Metaphysical Foundationalism: a New Form of Justification

• Authors: Kulieshov Aleksandr

Title variants

RU

Метафизический фундаментализм: новая форма

• Languages of publication: EN

Abstracts

EN

A new set of metaphysical arguments in favour of fundamental reality is proposed in the article. For this purpose the notion of the state of the world is introduced. The standard concept of grounding underlying metaphysical foundationalism is taken into account. The correspondence of the new notion and the initial principles of metaphysical fundamentalism are confirmed. The proof of fundamental reality existence is represented based on formulated principles and empirical data.

RU

Статья предлагает новый набор метафизических аргументов в пользу фундаментальной реальности. Для этой цели вводится понятие состояния мира. Учитывается стандартная основополагающая концепция метафизического фундаментализма. Подтверждается соответствие нового понятия и исходных принципов метафизического фундаментализма. На основе сформулированных принципов и эмпирических данных представляются доказательства существования фундаментальной реальности.

Keywords

EN

metaphysical fundamentalism; grounding relation; entity; state of the world; fundamental reality

RU

метафизический фундаментализм; основополагающая связь; сущность; состояние мира; фундаментальная реальность

• Publisher: Altezoro s.r.o. (Slovak Republic) and Publishing Center "Dialog" (Ukraine)
• Journal: Path of Science
• Year: 2016
• Volume: 2
• Issue: 12(17)
• Pages: 3.1-3.9

Dates

published

2016-12-06

Contributors

author

Kulieshov Aleksandr

• Cherkasy State Technological University

References

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Identifiers

DOI

10.22178/pos.17-3