiscrimination – not only teaches citizens resentment but furthermore often deprives them of these features whose lack makes the real social, moral exclusion an increasingly growing characteristic of modern societies. An antidote to this moral helplessness brought by modernity and its welfare state cannot therefore be found in a liberal, bureaucratic rationalization, Minogue seems to suggest, pointing that it begins with a recognition that there is no one simple principle which can relieve people of the duties which we owe to society and the world around us. In contemporary societies, social exclusion becomes more a moral exclusion of utter indifference. But moral exclusion is being ameliorated by wrongly conceived and applied means, the growing legal norms and the army of bureaucrats fighting discrimination and defining its instances in an exponential way, thus producing a society, in which economic and power inequalities are considered to be the preeminent ones to be battled by bureaucratic state. At the same time, battling these inequalities is tantamount to dismantling institutions, social mores, and morality as such. The last lets inequalities be diversified and rooted in the general sense of order, where everyone has a legitimate and inviolable place demanding respect. The modern equality, also in its latest version captured by metaphors of ‘social exclusion’ and ‘nondiscrimination’, has a self-propelled spiritual dynamic. A demand for it is, in fact, a demand for an upsurge of the bureaucratic state.

Equality has in such a case a built-in, revolutionary and yet centralizing potential. Once equality develops into the primary idea, it becomes insatiable in its demands, and a contemporary language of rights is a case in point. It is possible to perceive human beings as conceding, i.e. that they

¹⁵ For Burke, the French Revolution was therefore radically different from the previous ones. It introduced a new burning principle – unheard of before, foundational being a combination of eradication of social diversity on the one hand, and the increase of the political, centralized power on the other. The latter tended to a destruction of the intermediate authorities in a drive for social leveling. The same was observed by J. Fitzjames Stephen in: *Liberty, Equality and Fraternity* of 1873 – a response to John Stuart Mill’s philosophical system with its burning desire ‘to be a reformer of the world’. Stephen pointed out the incessant conflict between equality and liberty, others followed suit; their number included Henry Adams, Taine in France, and Nietzsche in Germany. They all drew attention to the dangers of the modern democratic leveling tendencies, the danger for liberty coming from the relentless drive towards equality. R. Kimball, *Mill, Stephen and the Nature of Freedom*, [in:] *The Betrayal of Liberalism*, ed. H. Kramer, R. Kimball, Chicago 1999, pp. 43–69.

have enough freedom or justice in a social order; it is not possible to imagine them ever declaring they have enough equality – once, that is, equality becomes a cornerstone of national policy.

In this sense, the modern idea of equality coupled with its underlying justifications of non-discrimination and an intolerance of social exclusion

resembles some of the religious ideals or passions which offer, just by virtue of the impossibility of ever giving them adequate representation in the actual world, almost unlimited potentialities for continuous onslaught against institutions [...]. Equality feeds on itself as no other single social value does. It is not long before it becomes more than a value. It takes on [...] all the overtones of redemption and becomes a religious rather than a secular idea.¹⁶

It becomes the basis of an incessant *la lotta continua* of the modern welfare state, which increasingly lacks instruments to create authentic social solidarity and responsibility for the weak. Such a state increasingly begins to consider intermediate institutions, families for instance, as a site of incorrect and discriminating thinking, and has embarked on a colossal and never-ending task of making everyone part of a social engineering solution to the question of human existence. By doing this, the welfare state dismantles private institutions and subjects their tasks to the welfare state, the very institutions the existence of which is a precondition of securing the real, not administrative social inclusion, based on the inculcated moral sense. This is so, points out Minogue, because the means provided by the modern welfare state are based on statistical measures, and thus constitute a crude indicator of what the real social exclusion is. The statistical resultant gaps never solve the problem. The ultimate irony of the welfare state is that the same unfavorable situations which such means are allegedly to remedy, are constantly reproducing themselves by the unlimited provision of goods and services to the people who are convinced that their lives without the state would be impossible.

One of the defining characteristics of modernity is individualism, and David Lorenzo takes up this subject from the perspective of Alasdair MacIntyre, one of today's preeminent political philosophers. But the understanding of Lorenzo's paper requires an introduction into the thought of MacIntyre, one of the most challenging critics of contemporary liberalism and thus modernity. Individualism as a term of political philosophy is notoriously difficult to define. But modern individualism began with the birth of self-consciousness and self-reflection, the slow decoupling of the individual thinking from the culture of *Christianitas* when mental processes were directed and shaped by Christian imaginary. The issue is additionally complicated, since one can argue that modern individualism was born exactly with Christianity and its idea of individual conscience and its wandering in search of the

¹⁶ R. Nisbet, *Twilight of Authority*, Indianapolis 2000, pp. 182–184.

ultimate meaning of life.¹⁷ Nevertheless, it is the Renaissance breakthrough – the rise of science and the new intellectual class – which paved the way for the modern solitary individualism in search of the meanings of life without the guidance of Christian imagery. This new sensibility combined the amazement with the unbound possibilities of the human mind with the apprehension of the wrongly chosen roads.

This idea of individual self-awareness or self-consciousness as the autonomous source of meanings gave impulse to a modern idea of freedom as a task to be won against this world, and not a duty to emulate the undeniable path to the truth. With it came a corresponding idea of moral auto-creation as a source of morality. In its inception – still bound to religious imagery – although already tied to the latter's deistic interpretation, the idea received a boost from the thinkers of the Enlightenment, especially Rousseau, and had exploded as the preeminent legitimizing idea of the modern world by the end of the 19th century.¹⁸ Finally, postmodernists – symbolically represented in its tragic form by Jacques Derrida and his clownish equivalent of Richard Rorty – gave it a nice package. The spreading counterculture of the 1960s marketed it widely, making moral auto-creation the only legitimate basis of human life and political organization.

The idea of human rights, uprooted from any ontological foundation, has finally become its preeminent guiding principle. The western civilization has made individualism and its moral auto-creation the self-defining feature of modern freedom. The formation of virtue and character gave way to idolatry of the self, creating its own conception of life on the basis of choice. The political, social, and cultural institutions were to follow suit, ensuring that such an unrestrained individual choice would be secured at the expense of any institution daring to inculcate the character and virtue forming, definite morality. Choice and New Tolerance, a.k.a lack of moral gravitas of one's course of action, always seeking another option and another road to the true meaning, have become the reigning ideology of liberalism.¹⁹ A new definition of the human being made the individual someone who defined own being in a process of auto-creation. This immediately raised the question of what a 'self' exactly we were supposed to affirm. Was there something ontological behind this search or, as Gertrude Stein famously said 'there is no there, there', there is nothing there.

¹⁷ This is the essence of the writings of first Christian theologians and philosophers, St. Paul and St. Augustine being the most important. The latter's *Confessions*, arguably one of the very few of the most important works of western civilization, still mesmerizes with its modern implications.

¹⁸ This process accelerated with the advent of the 'debunking philosophers' of the disenchantment, beginning with Marx and Darwin, through Nietzsche to Freud.

¹⁹ See: L. M. Friedman, *A Republic of Choice*, Cambridge Mass. 1996. As a consequence, the law of the state was just to reflect this state of affairs, the doctrine notoriously defined as given by the American Supreme Court in 'Casey vs Planned Parenthood' of 1992.

Political thinkers of modernity, as e.g. Thomas Hobbes or John Locke, became aware of the problem but considered it inconsequential.²⁰ What they proposed was to lower the sight, to search for procedures and institutions, and to eliminate the moral and virtuous from the realm of the state. But that entailed a hidden – and to a large extent arbitrary – notion that the moral world of norms and morals, of virtue and character belonged to each individual separately; it became a sole province of the individual's arbitrary creation. Moral notions and laws were the province of self-creation, the consequence of epistemological despair and the loss of ontological basis on which one could found a secure direction for a proper political order.

Natural law ceased to be a language of culture, it gave way to natural rights, where a solitary individual was the starting point of a legitimate political order. Historical, economic and social necessities were from now on dealt with through social contract, with a distinctive sovereign, arbitrating such necessities by means of individual rights, separating the public sphere from the private one. But individual rights, a discourse of modernity, turned out to be based on a very thin ground. They were devoid of any ontology considered to be useless. So we have a very paradoxical situation when one

cannot simultaneously destroy the ontological perspectives and then try to drive a pylon deep enough into ground you have excavated in order to sustain commitments to a regime of rights. Isn't that exactly what we have done [...]. So we content ourselves with a tautology: man is the being that defines himself by the fact of having rights. This is pretty thin [...] for with an unprecedented liberation of man we have also freed this modern person from that which alone could secure his freedom and make sturdy her liberty: we have made the modern person a creature 'now impenetrable to Being'. Thus severed from being, the notion of human rights by itself lacks ontological density. So we embrace that which we will be unable to sustain over time given what we have rejected. This [...] is our dilemma. But we refuse to recognize it as such because to do so would be to challenge the presuppositions of our own sovereignty and the sovereignty of the forces at work in, around, and through us [...]. The Triumph of the Will comes as no surprise [...]. In giving birth to ourselves, we have abandoned that which alone can nurture and sustain us.²¹

The chief goal of modernity was thus to unburden man, to release human beings from our own natures since humanity decided that there existed no nature. Without nature, there is only self-consciousness and moral auto-creation, since consciousness decided to abandon the version of virtue known by the ancient and Christian. The idea of the best regime was destroyed together with the idea of inculcated virtue, replaced with the authority of the present moment and an autonomous individual's response to it: an absolutely transient experience, best exemplified by ideas of interest, law, commerce, and negative liberty. This new regime of the final 'emancipation' and 'enlightenment' is based neither on Reason nor Nature, but

²⁰ What they wanted to do was to tame, in their judgment, the unbound hubris of the virtuous mind, arrogantly usurping to itself a conviction about finding the right path to it. The religious wars of the 16th and the 17th centuries and the corresponding political chaos destroying the unity of *Christianitas* was, according to them, the result of such an arrogance.

²¹ J. Bethke Elshaint, *Foreword*, [in:] P. Manent, *The City of Man...*, pp. X–XI.

just on the present moment, so it lacks any criteria of choice. Choice is exactly what has been chosen in the present moment. There is thus no final justification of anything in relation to something stable. Such a justification cannot survive, the present moment being replaced by the next one. We are in the midst of the shifting sands, there is a threat of de-legitimization of everything, of any stable ground, any morality, any value, it is a constant, incessant merry-go-round. With respect to duty and moral law, human beings become a function of their sentiments and longings of the moment.²²

This corresponded nicely to a theory of evolution when both self-consciousness of moral auto-creation of the moment and the blind forces of evolution

beckoned toward unfathomable whirls in which one was no more than a flotsam hurled round and round by the blindest of blind fates.²³

In such a situation, there was that depressing feeling that there is nothing which “saves a man from the degrading slavery of being a child of his age”.²⁴ In such a situation, a human being becomes merely a reflex of own circular self and his or her existence resembles an incessant string of revolving mirrors. Any discussion of objective reality, nay, of any communication across time – let alone across individual human existence – becomes problematic. Having destroyed virtue and objective morality grounded in natural law – which made it possible to communicate through history and through individuals, despite the fact that the traditions of virtue and natural law differed – we found ourselves in a void. Once the language of virtue has been lost, or transformed in such a way that the language of morality refers not to the universal (of what is common) but to a principle of singularity and particularity of a moment of each individual self-consciousness, communication through virtue seems impossible. There looms a danger of a total incommensurability of human beings to form any solidarity or community, in wit, a depressing notion of total anomie and ultimately despair. This is the modern situation in which we are incapable of providing any reasons why any moral norm should be held valuable and consented to if reason and passion can always find other reasons to reject them in favor of the utility principle. The conception of the human good becomes in such a situation impossible to attain, and together with it so do human community and solidarity.

It is such a modern condition that Alistair McIntyre intellectually faced, and defined such a stage of human development as a calamity. McIntyre is sometimes described as a communitarian, but this is too narrow and inadequate a description. McIntyre decided to rework the entire tradition of the hegemonic thought of the

²² This is a situation which Rousseau captured in his unintentional definition of the essence of modernity: ‘All on earth is a continual flux which does not allow anything to take on a constant form’, quoted after S. L. Jaki, *Apes, Angels...*, p. 48.

²³ *Ibidem*, pp. 54–55.

²⁴ Chesterton quoted in: H. Arkes, *Liberalism and the Law*, [in:] *The Betrayal of Liberalism...*, p. 118.

West, which may be loosely termed as liberalism, and which started with an individual and the individual's autonomy principle. For him, this project evidently failed. Originally given a sophisticated philosophical embodiment by Kant and Mill, this was an attempt to develop accounts of morality in the name of some impersonal standards in response to the loss of shared practices necessary for the discovery of common goods, all this under the conditions of morality based on the pursuits of an autonomous moral subject. The project was doomed to failure because it disregarded the very ancient, classical and Christian question how to explain the conditionality of humanity and above all its conditionality in history, the question which is the starting point for all transcendence. This philosophical question was disregarded in modernity, even if Kant accepted the possibility of the latter's existence.²⁵ Yet the practical problem of the common good could not be adequately explained, because no common standards can be sustained when they are abstracted from the practices and descriptions that render our lives meaningful and comprehensible. In other words, it is exactly modern moral philosophy which becomes not the solution, but the problem, claims McIntyre. Its stress on autonomy with a corresponding ethics derived from history creates people who are utterly incapable of living lives which have any narrative coherence. Such lives become essentially a response to constant impulses worked out by our autonomous consciousness, a string of events which cannot be tied to any overreaching meaning making individual life understandable to itself.

We have a situation reminiscent of the decadent ancient Rome. There were so many gods that, as Chesterton observed, it was impossible to live without offending at least some of them. This resulted, one might add, in the sigh of existential despair and reversion to what was immediately sensual and utterly practical. At the beginning of moral philosophy, which started with the reworking and systematizing of the modern practical impulse close to the end of the 18th century, a traditional moral agent – till that time construed and based on the classical and Christian sources of justification – disappeared from the philosophical platform. The character of a moral subject, the content and the structure of his desires and dispositions were pushed aside, became peripheral, ceased to stand at the center of moral philosophy. The moral philosophers from Socrates to (even) Hume had this issue at the center of their thinking, which meant that the question of character formation constituted the most important educational postulate, whether on an individual or communal level. Character was replaced by the most modern of modern words in all walks of life: choice. The rest, as the story goes, is history. A proper moral choice understood by Kant or Reid as deciding between desire and the requirements of morality, was still thought to be possible, since for Kant an objective morality was not only possible to be constructed out of the rational thinking, but somehow reproduced at

²⁵ For the most sophisticated approach to Kant in this context, see: G. Kruger, *Philosophie und Moral in der Kantischen Kritik*, Tübingen 1931, p. 236; also: Th. L. Pangle, *The Ennobling of Democracy: The Challenge of the Postmodern Age*, Baltimore 1992, p. 13.

the social, communal level²⁶. In the 20th century, choice, as for instance in Sartre, was defined as a condition of authenticity. It was authenticity – or, in popular parlance, self-fulfillment – that was to make character in moral philosophy, let alone at mass culture level, an obsolete, anachronistic idea. Such choice began to replace the character formation in public education, the very essence of education since Aristotle. The Ideology of the New Tolerance was the natural outcome of such a philosophical change. The corresponding blurring of the limits of human rights, the new ‘religion’ of liberal modernity, was another outcome. Since human rights are decoupled from any ontological basis, and such is the consequence of modernity and its moral doctrine of choice, the idea of human rights is simply beginning to be tantamount to individual choice. The indefinite expansion of the list of human rights is its consequence.²⁷ This replacement of character in moral formation by moral choice – or to put it bluntly, moral freedom – is the stage of modernity, on which the liberal world has found itself, singing Alleluia and smiling through the cultural catastrophe. It is in response to this critical time, a peculiar form of modernity today described as liberalism, increasingly unable to provide any means of comprehending the meaning of life and human existence, that McIntyre formulated his diagnosis. For him that liberalism’s descriptions have become totally inadequate for the human’s ability to act in a manner which would be intelligible to others as well as to individuals themselves.²⁸

McIntyre’s critique of liberalism is as commonsensical as it is novel in late modernity, outwardly heretical, and even arrogant. It stems from a conviction that human life, enabling the cultivation of virtues necessary for the formation of community and solidarity – the values which the Western civilization is allegedly proud of and whose perfect embodiment it constitutes – can be occur only when these who are engaged in constructing and engaging in community formation are focused on goods without which such an endeavor is futile. As a doctrine and its modern social embodiment, liberalism reached a stage where an axiom that there is an ultimate human good towards which humans should strive is decisively rejected. It denies the determinative concept of the human good – and consequently to the foundation of any models of common life such a concept – a place in public discourse. Intellectually, this is nothing new, such was the modern liberal project as devised already by Hobbes or Locke. What is new is a growing disillusion that this methodological, epistemological and ontological stance, might form a community of mutual obligations sustained by means other than the minute rules of the administrative state, the problem Minogue seems to indicate in an article published in this

²⁶ S. Hauerwas, *The Virtues of Alasdair MacIntyre*, “First Things”, October 2007, p. 36–37.

²⁷ This was already intimated by some conservative Enlightenment thinkers, as e.g. Burke and John Adams. See: A. Bryk, *Liberalism, Constitutionalism and Judicial Review*, [in:] *Historia Integra*, ed. Z. Chmiel, Toruń 2001, pp. 318–325.

²⁸ McIntyre’s seminal ideas, being among the most important for the possible recovery of the moral grounding of Western culture, are explicated essentially in three extremely influential books: *A Short History of Ethics*, the most important *After Virtue*, and *Against the Self-Images of the Age*.

volume. Despite this disillusion, liberalism nevertheless persists in claiming that this is the right foundational assumption and a course of action. This is visible in all public policy measures, for instance in public education, in construing the rigid idea of separation of state and church understood as a separation of religion from public life, or in the so-called New Tolerance becoming the main modern liberal ideology. In the most dramatic fashion such a policy measures make it a duty of the liberal state to deconstruct by law and administrative measures, i.e. force, all autonomous institutions, as e.g. churches and families to conform to the liberal state's image of the monistic good. This policy comes out of fear that such independent institutions might be so impudent as to dare to teach definite, foundational morality, based on character formation.

This liberal totalitarian impulse gives rise to a psychological and educational industry financed by the administrative state. Its goal is to guard the recalcitrant minds from committing a mistake of being not progressive and modern enough, and especially to prevent them from committing the most horrible liberal crime of 'non-tolerance'. To be non-tolerant means essentially that one is judgmental, that is making moral distinctions and creating a hierarchy of moral norms. Such a process is immediately branded as 'exclusive' and 'discriminating', and by ideological manipulation tied to its alleged consequence of igniting violence and civil war. Contemporary culture wars dividing the liberal societies defy such liberal monistic pretences. But for the liberals, culture wars are considered not an instance of reaction against false premises the liberals impose on others, but as another proof that their foundational axioms are correct. The result is a stalemate and a war of all against all, and a corresponding incessant campaign of the liberal state to wage wars on their own societies. This furthermore constitutes a clear rejection of reason in the name of which the liberals allegedly battle their enemies.²⁹

McIntyre is perceptive enough and, like his great contemporary Charles Taylor, realizes that, as Nietzsche said, 'we burned our ships', and there is no past which we might return to as societies, at least not in the foreseeable future. We may have pockets of immunity, churches and families, but they are increasingly assuming a role of the besieged ghettos attacked from all sides by the liberal state which considers them to be a throwback to the anachronistic past. McIntyre understands thus that we are all "inescapably inhabitants of advanced modernity, bearing its social and cultural marks", thus he acknowledges that his "understanding of a tradition of virtues and the consequences for modernity of the rejection of that tradition is possible only on this side of modernity".³⁰ Nevertheless McIntyre takes up a risky task of challenging modern liberalism from a standpoint of a different

²⁹ On the totalitarian potential of such a liberal monism, see: A. Bryk, *Akcja Afirmatywna. Doktryna różnorodności a plemienna koncepcja społeczeństwa liberalnego*, "Krakowskie Studia Międzynarodowe" 2004, No. 2; J. Hitchcock, *The Enemies of Religious Freedom*, "First Things" 2004, February; J. Bethke Elsh-tain, *Liberalism and Religion*, [in:] *The Betrayal of Liberalism...*

³⁰ S. Hauerwas, *The Virtues of Alasdair McIntyre...*, p. 38.

tradition, the classical one, as began by Aristotle. From Aristotle, McIntyre takes a simple, in fact, commonsensical, thought standing at the center of the Christian moral tradition too, that our actions require: first a conception of an end, and second the social and political conditions necessary to sustain a life formed by virtues constitutive of that end. Such a condition is utterly lacking in modern liberal moral practice and theory.

In other words, in contemporary liberalism there exists no end towards which we want to be moral, which makes morality a simple moral freedom of an individual desire. Moreover, there are no social conditions sustaining such persons and inculcating them into such ends, even if they existed. The latter case is faced especially starkly by innumerable parents teaching their children traditional or religious morality, in conditions in which such a morality is not only constantly being neutralized by the ubiquitous mass culture, but is officially treated as a problem to be rectified by the official political, educational, psychotherapeutic measures delivered by the state and pitting children against their parents.³¹ With such an approach, claims McIntyre, in modern liberalism it is impossible to provide any justification of a human good beyond a sheer desire of moral freedom. Such moral freedom is incapable of creating any morality, except the utilitarian morality of pleasure and the war of all against all, guarded by the administrative, psychotherapeutic state armed with the minute legal regulations. For such a morality of ends to be formed, there is a need for metaphysical grounding. Only because human beings have an end towards which they are directed by means of reason of their specific nature as humans, it is possible at all to sustain practices, traditions, mores which enable us to function as we do and not to become barbarians.

McIntyre is a metaphysical realist in a tradition of Aristotle and St Thomas Aquinas, where truth is understood as a relation of an adequate mind to its object, and the very activity of inquiry is the necessary condition for discovery of the first principles. Of course, McIntyre is closer to St Thomas because – unlike Aristotle and along the lines of Aquinas – he thinks that the proper object of human knowledge is not essence qua essence, because he believes that we know essences only through effects, and thus we have no other choice and no other place but to begin in the middle.³² McIntyre combines realism with empiricism, as by doing this we

³¹ See e.g.: M. Olasky, *Add, Don't Subtract: How Christian Conservatives Should Engage American Culture*, [in:] *The Future of Conservatism: Conflict and Consensus in the Post-Reagan Era*, ed. Ch. W. Dunn, Wilmington 2007, pp. 95–96; J. Hitchcock, *The Supreme Court and Religion in American Life*, Vol. 2, Princeton 2004, pp. 15–163; see also: the provisions of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union to that effect; see discussion on this problem *Karta Praw Podstawowych*, “Międzynarodowy Przegląd Polityczny” 2008, No. 21, pp. 239–243.

³² Here, McIntyre is close to Franz Rosenzweig, a modern Jewish thinker who wanted to combine Christianity and Judaism as two separate ways of finding the same God in his *Morning Star*. For McIntyre Rosenzweig did not begin with a primordial, adequate grasp of the concepts of knowledge and truth, in order to pass judgment on the basis of these concepts, whether we know something or not at all about God as such, let alone whether or not a statement that God exists was true. It is exactly by our encounters with God, in the very ritual we do and the intellectual activity we pursue in search of him, as well as the way we encounter the world and the other people, that we learn what it is to have knowledge of what the truth as such is. Thus it is Practice and inculcation, and

learn the precepts of natural law. The first metaphysical principles are discovered through enquiry, when the precepts of natural law are

presupposed in any situation in which learning and enquiry between rational individuals about their individual and common goods can be advanced and by any relationship in which individuals can conduct themselves with rational integrity.³³

But this presupposes challenge to any monistic tendencies of centralizing power, and is essentially inimical to any politics which wants to subject human mind to any ideology. In that sense such an approach is also opposed to the monistic pretensions of liberalism. McIntyre has a fundamental problem with the shallowness of the people liberalism produces, and its inability to create any type of spontaneous solidarity and moral obligations. That requires virtues. They in turn require a certain level of community, which allows ranking or ordering of goods.

This means that the little platoons, little communities of family, church, associations are necessary for sustaining virtues and should be supported. Goods of various practices have to be ordered, so an individual can find a narrative story which can connect them. It is always by reference to some concept of the overall and the final common good, claims McIntyre in the greatest classical tradition, that other goods are ordered, and we as individuals in life, in the families, churches and other communities, give expression to a concept of an overall good. Generally, then and only then when goods are ordered in terms of the adequate concept of human good, can virtues flourish. It is only in such communities, which liberalism is incapable of creating, that people may genuinely live lives which they not only understand but can find meaningful and open to others.³⁴ Teaching at Notre Dame University in Indiana, McIntyre has influenced a tremendous number of scholars, community organizers, religious people and politicians to alter some public policy measures. He himself seems to benefit from a work of his elder contemporary Edward C. Banfield (1916–1999). Communitarians, as e.g. Robert N. Bellah and Michel Sandel consider him to be their great inspiration, and so does Robert Putnam who in his influential sociological works stresses the idea of inculcating values in the community as the only means to retain moral solidarity.

In that perspective we may turn to David Lorenzo's article. He considers McIntyre to be one of thinkers who offer a viable and not anachronistic remedy against radical, debilitating individualism. For him McIntyre presents a concept of a developing person, not a static entity, defined by unchanging characteristics. But this development may also mean regression instead of flourishing, and it is only in the conditions of the latter that a coherent unity, a 'narration' of an individual life

not choice that is instrumental to acquiring truth, also moral one. McIntyre describes Rosenzweig's thought in his book *Edith Stein*.

³³ A. McIntyre, *Ethics and Politics*, as quoted [in:] S. Haurewas, *The Virtues of Alasdair McIntyre...*, p. 38.

³⁴ A. McIntyre, *Dziedziectwo cnoty. Studium z teorii moralności*, Warszawa 1996, pp. 3–21.

can acquire attributes and capacity to attain 'good'. This flourishing is possible only when a proper foundation is found. In the human case this foundation is 'human nature', empowering the person with the elementary skills for further growth. The goal of development, once such a foundation has been established, is to strive for the good defined by the rules of natural law derived from the foundation of 'human nature'. McIntyre is adamant in insisting, that although we are autonomous in modernity, this autonomy operates under the influence of principles that do not originate from it. These principles can be destroyed, and with them a potential for growth and meaning. Of course, the real question is how to recognize the principles of natural law, which is obviously impossible for the average human to grasp without falling back upon good 'practices' through which virtue is acquired. Virtue as a capacity of mind that allows a recognition of relative goods and the use of skills to attain them needs cultivating. Virtues may properly develop only in individual communities with set traditions.

At the center of McIntyre's thought, stands thus a notion of a 'community' which is a generic term. This recognition of dependence on community is, for him, the key to independence and first of all to solidarity. The paramount importance of community allows individuals to exercise capacities offered by their nature to full potential. This and only this is the way to achieve meaning and to reconcile oneself with the world and the others. In this sense, McIntyre – a powerful presence at the American liberal arts colleges – is making a real difference. His thought constitutes the growing intellectual pressure on contemporary liberalism and its suicidal course of battling any idea and thought which would make a meaningful life possible, and is present at the growing number of liberal arts colleges in the United States which decided to return to a classical tradition.

Harvey C. Mansfield is one of the most distinguished American political theorists writing today, and arguably the most prominent conservative academic teaching at a major American university. He takes a subject that is both perennial and extremely controversial in American historiography and political philosophy, namely that of the relationship between freedom and virtue. The subject has attracted the attention of political philosophers at least since Aristotle, but in the American context it has found a special role. It was one of the major points of debate between the proponents of the Constitution (the Federalists) and their opponents, the so-called Anti-Federalists, the latter obsessed with the fear of virtue and corruption.³⁵ The United States is a nation torn between the initial ideals as set forth in the 18th century and the logic of modernity. The question essentially boils down to a problem whether the American political project was a purely individualistic, freedom oriented one, increasingly understood as rights oriented, or whether it assumed

³⁵ See e.g.: H. J. Storing, *What the Anti-Federalists Were For: The Political Thought of the Opponents of the Constitution*, Chicago 1981; S. Filipowicz, *Pochwała rozumu i cnoty. Republikańskie credo Ameryki*, Kraków 1997; A. Bryk, *The Constitution and the Bill of Rights: The Case for the Anti-Federalists*, [in:] *European and American Constitutionalism in the Eighteenth Century*, ed. M. Rozbicki, Warsaw 1990, pp. 70–76.

more or less implicitly a strong component of the ethics of virtue, necessary to sustain an ordered liberty. Very roughly, we may define this opposition between two approaches as an argument between two recent American historiography schools. They can roughly be named ‘republican’ and ‘liberal’. An earnest discussion of these traditions began in the late 1960s, and a symbolic work which ignited the argument was a seminal book by Gordon Wood *The Creation of the American Republic*.³⁶ The gist of the argument can be summarized as follows: was the founding of the United States a republican endeavor, obsessed with virtue and corruption, focused on public participation in freedom and democratic spirit for the glory of the commonwealth, as allegedly projected by the Declaration of Independence of 1776 and as practiced by the Americans until the enactment of the Constitution of 1787, which turned America into a purely modern, liberal, rights obsessed project? Or was the latter course consciously implicit in the political and constitutional American ideas from the very beginning.³⁷

Mansfield seems to be on the side of the republicans but his argument is more sophisticated. Placing himself above the aforementioned discussion, he thinks that the problem of virtue is not so much of outward aim and institutions geared to produce such aims. In other words, it is not a definite constitutional construction which produces or does not produce virtue, but a certain potential to be realized by Americans. His style of analysis is very deeply rooted in history of political philosophy stretching backwards as far away as Aristotle and, more recently, Alexis de Tocqueville. In his books *The Spirit of Liberalism* (1978) and *America's Constitutional Soul* (1991) as well as in a work on the philosophical origins of executive power *Taming the Prince* (1989), Mansfield shows in Aristotelian-Tocquevillian reflection that the strength of the American political order lies in its carefully and intelligently designed ‘constitutional soul’. What he means by this, is an idea that the politicians who created the Constitution of 1787 rejected the Machiavellian ambition to dispense with classical virtue altogether, and did not focus solely on self-interest, economic interest and rights: features commonly associated with the American, Lockean type of liberalism. For Mansfield, Machiavelli is the principal and the most articulate exponent of modernity as applied to politics. In his books *Machiavelli's New Modes and Orders: A Study of the Discourses on Livy* (1979) and a deeply original and influential collection of essays *Machiavelli's Virtue* (1996), Mansfield follows his teacher Leo Strauss, emphasizing Machiavelli's thought as the first and self-conscious ‘founder’ of a distinctively modern political and philosophical sensibility.

³⁶ G. Wood, *The Creation of the American Republic 1776–1787*, Chapel Hill 1969.

³⁷ See: J. G. A. Pocock, *The Machiavellian Moment: Florentine Political Thought and the Atlantic Republican Tradition*, Princeton 1975, esp. pp. 389–391; J. Appleby, *Capitalism and a New Social Order: The Republican Vision of the 1790s*, New York 1984; B. Bailyn, *The Ideological Origins of the American Revolution*, Cambridge Mass. 1967; Th. L. Pangle, *The Spirit of Modern Republicanism: The Moral Vision of the American Founders and the Philosophy of Locke*, Chicago 1988.

Thus it is necessary to define the modern problem the way Machiavelli did this, since both for Mansfield and for Strauss, the recovery of virtue in the conditions of modern freedom has to start with the Machiavellian diagnosis and practical solutions. His world is our world, it is a known element of our modernity and we have to start here, if we are to engage in a meaningful and reasonable search for virtue in modernity of late liberalism to whose pressures the American constitutional system is increasingly subjected. Strauss believes that Machiavelli rejected the pre-modern classical tradition as exemplified by the ancient and Christian sense of virtuous life as a goal of political order. The tradition against which Machiavelli revolted in a premeditated and cold rebellion was characterized by certain beliefs and moral goals. Among them was an idea that political philosophy was to be understood as an incessant quest for the best political order, the order which was most conducive to the cultivation of virtue, and in which each person receives their due and occupies its proper, that is rightful, place according to his or her nature. This search for virtue was thus, by its very essence, hierarchical, distinguishing higher and lower orders of existence in the political realm. To use a modern language, this search for virtue was highly judgmental, non-tolerant, and discriminatory for the sake of elevating people above their instinctive impulses. Creation of a political order most suitable for a cultivation of the virtuous people was the main goal of politicians and political philosophers.

This idea was of course first articulated forcefully by Plato and Aristotle, albeit for different reasons. Aristotelian character was trained to acquire virtues. As he strongly insists in *The Nicomachean Ethics*, they could only be inculcated, never learned, although the essential virtues had to be recognized first by political philosophers.³⁸ The classical and Christian political philosophy recognized of course an element of chance, since it was unfortunately highly unlikely that the conditions which the political philosophers could recognize as conducive to virtue, could influence politicians, that is political power, albeit such a situation could not be entirely excluded. Yet the most important classical theme was the idea that nature, in this human nature, dictates humans the proper limits of conduct. Humans cannot overcome their nature. If they tried, the consequences for them and for a political order itself would be calamitous. The Greeks named this desire *hubris*, the Christians – the sin of conceit. This urge was recognized as a deadly sin that once committed would result, sooner or later, in total corruption of a polity and of an individual soul, leading to despair and anomie.³⁹

Machiavelli consciously rejected these assumptions, first of all subverting the very idea of nature, unequivocally rejecting it. Nature was just a purely speculative obstacle to clear-cut thinking. For Machiavelli, it constituted a nonhuman

³⁸ Aristotle, *Nicomachean Ethics*, [in:] *The Complete Works of Aristotle*, ed. J. Barnes, Princeton 1984, book I, p. 1743, book II, pp. 1103–1104.

³⁹ T. V. McAllister, *Revolt against Modernity: Leo Strauss, Eric Voegelin and the Search for a Post-liberal Order*, Lawrence 1995, p. 31.

standard. Its efficacy and utility for human aspirations was none. Machiavelli lowered the goals of political philosophy and human society, beginning with humans as he found them rather than as they should be, and declared that the political leaders were to take care of the basic human needs as they were, rather than their highest aspirations. With that, the role of political philosophers, in fact the role of a speculative, abstract reason as such in search of the ideal, higher order, had to be altered. No longer blazing the intellectual trails, the philosophers or theologians were reduced from the position of the leaders of society. Their place was taken up by the Prince: the state. The former were reduced just to a role of pure advisers. Not reason but power, at best contained and tamed, was now to be the pinnacle around which the very life of the polis was to revolve, possibly in the best interest of the fundamental needs of the society. As a consequence, chance, the ancient *fortuna*, was also to be drastically eliminated. Humans became sovereign, they make their own chances, leaders in turn have full control of their destinies and the destinies of the people they lead. As long as they devote their efforts to meet their subjects' immediate desires, instead of leading them toward some higher good, the political order can be stable and felicitous.

Machiavelli was the first modern, because he reduced the reach of political philosophy. It became simply not a quest for the good order or the natural, but just a technical problem of achieving a political order best suited to satisfy the basic human desires. Yet in the course of satisfying such desires, nature became an object of manipulation and understanding to conform to the human needs, which had essentially human will as its principal source. Nature became understood as an object of scientific study, which in turn meant that science itself focused solely on nature being used for immediate human needs. That is science treated nature as an obstacle, ready to remove it from its limitations. Teleological, and by implication also theological, understanding of nature grew increasingly obsolete, redundant. Since Francis Bacon, only a few generations later than Machiavelli, and the subsequent Enlightenment thinkers, science became the main mover behind human endeavors. They turned out to be ultimately rooted in the capricious human will. This Machiavellian as well as scientific revolution began to control, that is to transform, nature.⁴⁰

In addition to such a treatment of nature, Machiavelli changed the meaning of political philosophy. The lessons from this change were eventually drawn by Thomas Hobbes, and later Locke, who elevated the lowest desires of human will to the legitimate desires as highest political goal. The natural right: objective and rooted in ontology, turned into individual right, at the beginning a right of self-preservation and then rights as members of a state, to relieve humans from some burdens. This was the task which John Locke completed, and it became the ulti-

⁴⁰ For an excellent analysis of K. Minogue, see: *Alien Powers: The Pure Theory of Ideology*, New Brunswick 2007, pp. 20–38.

mate justification and source of liberal democracy.⁴¹ After Machiavelli, Hobbes, and Locke, the second wave of modernity started with Rousseau who gave up pretences that satisfying human needs somehow corresponded to nature itself or at least it was not contradictory to it. The best we could claim was that we did not know much about it, except that science was transforming it.⁴² There was nothing one might be certain about, except the knowledge of constant moral, political, and social fluidity, the very precondition of moral anomie and nihilism disguised with consumption. Science could organize such a civilization technically and politically into a regimen of administrative rules, but that was all it could do.

Mansfield refuses to grant Machiavelli the last word on the American constitutional system. Although America is a modern society, it was also built on a clear understanding that for this type of society to survive, real virtues have to be developed, inculcated, and defended. Yet virtue in the American constitutional system is not and cannot be inculcated directly. How could it be done when “society dedicated to liberty could [not] make much of virtue” since the one

resolved to have virtue could [not] pride itself on liberty. Yet liberty and virtue also seem necessary for each other. A free people, with greater opportunity to misbehave than a people in shackles, needs the guidance of an inner force to replace the lack of external restraint. And [since] virtue cannot come from within, or truly be virtue, unless it is voluntary and people are free to choose it, whence does it come from? Americans are, and think themselves to be, first of all a free people. Whatever virtue they have, and in what amount, is a counterpoint to the theme of liberty. But how do they manage to make virtue and liberty harmonious?

Mansfield tries to answer this fundamental question of American modernity and constitutional system, the tension between freedom and virtue, through an extensive review of different approaches, taken up by John Locke, Charles de Montesquieu, Benjamin Franklin, and finally the authors of the Federalist papers, the definite original commentary on the Constitution of 1787. Freedom understood in a modern sense is essentially unrestrained.

It is an impulse obsessed with will. Virtue is on the other hand a force of guided restraint, in a condition when guidance is increasingly being derived essentially from a sheer will of an autonomous self and its moral auto-creation. Where in such a situation, asks Mansfield, can we find thus a semblance of virtue in the American constitutional system?

For Mansfield, the only source of virtue is the very construction of the system itself. Ultimately, it is not Locke’s

self-interest generally or theoretically understood, but the interest of the office [...] through which ambition, energy, and responsibility [shines]. The interest of the office is a kind of interest

⁴¹ A sophisticated analysis of this process was given by L. Strauss in: *Natural Rights and History*, Chicago 1950.

⁴² Rousseau was already consciously treating nature and civilization as an enemy, and linked humanity with historical development. Kant and Hegel developed this current, and Nietzsche and Heidegger completed its logic.

that permits and requires the cooperation of virtue. The lesson overall is that moral philosophy is incomplete without political philosophy.

If so, Mansfield seems to suggest, political philosophy understood as wisdom gained from constitutional experience of the free people may lead us into gaining an insight into things permanent, a certain *déjà vu* for a modern philosopher. It is political philosophy again, which might lure us into turning our lives around and set them on a path of searching for truth. This would be done voluntarily and with the full understanding that this choice is free, although it brings happy rewards. Mansfield's appeal is as much a call for a resurrection of a certain political philosophy, as for a return to a classical, liberal education. In the liberal-democratic society, the latter was once the basis of knowledge, and is now being buried under the debilitating idea that the goal of education is no more than utilitarian preparation of young people into the market. Inadvertently, Mansfield is defending here a great tradition of the West's self understanding, forming a bridge to the university of *Christianitas* and the Academy of the ancient, a cry in the wilderness. This cry in the wilderness is unfortunately applicable in the context of Harvard University: Mansfield's *alma mater* and his academic turf for the last five decades. Being the first American university (est. in 1636), despite brilliant history and the highest market value of its diplomas, Harvard has become – in the judgments of many and in the company of other great American universities – an institution deserting the idea for which universities were found. It has worryingly begun to increase in its humanities departments: an epiphany of useless, porridge-like, ideological and acedic education to nothingness.⁴³

It is against this broad background of modernity that Andrzej Bryk attempts a comparative analysis of different responses to it, and of the corresponding models of modernization in the United States and the European Union. Inside the European Union, the different responses to late modernity are shown between the original, West European countries and the new countries of the Central and Eastern Europe which joined the Union in 2004 and 2007. This cultural and political federation of the aforementioned countries might be called, with an understanding of tentative utility of such a phrase, a 'transatlantic civilization'. The analysis begins with immediate political feuds inside this civilization in the wake of the post 9/11 traumas and the United States' Iraqi invasion in 2003. The latter pitted America dramatically against the European Union and also strained relations between the 'old' and the 'new' Europe. But the violent argument which then erupted, ostensibly over the immediate political goals, signified much deeper cultural differences which seem to be growing, and have not disappeared despite the fact that the immediate political clashes between the United States and the European Union have dramatically dec-

⁴³ On this problem see: J. Hart, *Smiling through a Cultural Catastrophe*, Wilmington 2004; on Mansfield's and other academics', both liberal and conservative, cultural battles at Harvard University in relation to a diminishing of the humanistic education see: J. Tasswell, *The 30 Years' War: Cultural Conservatives Struggle with the Harvard They Love*, "Harvard Magazine" 1999, September–October, pp. 56–66, 99.

lined. The cultural rift was suppressed when there was a communist threat to Western Europe, which was neutralized by the American military power. Yet once the common enemy in the form of the Soviet Union disappeared, the hidden differences between America and the European Union showed up, only to be exacerbated by the inclusion of the formerly communist states of Eastern Europe into the latter.

The opening of the European Union to the post-Yalta, post-Soviet countries of Eastern Europe, was done due to the sheer optimistic momentum after the fall of the Berlin wall in 1990. Its mood was related to illusions about 'the end of history' that was finally to arrive at a station named liberal democracy and free market. However, once the unification of the continent had been achieved, immediately there surfaced differences in approaches to the problem of what exactly the unification of the continent meant, how the inclusion of Eastern Europe was to proceed, and last but not the least what the meaning of modernization of backward Eastern Europe was going to be and how to accomplish it. The very term 'modernization' seemed to be understood ideologically from the very beginning. The liberal elites of the old European Union, and the liberal elites together with the post-communist elites in Eastern Europe, believed and wanted that modernization of the East to resemble thoroughly the West European pattern. This approach was pushed forward despite the fact that Western modernization had not been completed, was bringing not only salutary effects and was, in the case of Eastern Europe, to be implemented in different cultural conditions. It was more or less a conscious choice that this modernization was to be of the liberal-left variety, the combination of market mechanism and cultural transformation as had been executed in the West since the cultural revolution of the 1960s. Thus these elites defined the dominant language, the institutions and the course of transformation, eliminating alternative visions. In this view, the European Union was looked upon as a comprehensive economic, social, and cultural yardstick to be implemented or simply imposed on the new post-communist world in Eastern Europe by the professionals, the experts.

Liberalism has in this context a generic meaning, comprising a wide range of liberal politics, associated with the European, mainly French and German evolution of the Enlightenment, which has become the hegemonic western idea after the 1968. In politics, it means different models of representative democracy. In economy, it means liberalism of the free market but drastically limited by the administrative welfare state, which thus rejects the classical liberal economy. In culture, it means the liberal left's idea of an autonomous individual, who in a process of moral auto-creation has to liberate itself from the prevailing notions of any communal cultural code, defined essentially as an oppressive structure from which an emancipation must be conducted by means of law and the media.

This liberation was to be guaranteed in a nondiscriminatory way by the legal system. The cultural code of Western Europe rooted in the Enlightenment and radicalized after 1968, defining its mode of modernity and modernization, was faced by Eastern Europe immediately after the unification of Europe after 1989, and

especially after Eastern Europe entered the administrative and political structures of the European Communities in 2004 and 2007. The East European culture, except the elites, was basically unaffected by the Enlightenment of the French or German type. The region has also been subject to different economic modernizing experiments since the 18th century. All in all, the unification of Europe after 1989 proceeded with a tacit understanding that liberal democracy, free market, the rule of law, and cultural code were there, just waiting to be implemented in Eastern Europe. ‘No experiments’ was the battle cry of the liberal reformers, the methods and the means were known, and political, legal and economic modernization was to be imposed from above. Experts were to supplant politicians, and only the clear-cut rules of administrative governance mattered. Additional justification was added. To simplify the image somehow, one may say that after the fall of communism the liberal elites both in Western and Eastern Europe were apprehensive that the post-soviet societies, not having been able to experience the ‘normal’ and ‘civilized’ development would, by default, return to the most horrible patterns of their nationalistic, xenophobic and intolerant past ‘frozen’ by communism, the traits which were successfully, so the argument went, eradicated after 1945 in Western Europe. The populisms emerging in Eastern Europe could introduce such features into political life in Eastern Europe, threatening the only valid and set model of West European modernization.

Thus the liberal elites used all feasible tactics to take advantage of a sense of urgency trying to monopolize the language of public discussion, the media and the formation of a particular type of civil society. The objective was to block the emergence of a pluralistic political process which might threaten the modernization model: allegedly already settled and just to be implemented. This pattern was especially visible in Poland, but was characteristic as well for all the countries of the region.⁴⁴ This model was quickly challenged. Such a liberal modernizing approach was considered to be too primitive, representing a kind of post-colonial model and mentality. It did not recognize the distinctive nature of a new political and economic regime, tentatively called post-communism.⁴⁵ It also neglected cultural identity, permanence of historical memory in the capacity of a political factor, and the attempts of East European societies to define themselves anew. After communism, Eastern Europe was trying to recover its sense of identity. Its states searched their traditions looking for a solid ground exactly at the moment when such traditions in the European Union were increasingly defined as useless, since they are ridden with potential conflicts, as for instance such traditions as a robust sense of national identity, collective memory, heroism, patriotism or a sense of freedom. In this way many features of East European collective national identities were resembling not so much the post-metaphysical, post-national cultures of West European countries

⁴⁴ See, e.g.: Z. Krasnodębski, *Czy Polska potrzebuje modernizacji?*, “Nowe Państwo” 2006, No. 4, pp. 27–32.

⁴⁵ J. Staniszkis, *Postkomunizm*, Gdańsk 2001; R. Skidelsky, *Świat po komunizmie*, Kraków 1995.

but rather the culture of the United States. Siding with the United States on many current political issues and considering it an ally not only in military but also in cultural sense, was in this case an instinctual choice. This seemed to be mainly the case of Poland being the largest East European state, but was also visible to a various degree in Czech Republic, Slovakia, the Baltic States, Romania, and Hungary. The inclusion of Eastern Europe into the European Union thus posed a real challenge to the set theories of modernization and its relation to modernity, causing in Eastern Europe counter reactions against a postcolonial pattern of thinking, demonstrated both by the dominant liberal left West European elites and the East European ones corresponding to them mentally.

The article proceeds then to a cultural and political comparison between Western Europe and the United States, and their different responses to modernity and modernization. Despite common Enlightenment roots, they have had distinctive models of political, social, and cultural responses to challenges of modernity and modernization, which from the beginning continued to influence their present differences. Europe was built inside state structure by privileged classes from top down, and – despite the revolutionary Enlightenment upheavals – continues to think this way about its identity and its transformations even today. America was essentially built by immigrants, beginning with the colonists, from a scratch. As a result, albeit with significant modifications in the 20th century, history of Western Europe has produced dependence of the ruled from those who govern, whereas the Americans believe that it is government's responsibility to protect freedom of the individual, not to limit that freedom even for the best of the collective reasons conceivable. The divisions along the aforementioned lines are visible also inside West European and American societies in the phenomenon known as 'culture wars'. Such a picture has recently been complicated by the inclusion of the post-Soviet part of the continent into the European Union. East European societies show an instinctive mistrust of the state and governing elites, and a corresponding desire of self-management of their affairs, without the paternalistic overview of the elites and the states.

The United States is a much more ideological nation than Europe, relating constantly to the foundational ideals of the Declaration of Independence and republican constitutionalism, although it has very distinctive cultural traits inherited from the protestant heritage or the common-law English culture. Nevertheless, it is this feeling of exceptional foundational creed which enables Americans to adapt to the challenges of modernity without losing a sense of collective identity despite enormous diversity. This conviction of being the new and exemplary nation, rooted in the robust individualism from bottom up, has given Americans a spectacular dynamic and flexibility. There was thus a profound difference between the American and the French Enlightenments. The West European Enlightenment became gradually culturally dominant in post-1789 Europe. The Enlightenment had of course a common foundation, rooted in individual autonomous will, attacking the established feudal institutions as e.g. the Church, and feudal obligations. Ame-

ricans, on the other hand, never had any feudalism in the first place, so they did not show enmity towards the political and social reality as such, which was to be destroyed and transformed so that the new order could be created. Their colonial society built from the bottom up was at the moment of the Revolution (1775) and the Declaration of Independence (1776) considered a 'good' one. Americans just wanted to secure constitutionally what they had achieved and independence was the means for this goal.

The French revolutionaries of 1789 wanted to destroy the entire order so as to build a new one on its ruins. Thus an incessant struggle against surrounding political and social reality understood as a recalcitrant domain of surviving reaction, and resulting from it need for a real revolution, transforming everything which resisted the progress of democracy and liberalism. The American Enlightenment was at ease with itself, its revolution was to a large degree conservative, and its eschatological objective of the new order was already immanent in the American civilization as such. The Americans were not fighting against reality but against a concrete political enemy and for concrete rights. The revolutionaries were not to capture the state and transform it totally, but to ensure the inclusion of the excluded, so as to let everyone participate in a good society already present: the subconscious idea propelling all the American reformers since the 18th century to this day. Some additional differences materialized. The American Enlightenment was rooted in its Scottish branch, more commonsensical and skeptical than the French. The latter was purely rational, speculative, and radically monistic, with reason elevated to a primary role in human affairs. The Scots, the British, and consequently the Americans never sanctified the speculative reason, concocting its ideal schemes of human organization, but attached a real value to virtue, personal and social compassion, benevolence and sympathy which bred charity from bottom up as an ingredient of the social order, and not from top down, as a duty of the paternalistic state.

For this reason, religion in America, which has been overwhelmingly Christian, has never been considered an enemy of democracy and liberalism but its main ally. America never had a single state church. The federal First Amendment of the Bill of Rights to the Constitution of 1791, guaranteeing the separation of the federal government from religious denominations, was at the same time a guarantee of a full freedom of participation of churches in social (and, generally, public) realm and discourse. In a tradition of the continental French Enlightenment elites, religion, mainly Christianity, was not only defined as superstition, but as a competitor to the rational vision of a good society. Last but not least, there has always been a different relationship between the West European and American elites and their respective societies. French philosophers and the subsequent European literati felt superior to their masses degraded by feudalism, they experienced an utter alienation from the ordinary ways of life. Their rational mind was thus fuelled by resentment of insignificance and at the same time of its potential usefulness to the new Prince: the state.

The United States never had such an alienation of the intellectual elites from their societies. They were part and parcel of them: practical people who engaged in intellectual pursuit not because they were morally better than their societies, but simply more knowledgeable. The rational sense of understanding was never considered as giving a better understanding of reality than common sense, practical way of building society from the bottom up. Thus unlike the European modern elites, there has never been a temptation to feel better than their people on the part of the American elites and, at least not until the 1960s, a temptation to manipulate them and lead them to the preordained rational future. The question was not in the inability of the American elites to develop such an attitude, it was just impossible to acquire political space to execute it, they have been largely kept on a short leash by the bottom-to-top democratic process. Thus there was neither a sense of the *noblesse oblige* paternalistic attitude of the European elites, nor a desire to lead despite the wishes of their societies in the United States. All the aforementioned cultural differences have made the American and the West European attitudes towards modernity and modernization different. These differences surfaced forcefully after the disintegration of their common Soviet enemy, when they had no longer to be muted for the sake of immediate, political, and military defense. What the United States and the European Union will do with them in the future, the latter also with the differences between its Western and Eastern parts, will be decisive for the future of the transatlantic civilization.

Maciej Brachowicz takes up a similar problem, trying to show the basic pre-constitutional differences between the United States and the European Union in a slightly different context. He rejects a commonly repeated opinion, being both a certain description and hope, that the member states of the European Union should follow the example from the American experiment in order to build a durable, efficient and competitive super-state. Brachowicz considers such an inflated hope or fear inappropriate for historical as well as political reasons. He claims that it is wrong to apply American lessons to the European Union dilemmas of cohesiveness. It is impossible to create Europe-wide democracy by a sheer political act.

The analysis of the Treaty establishing the so-called Constitution for Europe (2003), and its cosmetically altered version, the Lisbon Treaty of 2007 provides in this context grounds for Brachowicz's analysis. He treats the American and EU's constitutional aims, and institutional and political tools used as essentially different experiences. On the part of the European Union's elites, the creation of the democratic framework seems not only to be impossible, due to the resistance of national identifications, but outwardly undesirable for a fear of losing control over the decision making processes at the expense of the nations of Europe.⁴⁶ In the United States, such a stance has always been politically a kiss of death for any governing

⁴⁶ P. Manent analyzes this problem comprehensively in his unorthodox *Democracy without Nations?*, Wilmington 2007.

elite.⁴⁷ One of the most fascinating contemporary debates in the United States and the European Union, is a fate of religion and a question of mutual relations between liberal-democratic state and a public role of religious language and institutions. Christopher Wolfe, the preeminent American authority on constitutional law takes up this topic in the context of the Church–State debate in the United States. Wolfe begins, as usual done, with an analysis of two clauses contained within the First Amendment to the US Constitution concerning the relations between the church and the federal government: the ‘Free Exercise’ clause which guaranteed freedom of worship, and the ‘Non-Establishment’ clause which prohibited the establishment of state religion, originally at the federal level and since mid-20th century, through the incorporation doctrine, at any level, federal or state. Wolfe shows how the ongoing Supreme Court interpretation of the First Amendment has shaped its original and historical meaning, trying to eliminate any trait of religious, mainly Christian presence from public presence. This stance of the Supreme Court resulted, for instance, in such decisions as banning a display of the Decalogue in court buildings and performance of Christian nativity plays in schools. Wolfe considers such an interpretation of the First Amendment to be an ideological usurpation of power by the Supreme Court. The prohibitions mentioned can be reconciled with freedom of public manifestation of religion only with the most sophisticated casuistry. The problem goes naturally beyond constitutional discourse. Searching for a proper interpretative perspective, Wolfe refers to the original, foundational position and goes to the thought of the American Founding Fathers, believing them to have followed rather John Locke, for whom the guarantee for religious freedom was first of all extended to the believing people, not to the atheists. In other words, the freedom of religious clause was put into the Constitution to protect religious believers from the intrusion of the state in the first place, not to guard the state against the religious people.

In this way, Locke was reflecting the sorry state of persecution of dissenters during the religious wars in Europe by particular states. These states were at the same time the executors of the religious orthodoxy, whether the Catholic absolutist state or the Anglican Church in England. The atheists, barely existing at the time, were there, but were considered insignificant. The modern, liberal concept of constitutional law as presented by the Supreme Court has begun to interpret a phenomenon of ‘religion’ along the lines of the Free Exercise choice in a much broader, revolutionary sense. In the Supreme Court’s reading of the Free Exercise clause, it was put there to protect first of all the public space against the religious people and denominations, the latter being potentially dangerous to the rational people. The latter want, so the argument goes, to establish a religion-free public space, the only conceivable and rational one. But the Supreme Court also seems to define

⁴⁷ For a forceful argument against the dissolution of national American sovereignty, see: J. A. Rabkin, *Law without Nations: Why Constitutional Government Requires Sovereign States*, Princeton 2005, and for an international tendency to push the United States in this direction: R. Hirschl, *Towards Juristocracy: The Origins and Consequences of the New Constitutionalism*, Cambridge Mass. 2004.

a term 'religion' in an extremely expansive and fuzzy way, as referring to any, even the most bizarre value system. In such a view religion becomes tantamount to any 'potential answers to the question of faith', including its negation in the form of atheism or agnosticism.

Such a far-reaching assumption, based on a definition of faith through the radical autonomy principle, is in Wolfe's view entirely mistaken and dangerous. Not only does it subvert the original intensions of the authors of the Constitution, but in fact it puts a burden of proving that the demands of the atheists and agnostics are not compromised by the religious people on these very people, and considers this fact the ruling principle of constitutional legitimacy. This way, a small minority of non-religious people dictate the very terms of the public debate, which is in principle formulated in the language inimical to religion and religious people. Such a stance of the US Supreme Court reflects a new mode of liberal thinking in America, corresponding in fact with the pushing of religion and denominational institutions into a position of being a threat to social peace and conducive to social divides. The term 'divisive' has become here a battle cry of the new interpretations of the Constitution. This is a new view of secular intellectual elites and their specific outlook on religion, which ranges from total ignorance or indifference to radical hostility and even contempt to it, in the latter case especially towards evangelical Christianity.⁴⁸ Such a view is absolutely 'not tainted by the acquaintance with numerous believers', the overwhelming majority of the American people. Thus, concludes Wolfe, the radical separationist model looks at religion as a threat to constitutional order and society that should be guarded against it. Yet, this is a stark reversal of a traditional constitutional stance and American historical experience, where the essence of the First Amendment was to protect unrestrained religious freedom against the state intrusion. Such a reversal constitutes thus to be a dire threat to American democracy.

The real democratic and republican spirit and distinctiveness of America, as Tocqueville observed already in 1835, was in fact founded on the unrestrained worship of God by various Christian denominations, forming robust public ethic, inseparable from its Christian foundation. Wolfe writes in a tradition of constitutional interpretation which analyzed such a trend in the Supreme Court verdicts concerning religious freedom as an usurpation of power, not only against American tradition but first of all against the very essence of human freedom as such, of which religious freedom of public worship is the very basis.⁴⁹ The aim of such

⁴⁸ See: R. Hittinger, *The Supreme Court v. Religion*, [in:] idem, *The First Grace: Rediscovering the Natural Law in a Post-Christian World*, Wilmington 2003, pp. 163–182; J. Bethke Elshtain, *Religion and American Democracy*, [in:] *Religion, Politics and the American Experience: Reflections on Religion and the American Public Life*, ed. E. L. Blumhofer, Tuscaloosa 2002, pp. 16–26; P. M. Gary, *The Cultural Hostility to Religion*, "Modern Age" 2005, Spring, pp. 121–130.

⁴⁹ On a danger of such an attitude to liberty as such, see: H. J. Berman, *Religious Freedom and the Challenge of the Modern State*, [in:] *Articles of Faith, Articles of Peace: The Religious Liberty Clauses and the Public Philosophy*, ed. J. D. Hunter, O. Guinness, Washington D.C. 1990, pp. 40–53.

a judicial interpretation of the First Amendment is to push religion out of the public space altogether, and to make it a domain of a purely private affair. This constitutes essentially a constitutional interpretation along the lines of the French Enlightenment tradition, and threatens to change, by judicial fiat, the very nature of American culture and polity. It would make the United States a country with a totally ‘naked public square’, beyond a democratic mandate and beyond any common sense.⁵⁰

Robert A. Sirico, a scholar of a liberal conservative Acton Institute in Michigan, its former director and a Jesuit priest (SJ) at the same time, focuses on a fascinating figure, barely known in Europe, of father John Courtney Murray SJ. Murray (1904–1967) became famous in the 1950s, when the ‘entrance’ of Catholics into the mainstream of American life had been completed. For centuries Catholics had been considered the Pope’s treacherous agents in the United States, having a double loyalty and subverting a predominantly protestant society. They were on the one hand persecuted by some extremist groups, and on the other not recognized as a legitimate faith by the mainstream Protestant denominations. By secular intelligentsia they were considered, at best, to be incurable half-wits. But in the 1950s and the early 1960s, due to the sheer numbers and the political, economic, and cultural success they were recognized as the cream of the crop of intellectual America. It was then that Catholic politicians, theologians, and writers achieved public prominence, with such influential figures among them as Clare Boothe Luce (1903–1987), Cardinal Fulton J. Sheenan (1895–1979), writer Flannery O’Connor (1925–1964) and the young Walker Percy (1916–1990). This period also constituted a heyday and a fascinating incorporation of the European Catholic Renaissance into American culture, beginning with such writers as Evelyn Waugh (1903–1966), Gilbert Keith Chesterton (1894–1936), Georges Bernanos (1888–1948), Clive Staples Lewis (1898–1963), John Ronald Reuel Tolkien (1892–1973), philosophers and theologians Charles Peguy (1878–1943), Jacques Maritain (1882–1973) and historians including Christopher Dawson (1889–1970).⁵¹ That was also the time of the spectacular revival of Thomistic studies and a fascination with natural law tradition, both in Europe and in America, for reasons having to do both with the Catholic Renaissance as well with a revulsion against the calamity of the Second World War.

Murray was an exception even among such prominent figures. He set out to do something intellectually extraordinary by American standards. Together with his spiritual heir, much younger Richard J. Neuhaus (b. 1936), a Lutheran pastor turned Catholic priest and a founder of “First Things” (1990), a powerful influential monthly surveying a religious and cultural life, they redirected the religious

⁵⁰ For an influential argument that is still valid although was made as early as 1984, see: R. J. Neuhaus, *The Naked Public Square: Religion and Democracy in America*, Michigan 1984.

⁵¹ See: P. Allitt, *Catholic Intellectuals and Conservative Politics in America 1850–1985*, Ithaca 1993; G. Nash, *The Conservative Intellectual Movement in America since 1945*, New York 1976; D. O’Brien, *The Renewal of American Catholicism*, New York 1972; J. T. Fisher, *The Catholic Counterculture in America. 1933–1962*, Chapel Hill 1989.

thinking in the United States, giving it not only prominence and intellectual respectability but forming an entirely new religious language of discussing challenges of modernity, the language of modern natural law. In other words, they made Catholics in America the intellectual leaders of argument with modernity: a feat of an extraordinary dimension in an essentially Protestant culture. Murray wanted not only to reconcile Catholics with the United States pluralistic tradition. He moreover wanted to show that the very American tradition as set forth in the Declaration of Independence of 1776 was in fact commensurate with the natural law tradition. In wit, he argued that Catholics are not only good American citizens, but that they are good instinctually, habitually, thanks to their natural-law thinking which had always been the very basis of Catholic reasoning and at the same time the heart of the American creed. This was an extraordinary task, since it was taken up against the prevailing grain of cultural Protestantism, which does not in general recognize the natural law sources of biblical understanding. Protestantism not only fails to recognize natural law as a useful interpretative tool of biblical hermeneutic, but for a long time considered Catholics to be inimical to the very order of America, the latter entirely commensurate with the millenarian Protestant covenantal theology.

Murray totally reversed the argument. He argued that the Catholics were not only the true and conscious guardians of the very creed as sealed in the founding documents. He also implied that in conditions of secular modernity soon to be battling religious metaphysics at every level of liberal society, Protestants would be helpless. Even if they did recognize the dangers of secular modernity they did not possess any intellectual tools to engage and challenge it on equal terms. In other words, Murray claimed, the Protestants were battling essentially a rearguard battle soon to be lost, unable to engage modernity on its own terms from a religious, metaphysical perspective, but in a language which was non-religious, yet at the same time not inimical to religion, as the increasingly postmodernist language of modernity turned out to be. History of the 20th-century Protestantism seemed to have corroborate this diagnosis. Protestantism began to split into two powerful, separate wings. One was the wing of the mainline churches, still dominant into the 1960s, playing essentially social and cultural role. It gave up on engaging secular modernity head on in a rational way, and focusing essentially on charity and civil religion ritual in the service of progressivism.⁵² The other wing was comprised of Fundamentalists, slowly augmented by all kinds of evangelicals and born-again Christians. They were terrified by modernity since the liberal Protestantism ascendance, and public humiliation connected with the Scopes trial of 1925. These Protestants closed themselves in anti-intellectual ghettos, socially numerous and soon to be politically powerful, but incapable of engaging the public in an intellectually accepted way. Protestantism was heading for a crisis whose essence was a lack of modern rational language to engage secular modernity and the culture it produced.

⁵² See: R. M. Gamble, *The War for Righteousness: Progressive Christianity, the Great War, and the Rise of the Messianic Nation*, Wilmington 2003, esp. pp. 25–68.

American Catholicism had its hour of triumph in the 1950s. From the margins of society it was elevated by the sheer power of the intellectual argument of Luce, Sheenan, and Murray into the mainstream. Murray outlined his position in the best-known collection of essays put out in a book form in 1960. The book entitled memorably *We Hold These Truths: Catholic Reflections on the American Proposition*, thus connecting in the very title the

sacred American words of the Declaration of Independence of 1776: 'We hold these truths to be self evident [...]' and Catholicism, was a blockbuster, giving intellectual credence also to the presidency of John F. Kennedy, the first Catholic, at least nominally, ever to be elected to the office. Murray's thesis was much more sophisticated in fact. He argued that American democratic experiment could not be sustained without a public philosophy which was capable of disciplining a widely pluralistic, American national discourse, and it needed a more fundamental grounding. This grounding and justification was natural law. A thesis that America could not do without a shared public philosophy which was grounded in some fundamental, not-of-this-world moral principles, was not new in American political history not new.

For instance, it was visible in the pronouncements of American presidents beginning with Washington, via Lincoln to Murray's contemporary Eisenhower – but it was mainly rhetoric, a certain public ritual. With the Cold War in progress, this view was shared by a large spectrum of the public opinion and acquired a gravity going beyond the civil religion: the let's get together under God, argument. As a reasoned argument it could yet be useful not only to justify a fight against communism but also to explain its reasons. America was fighting communism, argued Murray, not because it was another hegemonic power, threatening the United States. America was fighting it, because communism was inimical to the natural order of things, it was against nature as such, and it was America's duty to take up the fight in the name of moral civilization against essentially immoral civilization.

Murray was repeating here the central argument of an earlier book by Whitaker Chambers *Witness* published in 1952, one of the books most influential for the birth of the modern American conservative movement.⁵³ Chambers, a former communist turned Catholic, was a fierce anticommunist on existential and moral ground. His personal history made him implicated in one of the most bitter and long ideological battles in American history, as a witness against Alger Hiss, accused by Chambers to be a soviet spy. The duel-like case held in front of the Senate commission, pitted the former obscure communist against a scion of the American liberal elite, the very epitome of this upper crust. For this reason Chambers was discredited among the progressive liberal intelligentsia as a slanderer, the verdict which has stood to a large extent till today, although the evidence that Hiss was a traitor was proved beyond the reasonable doubt after the opening of the Soviet archives. But at the time of Chambers-Hiss hearings and the Joseph R. McCarthy's blunders in the Senate, anticommunism was discredited and thus Chambers's argument was

⁵³ W. Chambers, *Witness*, Washington D.C. 1952.

popular only within a narrow circle of his friends and committed anticommunists, not among the culturally dominant and politically liberal elites.

With Murray it was different. Not only was his book published later, when at least some of information about Stalin's genocide had been confirmed by the Soviets themselves in 1956 during the 20th Congress of the Soviet Party. Communism was condemned somehow by default, by being contrary not to natural law but to America as the bearer of the natural law tradition sketched by its founding documents. It was this language of natural rights which was then turned to the human rights language across the world, and was crucial to the collapse of communism. Murray was also instrumental in giving intellectual justification to the 2nd Vatican Council's (1962–1965) *Declaration on Religious Freedom*, subsequently used by John Paul II in defense of human rights and democracy, as a political system most likely to secure those rights under modern conditions. Murray was crucial here, because he worked in the 1940s and 1950s on the Church–State relations profusely, and tried to disengage the Catholic teaching and the Church on this point, from the latter's principled preference for the altar-and-throne arrangements of the European ancient regime.

Sirico does not deal with the aforementioned aspect of Murray's thought, but undertakes to apply Murray's argument concerning religious freedom to economic activity. Despite all appearances to the contrary, economic freedom according to Sirico displays plenty of features common with the creedal freedom, since in both "the consciousness, choice, and human nature play crucial roles in the moral drama of social life". Without these two freedoms, the free society is impossible: argues Sirico. Murray's teaching were founded on two principles deeply established in the Catholic tradition: the principle of freedom as tied to the principle of subsidiarity; by two ideas of equally deep roots: the principle of consent and the free institutions. The principle of consent goes back to the medieval monarchy, when the king, to rule effectively, had to acquire a consent of his subjects, or at least lack of their resistance. Free institutions, in turn, are the foundation of a crucial distinction between the society and the state. The latter has a strictly prescribed sphere of operation and could not go any further. The First Amendment concerning the religious freedom to the US Constitution applies these principles. Murray noticed, as Sirico quotes him, that the First Amendment did not answer any

eternal question about the nature of truth or freedom, or the way the spiritual order of human life should follow [...]. It does not need expressing religious consent, but only the guarantee of rational civil obedience.

In such a situation a vast benefit for the Church is a fact that the area of its operation lies beyond the competences of the state, which guarantees it a broad freedom of religion. This system of reasoning can be applied to economic activity for a simple reason. Much like an internal realm of the human activity (also business)

must operate in the conditions of freedom to be able to come to full fruition. The role of state is simply to ensure the conditions for the good-will cooperation between free subjects. Such conditions will be beneficial for a society as a whole. For this very reason, the market – in the same way as the constitutional framework of the state – is not so much a particular creed, but the very condition for peace.

Marta du Vall tries to analyze sources of the astounding popularity of the neoconservatives' thought in the American foreign policy at the turn of the 21st century. They took advantage of the 11th November attack on the United States to take control over the American foreign policy. During a previous decade they became the forceful critics of its course, without much practical influence. Implementing the new policy, the neoconservatives wanted to establish the dominant position of the United States in the new, post-Cold War geopolitical situation. The Cold War forced the neoconservatives, claims the author, to reformulate the major aims of the American policy, once their strategy of fighting communists turned out to be an astounding success. The discussion caused a split in the Republican Party. The supporters of the so-called 'Enlightenment rationalism' wanted the foreign policy to be based on the principle of non-intervention. On the other side were the neoconservatives who did not want to return to the classical rules of conducting policy from the past, and wanted to conduct an active, interventionist policy focused on spreading democracy in the world and enlarging a sphere of liberal freedom. According to the neoconservatives, the United States foreign policy in the post-Cold War period was to be based on an axiom that American security diminishes, once the sphere of liberal democracy in the world diminishes. Democracy and individual freedom were the universal human rights, thus their active support was justified. For this very reason, the United States was to be a leader in this endeavor, being the only country which had a military, diplomatic, political, and economic potential to do it. Contemporary imperial policy of America is, according to du Vall, a natural consequence of the acceptance of this neoconservative principle. The basis of the American security, in this sense, was to be the imperial strength, and the consolidated and enlightened leadership: a precondition for increasing the world security, democracy and freedom.

Kazimierz Dadak, an economist working in the United States, takes up a fascinating topic of the extent to which the Europe's monetary union could be a lesson for the United States, both as a warning and as an inspiration. He begins with a question whether the single currency and a central bank make a nation powerful. The American experience would suggest that the positive answer is not necessarily the only one available. The United States during the first century of its existence had neither, and despite this fact it was becoming an economic and political superpower fast, it reached the central-bank stage at the turn of the 20th century. If the European Union decided to create one currency and one central bank, it thus had to be convinced that such a centralization in the modern global world was a precondition for development and survival. That would suggest that a similar course would seem to

be natural in case of creating such a union as was the case with the United States in the 19th century.

The author stresses the fundamental differences in economic environments during the American and European unifications, and its corresponding different impacts on growth and employment. In the late 19th century, markets for economic resources, and especially for labor, were extremely flexible, therefore economic crises and different shocks were easily absorbed by these markets. Recessions, resulting in significant decline in prices and wages, led to a new equilibrium. Discretionary monetary policy and flexible exchange rates were not necessary in such a situation. By the end of the 20th century, the situation had radically changed. Markets for all the diverse factors defining production became much more rigid, and discretionary monetary policy and currency depreciations turned out to be effective tools of response to negative economic shocks, especially on the demand side of the equation. The European Union's economic zone is yet not economically integrated enough and does not constitute, as Dadak says, an optimum currency area, that is it is still vulnerable to asymmetric shocks, affecting some regions and leaving others intact. Because of this danger, economic decentralization seems to be a much more flexible way of responding to such situations. The European monetary integration, an introduction of the euro and the central bank, resulted in such a dangerous situation: in irrevocable fixing of the exchange rate among the member currencies and thus shifted the management of monetary policy to a supranational level. As a result, concludes Dadak, the European Union's monetary integration and centralization has become more rather than less vulnerable to the asymmetric demand-side shocks, which has consequently led to unintended consequences: a lower rate of economic growth and more unemployment than would have been experienced if the flexibility of currencies and banks had been retained.

The conclusions which might be drawn from Dadak's analysis, and which he does not state directly are striking. The creation of euro changed the international market and turned out to be a real success, dethroning the dollar as the only global currency. It also gave other countries, who would like to distance themselves from dependence on the dollar and American influence, a certain salutary field of maneuver, since they can conduct international transactions in euros, not dollars. Some countries, for various reasons, play this card consciously. According to many scholars, Saddam Hussain's decision to switch from dollars to euros in oil transactions was the last straw which made the Americans decide to invade Iraq. Iran is today playing the same game. For other states, a partial switch from dollars to euros in international transactions might be a form of economic diversification in an unpredictable, turbulent global economy. In that sense, the creation of euro and one central European bank elevated the European Union in the international market as an economic and political power. Paradoxically yet, a durability of this new political power in the international market, depends very much on the European Union's ability to sustain its economic growth across Europe, to keep up with the

outside world. And that is exactly a problem which a new monetary union might hinder, instead of facilitating. Unless one assumes – and that would be a rather dire consequence for the less developed countries – that the European Union would have two zones of development. The leaders and the less developed followers, in a permanent state of postcolonial dependency, unable to respond in a more flexible way to different economic and political challenges. If so, the monetary union in Europe at this particular historical stage, has to be looked upon less as a rational tool of economic development, but more as a means of building a political super-state, an equal player in relation with the United States and other potential contenders, with Germany being its dominant core.

One of the astonishing features of America, at least looking from the European perspective, is an experimental character of religious life there and the way religious people, mainly Christians, face the utterly unpredictable challenges of modernity. In one sense this has always been the very essence of American robust, pluralistic, and maddeningly confusing religious life, and thus the contemporary conditions of late modernity make the study of religious responses to it both familiar and original.⁵⁴ Ewa Grzeszczyk focuses on two contemporary Christian religious movements that originated in the United States. One is the so-called the Promise Keepers, gathering men, the other – Aglow International – gathers women. Both movements share similar goals. They focus on spiritual and moral revival through devotion of life to Christ, strengthening of family ties, and formation of community of people sharing similar values. Both the Promise Keepers and Aglow International oppose the dangerous phenomena of contemporary culture with its excessive individualism, a decreasing importance of local organic communities, destruction of a traditional family, a corresponding general decline of morality, rise of violence, racism, a corrupting media influence, and last but not least a decomposition of the traditional models of femininity and masculinity. This last symptom especially, is considered by both organizations to have a pernicious influence on the mutual relation between men and women, a rise of violence between sexes and the decomposition of the families.

It should be added as an introduction to the author's article that both the Promise Keepers and Aglow International constitute one of the most interesting, even if widely misunderstood and chaotic, grass roots efforts, of mainly religious people, to challenge the dysfunctional tendencies of late modernity, in which the dissolution of family, traditional marriage, and natural relations between men and women are not only consequences of a spontaneous, out-of-control developments, but these developments have been consciously promulgated by a variety of ideological lobbying groups. These groups, as e.g. the radical feminist movement or the gay movement are soliciting the aid of the state to impose their own, radically new

⁵⁴ A recent excellent overview of this development: H. Hecl, *Christianity and American Democracy*, with responses by M. J. Bane, M. Kazin, A. Wolfe, Cambridge Mass. 2007; see also: W. Russell Mead, *God's Country*, www.foreignaffairs.org/mead.reading.

vision of family life, as well as relations between men and women. The issue is not only that of individual autonomy vs. collective sense of uniformity. The issue stands at the center of contemporary liberal society where the state, by means of all instruments available, one of them being the public education, tries to impose a certain uniform system of ‘politically correct’ monistic images how a proper model of marriage and relations between women and men should look like. What is at stake is something much more fundamental and absolutely crucial to a liberal society, a right to retain control over autonomous institutions like churches and families so they can sustain their freedom and ability to teach their creeds and sovereignty of parenting.⁵⁵ One may argue that the proponents of such a liberal state want only to implement the principle of neutrality of the state where community ‘is continually being recreated by acts of the will’, whereas conservatives, including the religious and family conservatives are de-legitimized, by the very fact that they allegedly want to interpret the constitution and public policy within a framework of ‘a single community of meaning’.⁵⁶ But to put this issue in terms of such a dichotomy is a falsification or, to apply a milder accusation, an anachronism.

The problem is no longer whether society as such, including the conservative groups, religious and otherwise, has power to impose its will on the liberal state and each individual’s will which is supreme, and this morally sovereign autonomous self will be guaranteed as inviolable by the liberal state. The issue is whether the monistic image of liberal state – how the society should be organized – will be considered the only legitimate one at every level of society, preventing any autonomous institutions, as e.g. churches or families, to inculcate voluntarily their moral systems. The issue is just the ability to retain a distinction between the private and political society and the operation of the state by the means of the rule of law. If not, then this distinction is obliterated, by a more or less conscious incorporation of the New Left’s idea of ‘private is political’. In such a situation the liberal state in a monistic, ideological fashion would impose one ideology on all.⁵⁷ Thus, the problem ultimately, is not the issue of religious or family freedom for just conservatives, but the issue of freedom as such, and ultimately of the freedom, which the liberals

⁵⁵ On such a mechanism of neutralizing by parental and church teachings means of public education and to stigmatize it as ‘wrong’ to be corrected by the ‘proper one’, especially in relation to religious instruction related to marriage, sexual life, and relations between women and men in marriage in connection with the so-called ‘same-sex marriage’, see e.g.: M. Olasky, *Add, Don’t Subtract...*, pp. 96–97; D. Mack, *The Assault on Parenthood: How our Culture Undermines Parenthood*, San Francisco 1997; R. J. Neuhaus, *The Public Square*, “First Things” 2007, April, p. 64; a different perspective showing how the modern liberal state excludes the autonomous institutions as e.g. churches and families from having an impact on public policy, see an excellent book by J. Hitchcock, *The Supreme Court and Religion in American Life...*, Vol. 2, pp. 142–163.

⁵⁶ M. V. Tushnett, a leading separationist, put forth this standard liberal argument in *Red, White, and Blue: A Critical Analysis of Constitutional Law*, Cambridge Mass. 1988, p. 65.

⁵⁷ See: J. Bethke Elshtain, *The Bright Line: Liberalism and Religion*, [in:] *The Betrayal of Liberalism...*, pp. 139–156; on the advocacy of social engineering task of the liberal state to create monistic ideology, in the field of religious life, see: A. Gutman, D. Thompson, *Democracy and Disagreement*, Cambridge Mass. 1996, p. 56–58, 66–68.

allegedly defend, namely that of an autonomous individual.⁵⁸ In response to such monistic, ideological efforts on the part of the liberal state, many movements were organized in defense of their autonomy, one of them being the religious Right in the United States.

Contrary to the majority of the liberal commentators, it entered public life not because it wanted to impose particular religious views on others but because the liberal space provoked religious people, trying to impose a monistic ideology on their autonomous world. The issues of traditional family and marriage, and the relationship between women and men are crucial here. Traditional family and marriage as institutions have been battered by the legal and cultural system since the 1960s, but there have been forces which took up the challenge. These are especially private pro-marriage and family forces doing important work through churches think tanks, lobbies and other institutions. Much damage has been done especially to the critically important marriage culture by bad legislation and policy, always in the name of reform and equality. The idea that marriage is barely a consent institution without any social, let alone natural, value for the operation of viable society, has become dominant in liberal culture, especially in the United States. For this reason, it was to be privatized, with the concomitant consequences of allowing the so-called ‘same-sex marriage’ and all possible combinations of human unions, and also giving the liberal state the right to enact laws conducive to such unions inside culture. But this culture has been challenged forcefully not only by the grass roots, mainly religious and traditional organizations, but also adamantly by some of the most respected scholars inside the liberal camp.⁵⁹ Yet, this antifamily and anti traditional marriage culture has also destroyed traditional roles between men and women, to which destruction feminism contributed enormously. At the surface, the issue is simple: the roles change as everything does, and the role of women and men has to respond to it, especially in the light of the equality culture. Yet, there is a much more deeper issue involved here.

Ideological feminism begins with two basic ideas which need to be proven, and have so far been proven negatively. Nevertheless, they are being pursued relentlessly by lobbying groups, legal advocate groups, foundations, mass culture, and public policy: a particular liberal-left ideology in the name of alleged equality. The first ideological idea is the idea, most prominent in all kinds of gender feminism, that there are no natural differences between men and women. The other idea never clearly stated but implicit is an assumption that the fates men and women are to

⁵⁸ A fascinating account of this conscious effort of the liberal state to prevent a religious freedom of moral teaching in America and the leading liberal academics’ justifications of such measures as the only commensurate with a liberal society, see: J. Hitchcock, *The Enemies of Religious Freedom*, “First Things” 2004, February, pp. 26–27.

⁵⁹ An important and very influential book, showing travails of marriage in Western liberal society and demolishing the spurious arguments of the gay movement to claim the institution for itself was written by one of the most respected liberal academic sociologists, D. Blankenhorn, *The Future of Marriage*, New York 2007. Blankenhorn is also the author of an earlier widely read book showing the disintegration of fatherhood as one of the reasons of social disintegration *Fatherless America: Confronting our Most Social Problem*, New York 1995.

be in fact separate, based on power relations that is rights.⁶⁰ Such subconscious axioms lie behind the relentless pursuit of equality by feminists and their political allies who argue that the increasing prevalence of violence between men and women, i.e. mutual violence, validates such assumptions. Thus necessary further steps have thus to be taken to make equality in all [sic!] walks of life mandatory by administrative means, where a definition of equality is purely statistical and mechanical. Such a policy has incredible consequences for relations between men and women in the private realm, also in terms of autonomous institutions. They simply make the whole world of relations between women and men, in public as well as in private, including family and marriage, an object of incessant micromanagement of state regulations in a relentless pursuit of equality understood in the light of the textbooks by feminists ideologues.

It seems that the problem of men's and women's mutual relations has been wrongly stated. It has been based on false feminist assumptions. For these very reason the countermeasures cannot produce the allegedly required goal of reducing damaged relations, despite the fact, that the programs and money devoted to rectify them have been exponentially increasing. Feminism and the liberal state which is increasingly assuming the role of the hostage to its clamor, does not solve the problem, because it is a problem itself. Men and women cannot talk to each other in a complementary way because manhood was criminalized, or to put it differently, there are fewer and fewer fields of mutual encounter between men and women when manhood can be used. A feminist cringes hearing such a statement, but there is an increasing wave of studies showing how contemporary liberal culture is focused on destroying manhood and men. The issue is not one of changing roles and equality, the issue is one of uselessness of manhood, the corresponding uselessness of fatherhood, and their replacement with the ideology of parenting being put in its place, a corresponding derision of chivalric attitudes and behavior towards women, and the general anesthesia of natural differences leading to loneliness and utter indifference, with mutual callousness. The evident spread of homosexuality and the culture supporting it is another instance of this situation. It cripples both men and women, but it is exactly such a goal that feminism and the corresponding public programs seek using all the psychotherapeutic, educational, and administrative means to sustain it.

The rebuilding of roles and, together with it, of responsibility seems to be needed. In case of manhood this would probably result with a decline of patholo-

⁶⁰ See: K. Minogue, *How Civilizations Fall*, "The New Criterion" 2001, April, p. 12; W. Shalit, *A Return to Modesty: Discovering the Lost Virtue*, New York 1999. Shalit wrote one of the most influential books which caused a continuous rebellion among the young generation of educated women against gender feminism. By the same author see also: *Girls Gone Mild: Young Women Reclaim Self-Respect and Find it's Not Bad to Be Good*, New York 2007; A. Bryk, *Neokonserwatywna krytyka feminizmu i rewolucji seksualnej w amerykańskim neokonserwatywnym*, "Krakowskie Studia Międzynarodowe" 2006, No. 2, pp. 9–78; Ch. Hoff Sommers, *Who Stole Feminism: How Women Have Betrayed Women*, New York 1994; also from a conservative perspective: C. Graglia, *Domestic Tranquility: A Brief against Feminism*, Dallas 1998.

gies which are substitutes for it. The desertion of women, families and children; violence, extreme sports, senseless promiscuity available on the market, and just the not properly recognized indifference towards women, which masks an utter contempt for them are just some examples of such pathologies. The same of course affects women too, but their response is more nuanced.⁶¹ It is in this light that the movements like the Promise Keepers and Aglow International, and Marriage Savers should be looked upon, so that the most extensive context is exposed. Such movements are among the many grass roots challenges to a culture, which – behind the language of equality and fairness – created in fact a world of insecurity and total confusion between the sexes, and incidentally – hell for countless children.

Grzeszczyk shows these mass organizations as fierce critics of modern radical feminism. They point out that there is an urgent need to rebuild the traditional roles. Men's violence towards women, and the corresponding increasing violence of women towards men, understood not only as a physical brutality but also as desertion of families and an increasing inability to take up responsibility, stem, in both the Promise Keepers' and Aglow International's judgment, from a simple lack of moral Christian impulse and confusion of roles. Yet they represent another instance of a subconscious protest against an inability of the contemporary culture and institutions to recognize the uniqueness of traditional family as a civilizing force and not, as a large part of the feminist movement and the culture of equality claim, as a subconscious source of oppression, and also a protest against the cultural inability to accept in fact a persecution of any idea that one could legitimize any role for manliness and femininity. The major problem is a problem of unused, or wrongly used sexual roles, defined by the feminists and of the mass culture, as the major gain on the road to equality, based on wrongly stated initial axioms. From the Christian perspective, such a definition of the mutual roles is not only theologically wrong, it is pernicious and destructive for the very sustenance of a truly Christian personal and family life. The aforementioned movements, of mass character in America, form an antidote to such destructive tendencies, and propose a return to Christian principles, traditional values and traditional sexual roles to their members.

The movements, portrayed by the liberal media and feminist organizations as conservative, reactionary religious revival groups against liberal culture – a standard term of abuse, contempt and stigmatization of other thinking people, so profusely employed by the contemporary liberal left – constitute nevertheless an interesting self defensive response to the utter license of the liberal culture and its corruptive influence on all aspects of personal and communal life in late liberal modernity. In this sense, they are a potent reminder of the American bottom-up ability of self-

⁶¹ On the problem of attack on men and boys in contemporary liberal culture, especially in mass culture and public education, see: Ch. Hoff Sommers, *The War against Boys: How Misguided Feminism is Harming our Young Men*, New York 2000; D. Mack, *The Assault on Parenthood...*; on the concept of unused manhood as a source of dysfunctional relations between men and women see: H. Mansfield, *Manliness*, New Haven 2006; W. Shalit, *A Return to Modesty...*

help and self-organization to face new challenges. Despite all the eccentric features of the movements involved, they constitute an example of a robust plurality and vitality of the American civil society. Even if, in some doctrinal aspects and concrete social practices, both Promise Keepers and Aglow International seem to succumb to the very culture they so valiantly oppose.

The last article in a section devoted to the various American and European responses to modernity, tries to look at contemporary subcultures in the United States. Studies of contemporary subcultures stem from a number of sources. One is a modern liberal-left fascination with societal rebels living on the margins, the ubiquitous experience of the first generations of the liberal left contestants, especially of the radical counter-cultural, new left type. Their key battle cry was ‘liberation’, a way to a final emancipation from the constraints of the oppressive American society and a means of secular salvation through communes, sex, drugs, crime and ‘opting out’. This romantic-decadent type of rebellion made subculture as such and its hero a staple of mass culture. This was visible in the writings of such writers as Norman Mailer and Jack Kerouac, and in cult films including *The Easy Rider*, *Bullitt*, and *One Flew over the Cuckoo’s Nest*. Such artistic genre, although popular for some time, was quickly bought by the mass market as an excellent commodity, and simply became a caricature of itself.⁶² Yet the total rebel as a hero, escaping into drugs, sex, abnegation and withdrawal, managed in the meantime to condemn to hell innumerable lives of young people, seduced by an image of an unrestrained life. The legacy of this rebellion, which afflicted overwhelmingly the young people from the lower classes, since they had no safety net behind them, is still visible in the ghettos of the American cities and in an obsession with the psychotherapeutic approach to life.⁶³

But the other approach to subcultures, in its wider sociological aspects, stresses the essentially modern character of them, one of the consequences of a gradual dissolution of small, homogenous, organic communities. These communities have been replaced by more diverse and complex societies, with individualism being the king, and moral auto-creation – the source of the only legitimate behavior, turning people into a more and more disintegrated mass. They progressively recede to smaller and smaller communities, finally of one, and change identities of choice, fluctuating between institutions, groups, partners, and religions. Choice of an autonomous subject is the absolute criterion of good living. It is in relation to this second understanding of subcultures, which contains also the first form mentioned above, that Katarzyna Skawińska tries to answer what they look like in contemporary America, and how they can be measured. She shows such societies as being composed of numerous smaller and smaller groups, sharing different beliefs,

⁶² For an excellent analysis of this phenomenon as early as in 1958, see: N. Podhoretz, *The Know-Nothing Bohemians*, [in:] *The Norman Podhoretz Reader*, ed. Th. L. Jeffers, New York 2004, pp. 29–40.

⁶³ Ch. Woltermann, *Reflections on the Therapeutic Safe*, [in:] *Making Sense of Modernity*, ed. P. Gottfried, “This World. An Annual of Religion and Public Policy” 1993, No. 28, pp. 18–27.

customs and interests of their autonomous choice, distinct from the larger society. Although a destruction of the very idea of the overwhelming, controlling social norm for all is today an assumption taken for granted, and we might say that everybody is a member of a particular subculture, Skawińska focuses essentially on the common sense observation that there are groups which are off the mainstream society. Such groups may have many cultural aspects which connect them to the mainstream culture, but they are definitely distinct and diverse, establishing boundaries which set them off and also isolate from the rest of society. They form entities which sociologists refer to as subcultures, on the basis of particular norms, values and behaviors. Skawińska looks into diverse interactions and patterns of behavior within subcultures, and analyzes different theories of subcultures, focusing particularly on their youth and delinquency-related forms. At the end, she tries to contrast her understanding of counterculture with subculture, and discusses the latter's different styles. Subcultures have always been present within human societies, not necessarily always frowned upon. They have played different roles, and were tolerated, if only out of an understanding of fragility of life and its imperfectability. Nevertheless, they were never looked upon as value neutral entities, since societies were based on a formation of character as its goal, which made hierarchy of virtues a prerequisite for noble and good life. The present modern society seems to withdraw value qualifications. It seems incapable, out of fear of oppression and symbolic violence and out of a lack of any universal moral point of view, to pass judgment on any behavior which contravenes any social norms, treating all of them just as arbitrarily as any subculture norms. A doctrine of modern New Tolerance and the commercial potential of the subculture image, seem thus to be conducive to a general anomie and lack of resistance towards disintegration and atomization of a modern liberal society, the mood brilliantly captured by one of the most perceptive analysts of subcultures writing today, Theodore Dalrymple.⁶⁴

How to face Western modernity and modernization has always been a painful, dramatic problem and a challenge for peoples who have not experienced the Enlightenment and have been remote to the western cultural pattern. It is a fascinating problem for the scholars, the very essence of postcolonial thinking, globalization, and multiculturalism. Among the western nations it has also been visible in the context of Western and Eastern Europe after the latter was accepted to the European Union. Eastern Europe belonged to the West for a millennium, but has barely been touched by the cultural pattern of the Enlightenment characterizing only liberal elites. Modernization in its western model, the scientific and rational model most successful in transforming and controlling the world during the last half of the millennium – is basically a story of a clash between two incompatible cultures. One has considered itself technically and organizationally stronger, at a higher stage of development and planning to accomplish a modernizing conquest of the inferior one. The other, resisting, trying to find ways of accommodation and

⁶⁴ Th. Dalrymple, *Our Culture, What's Left of it: The Mandarins and the Masses*, Chicago 2005.

survival, was brewing with resentment. Therefore, modernization has long been considered by many scholars, at least since Michel Mann or Hans Jonas, a violent process, physically as well as symbolically. Such studies put aside the rosy self-images of the Western world bringing benevolent progress to other non-Western people, the idea of the Enlightenment as an essentially optimistic march of progress. Modernization has thus long been recognized not only as a harmonious and happy process of incessant economic, political, cultural, even moral progress, where all are victors in the end and no one becomes a victim, but an ambiguous and torturous experience. It has often been a history of incredible violence, rape and plundering, often by war and conquest, where the weak were simply exterminated or reduced to a state of dependency, at best transformed to become new people. Such modernization has always been a part of the internal story of the West. One has only to remember the modernization of the East in medieval Europe, especially of Prussia and Lithuania, a process of civilizational progress mixed with the acts of merciless conquest and colonization.

The most dramatic question for a weaker civilization which has to face the stronger even if a benevolent one, has always been whether the iron law of history is inexorable, whether a submission has to be total, and last but not least – whether there are parts of a weaker civilization which can or must be saved, and what the best means of doing that are. And finally, whether the stronger civilization, even the benevolent one, is ready to negotiate and accommodate the wishes of the weaker ones, or whether it demands only an unconditional surrender. Whatever a face of modernization and the intensions of the stronger civilization, the weaker one has a limited choice. It faces destruction or intelligent adaptation to a new situation, trying to test in practice which parts of its traditions can be carried towards the future intact and which have to be abandoned, and what methods of adaptation are the most efficient.

The eternal question of the main protagonist of Giuseppe Lampedusa's *Leopard*: "how to change everything so everything can stay the same" is also the question of the modernized and the modernizing elites. The non-Western colonized people faced a real drama here. Nowhere was the such a modernization more visible than in the case of the North American Indians. The Indians faced it acutely but for the majority it was an instinctual resistance. Modernization *vis a vis* colonial and then state and federal United States imposition, was mainly thought of as a case of conquest, and a corresponding burning desire of resentment and resistance. The enemy's power was simply not clearly recognized, or simply a question of identity and honor was the overwhelming value worth dying for. The Sitting Bulls and Crazy Horses of the Plains fed the heroic imagination of the succeeding generations, but their resistance did not save their people. There were Indians, however, who were able to face this danger and decided to modernize along the Western, white man's path in order to survive.

Although their efforts turned out to be to a large extent futile, it is worth considering them an interesting case of adaptation in the face of a stronger enemy. Some North American Indian tribes at the beginning of the 19th century took up such a challenge.

Magdalena Butrymowicz analyzes such a problem of modernization and survival in the context of the Cherokee Indian People and their attempt to transform and adapt to the white man's modes of organization and thinking, without rejecting own cultural identity at the same time. The Cherokee Indian People belongs to the Five Civilized Nations of North America. They were named thus by colonists, because they chose to modernize along the white man's path. The Cherokee Nation was the first which started transformation in this direction. Yet, the change, although altering the tribe's certain features, was also to preserve its culture, language, tradition, and ancestors' law. A decision to transform along a modern, American way was taken up at the beginning of the 19th century. Then, the Cherokee nation enacted numerable written laws, established the capital of their state, organized state financial structure, created the judicial system, and finally wrote and passed state constitution. The first written constitution of native North Americans was a compilation of English and tribal law. It was based on the American model, especially in the parts that concerned the power sharing and taxation system. The Cherokee effort of twenty eight years of state building crowned with a written constitution, was a dramatic attempt to create a constitutional state as the only way to survive modernization of the western, white man's type. It constituted an interesting example of a nation that – in the face of the overwhelming odds of hostile colonization, and facing cultural annihilation – took up a task of thinking through the ways of how to survive and retain their identity at the same time.

The last articles in the volume deal with various specific aspects of American history. Piotr Michalik analyzes the Charter of Maryland as a particular type of English colonial charters, issued by the Crown since the end of the 15th century, depending on the character of the subject at hand. He depicts two types of charters, corporate and proprietary ones, showing how they were based, in form and in content, on medieval models and treated as privileges, gradually strictly limited in England, but used in the colonies. The Charter of Maryland occupied a special place among such charters, being the exemplary case of the so-called Durham type. The author analyzes its text in detail, focusing on the structure and the content of this proprietary charter, which provides an additional insight into important political, social, and economic issues shaping the character of the 17th-century English colonialism.

Michał Chlipała, is the only *polonicum* in the volume. His work is devoted to the Polish contribution to the formation of the US Army beginning with the War of Independence (1775–1781) and continuing to the Civil War (1861–1865), with a special stress put on the latter. The Civil War stays at the center of the author's narrative. The Polish Americans fought on both sides of the Civil War, or as the

Southerners prefer to call it, the War between the States, the largest and the bloodiest conflict on the territory of the United States. Chlipała shows the origins and motivations of particular Polish immigrant groups that decided to take part in the conflict on the side of the Union and the Confederacy, trying to assess their real contribution to the war. He indicates that the real number of soldiers of Polish origin on both sides of the conflict is difficult to assess but concludes that Polish historians have probably a tendency to underestimate their total number. The article concludes with a predictable observation, that the Polish soldiers' primary motivation in the war was to fight for freedom that they understood the best way they could in particular conditions, and at the time when their state did not exist. This was done in the conditions of strong intolerance and many prejudices towards the Poles on the part of the American society.

A new part of the American issue of the Kraków International Studies introduced in this volume is a section called "Archive". Its aim is to commemorate significant authors and books which decisively influenced the course of American history in the 20th century. We publish here an excerpt from a book by Russell Kirk, *The Conservative Mind. From Burke to Eliot*, of which the 55th anniversary is just passing. The book, published in 1953 is universally acclaimed to be the intellectual stepping stone for the modern American conservative movement. The revolt against the dominant progressive and statist course of American liberalism was intellectually prepared several years earlier when Friedrich Hayek (1899–1992) published *The Road to Serfdom* in 1944, Richard Weaver (1910–1963) issued his *Ideas have Consequences* in 1948, and Peter Viereck's (1916–2006) *Conservatism: From John Adams to Churchill* was published in 1956. Hayek tried to show the calamitous consequences of the ubiquitous state intervention in the economy, warning against its totalitarian potential, irrespective of an ideological banner under which this has been done, whether liberalism, fascism or communism. Weaver located sources of the loss of cohesion and disintegration of the Christianitas, and a consequential loss of freedom in the medieval nominalist revolution. Both extremely challenging and stimulating his work made a huge intellectual impact but barely rippled the surface of American political life at the time of their publishing. Hayek was universally considered a crank, hopelessly geared to a reactionary past of the anarchistic free market by the new Keynesian economic orthodoxy, busily creating the New Deal welfare state. Weaver was considered to be so hopelessly philosophical and out-of-touch with the American optimistic spirit that his book was just considered a nice utopian cry in the wilderness, comparable to the ghetto of the Southern Agrarians, of whom he was considered to be the late son. Viereck in turn was too academic and aloof, too Olympian, and in fact too damn aristocratically British. The aforementioned books stirred the intellectual imagination but never touched the heart. With Kirk it was different. Kirk (1918–1994) seemed to be the least suited candidate for resurrecting American conservatism which, since the rise of progressive liberalism at the turn of the 20th century, through the Great Cri-

sis and the rise of the New Deal, was considered to be brain dead, intellectually as well as politically. Moreover, Kirk was far away from the only branch of traditional liberalism most likely to be revived, one that had a venerable tradition in America. The latter, challenged by progressive liberalism of state intervention, soon changed its name to more proper conservative liberalism of the free market opposing the welfare state. Hayek was the most prominent representative of this type of conservatism. Yet Kirk was a classical European traditionalist in a true sense of the word, which meant he was an American reactionary. For this reason, he seemed to be least likely to make any impact.

At face value, his brand of conservatism looked hopelessly anti-American. It was nostalgic and pessimistic, more akin to the Southern school of melancholic Agrarians, out-of-touch with industrial, urban America of the mid-20th century. Nevertheless, he made a tremendous difference, cultural as well as political. For one, he represented one of the several streams of the conservative coalition soon-to-be-risen-from-ashes, comprising all anti-progressive, anti-state, and anti-communist forces. For two reasons some find mysterious, Kirk's book touched the heart and the nerve of these Americans resisting the progressive temptation of the modern state. It also captured the imagination of the young conservatives. He clearly stated the creed of real conservatism, which was antipodal to modern debilitating individualism leading to anarchy, and as a result to the totalitarianism of a regulatory state. This was conservatism which cherished an ordered liberty. With such an initial definition, Kirk tied conservatism to the whole tradition of American republicanism of the founding, constitutional generation. This part of the American tradition was buried under the Lockean monism of Louis Hartz's type liberalism, as exemplified in the latter's seminal book *The Liberal Tradition in America* of 1955.⁶⁵ This new, but as Kirk argued, in fact recovered tradition of American conservative republicanism, stretching from still English, but already pro-American Edmund Burke, through Alexander Hamilton and John Adams, to George Santayana and again English Thomas S. Eliot, attacked the progressive and statist liberalism as a form of debasing relativism. Kirk attacked this brand of liberalism in the name of natural law, which he popularized under the banner of 'moral imagination'. The term having been coined by Burke and later used by a host of conservative cultural critics in America including Paul Elmer More and Irving Babbitt, was a philosophical concept to be applied in response to modern ideological, relativist and statist challenges. It referred to man's intuitive power to perceive ethical truths and abiding law in the midst of the seeming chaos of the surrounding experience. According to Kirk, it is imagination and not calculating reason that elevates man above the animals. Kirk stressed an indispensable role of religion and mores which were the preconditions for a civilized life and free society. He firmly stood by the fundamental moral principles staring in the face of modernity's chaos and professing belief in

⁶⁵ L. Hartz, *The Liberal Tradition in America: An Interpretation of American Political Thought since the Founding*, New York 1955.

an adage of his English brother in spirit John Ronald Reuel Tolkien, one of whose heroes, Gandalf, remarked: 'we choose only how we live our life, and not the times in which it passes'. Kirk's book seemed to be too utopian, too romantic and too out-of-this-world, as another American conservative, Willmoore Kendall (1909–1967), remarked, and apparently at face value seemed useless in America. This prediction, however, turned out to be wrong. The book became immensely popular, conveying an image of American civilization as a part of the universal Western civilization, it tied American conservatism to the very depth of its heritage and put the liberal progressive thought on the defensive.

It also made conservatism respectable again. This applied especially to the American youth of a conservative disposition. The deadening monopoly and conformity of American postwar progressive liberalism, its self-obsession with rationalization, planning, and consumption was soon to unravel and liberalism went down in smoke. For a substantial part of the American youth, a rebellion took on a form of counter cultural and anti-American immolation. But for another, less colorful and less exhibitionist, but nevertheless substantial part, for whom progressive liberalism was dead, but the anti-American and antinomian counterculture was a road to nowhere, "The Conservative Mind" formulated a certain alternative. It searched for the reinvigoration of the American tradition in this tradition itself, coupling it with the universal framework of western heritage. It formulated the intellectual dream of a better society in a conservative language. These two silently flowing streams of the American cultural war, exploded in the 1960s.

The book was beautifully written, a real transforming experience for a pragmatic intellectual tradition in America, with its post-war sober, technocratic, process-oriented liberalism. It recovered the metaphysical language and the metaphysical dream in the best tradition of American millenarian and covenantal sensibility. Even if the political reality of the next generation America rarely mirrored the dream of the book, for the generation which was brought up on it, its memory has remained to this day. For the conservative young it was a gem of fresh air in a technocratic society. The book was a call to more than conservatism. It was a call to recover a classical tradition of political philosophy against materialism, logic, and technological regimentation of the American liberal mind obsessed with 'science', a call for a cultivation of the mind and soul in increasingly mindless circumstances. The book was inspired by the same spark of rebelliousness that soon brought America's youth to the countercultural barricades. Kirk was a spark of conservative counterculture which a generation later brought to power Ronald Reagan, and America was never the same again. For this reason his book changed America, and that is why it is duly reminded here in the form of a reprint of Kirk's principles of conservatism found at the end of his book.

The very last part of the issue is a short "Note", focused on one of the most important Supreme Court decisions, namely, *Dartmouth College v Woodward* of 1819. Monika Zbrojewska shows how this decision formulated the judicial basis for the

explosive expansion of American institutions and corporations, and contributed to a rapid economic development, making the expansion to the West possible. In the annals of American history the case is well known, while outside America it is, if noticed, grossly underestimated. The analysis of the 'Dartmouth College v Woodward' case in this issue is a bow towards the wider popularization of American history and its civilization. Beginning with this issue, Archive and Note are permanently added to the content of each of the American issues.